Rong-ston on Buddha-Nature by Bernert, Christian Andreas
 
 
 
D I P L OM A R B E I T 
 
Titel der Diplomarbeit 
 
„Rong-ston on Buddha-Nature: 
A Commentary on the Fourth Chapter of 
the Ratnagotravibhāga (vv.1.27–95[a])” 
 
 
Verfasser 
Christian Bernert 
 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
Magister der Philosophie (Mag. phil.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Wien, im April 2009 
 
Studienkennzahl laut Studienblatt:  A 057 011 
Studienrichtung laut Studienblatt:  Indiv. Dipl. Stud. Religionswissenschaft 
Betreuer:     Priv.-Doz. Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes 
 
 
 
 
 
Content 
 
Foreword and acknowledgements................................................................................... 3 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 5 
1. The doctrine of buddha-nature.................................................................................... 7 
1.1. Overview............................................................................................................... 7 
1.2. Sources.................................................................................................................. 8 
1.2.1. The sūtras ...................................................................................................... 8 
1.2.2. The śāstras ................................................................................................... 11 
2. The Ratnagotravibhāga ............................................................................................. 14 
2.1. The text of the Ratnagotravibhāga ..................................................................... 14 
2.2. The question of the authorship of the Ratnagotravibhāga ................................. 15 
2.3. The Ratnagotravibhāga in India ......................................................................... 16 
2.4. The Ratnagotravibhāga in Tibet......................................................................... 17 
2.4.1. The analytical school of Blo-ldan shes-rab.................................................. 18 
2.4.2. The meditative school of Btsan Kha-bo-che.................................................21  
2.5. Previous studies and the aim of the present work .............................................. 22 
3. Rong-ston and his presentation of buddha-nature .................................................... 25 
3.1. A short glimpse at the life of Rong-ston Shes-bya kun-rig................................ 25 
3.2. Rong-ston’s presentation of buddha-nature ....................................................... 31 
3.2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 31 
3.2.2. The buddha excellences and the dharmakāya.............................................. 33 
3.2.3. The dhātu as a cause..................................................................................... 36 
3.2.4. The gotra and the luminous nature of the mind........................................... 37 
3.2.5. Rong-ston and the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā ........................................... 40 
3.2.6. Summary ...................................................................................................... 41 
4. Translation of Rong-ston’s commentary on RGV I.27–95[a] .................................. 43 
4.1. Notes on the translation ...................................................................................... 43 
4.2. The translation .................................................................................................... 45 
Bibilography................................................................................................................ 109 
Appendices .................................................................................................................. 119 
Appendix I: Outline of the translation (sa bcad)..................................................... 119 
Appendix II: Zusammenfassung und Lebenslauf (German) ........................... 123, 125 
Appendix III: Tibetan text ....................................................................................... 129 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Foreword and acknowledgements 
 
This work is, to me, a perfect example for dependent arising (Skt. pratītyasamutpāda) 
and I feel very fortunate to have been able to spend all this time “producing” it. Many 
people, many events, and many states of mind contributed and worked together, 
assisting me in the process.   
First of all I would like to thank my parents for their generous support over the years 
to which I owe my entire education, and for their continuous encouragements; I am 
very grateful to them.  
My interest in the studies of religions in general and in Buddhist studies in particular 
manifested itself in the year 2000, after an extended visit to India and Nepal with its 
many sacred Buddhist sites. Subsequently I enrolled at the University of Vienna to 
study comparative religions and Tibetan and Buddhist studies, and at the International 
Buddhist Academy in Kathmandu where I spent several of my summer holidays 
studying traditional Buddhist treatises with Tibetan scholars. One of the texts I 
encountered in Nepal was to become the subject of this present work. I am therefore 
particularly indepted to Khenpo Dr. Ngawang Jorden who introduced me to this text 
and with whom I had the opportunity to spend many hours discussing the various 
questions that came up in the course of my research. Also, I would like to thank him 
for letting me use his yet to be published dissertation.  
In the years 2004 and 2005 Prof. Klaus-Dieter Mathes from the University of 
Hamburg was a visiting professor at the Department of South Asian, Tibetan and 
Buddhist Studies in Vienna. As I was already looking for a suitable subject for my 
M.A. thesis at this time and my interests concurred with Prof. Mathes’ fields of 
research, I asked him to be my advisor to which he kindly consented. Initially, I chose 
a religious biography of a Tibetan master from the last century as the subject of this 
M.A. thesis. After a few months of research however, I found this enterprise to exceed 
the scope of my abilities and decided to drop it, with both reluctance and a sense of 
release at the same time. With Rong-ston’s commentary on a classical treatise on 
buddha-nature I soon found a more suitable subject. I want to thank Prof. Mathes for 
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his patience and for supporting me in pursuing my personal interests, as well as for his 
able guidance and his many suggestions and corrections that helped me produce this 
work. 
From the outset of my journey into the world of Tibetan Buddhism literature until 
today, I have had the opportunity to study the Tibetan language under a number of 
teachers both native speakers and western scholars. All of them played their part in 
this puzzle and I want to express my gratitude towards all of them, mentioning in 
particular Genla Jamyang Zangpo, Dr. Horst Lasic, Dr. Helmut Tropper, and Dr. 
Junjie Chu. My understanding of the Sanskrit language, though only rudimentary, I 
owe to Prof. Karin Preisendanz––I hope to nurture the seeds she sew in my 
ālayavijñāna.  
I am thankful to Prof. Max Deeg, Prof. Johann Figl, Prof. Birgit Heller, and Dr. Hans 
Gerald Hödl for teaching me the basics and methodology of religious studies. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Kazuo Kano for kindly allowing me to use his 
dissertation closely related to my subject, Dr. Mamoru Kobayashi for sending me his 
articles, Karen White and Eugene Romaniuk for helping me polish my English, Mag. 
Markus Viehbeck and Dr. Anne MacDonald for their useful suggestions, as well as 
Barbara Schaffer to whom I could always run when I was troubled by the Sanskrit and 
who has been supporting me all along.   
Last but not least, I want to thank Geshe Sherab Gyaltsen Amipa for introducing me to 
Tibetan Buddhism in general and to the teachings of the Sa-skya tradition in particular. 
His teachings and his presence have always been a great source of inspiration to me.     
 
It is evident that this work is, in fact, a work in progress. There are bound to be 
mistakes (for which I want to apologise at this place), and I certainly could have 
continued correcting it ad infinitum. At best, I hope it can contribute to our 
understanding of a chapter of the Tibetan Buddhist religion. At least, I hope not to 
distort my author’s views in presenting my necessarily limited understanding of his 
treatise.  
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Introduction 
 
Set within the broader framework of Buddhist world view, the fundamental concern of 
the Tathāgatagarbha literature is to show that all sentient beings, without exception, 
can attain freedom from every kind of suffering and unease, and, ultimately, actualise 
the state of a fully awakened buddha. According to these scriptures, all sentient beings 
are by their very nature either empowered to attain buddhahood, or essentially already 
buddhas (depending on the interpretation). This innate quality of all sentient beings is 
given the name “buddha-nature” (Skt. tathāgatagarbha; Tib. de bzhin gshegs pa’i 
snying po).  
This doctrine has played an important role in the history of Buddhism. Although 
rudimentary elements of this doctrine can be identified already within the Pāli canon,1 
those passages relating to the natural luminosity of the mind, which is said to be 
temporarily stained by adventitious mental afflictions, required the emergence of the 
Mahāyāna movement before developing into a fully fledged doctrine in its own right. 
Since it is supported by a number of sūtras2 and śāstras (i.e. the Buddhist canon 
composed of the Buddha’s sermons and the Indian commentarial literature), it can be 
regarded as a third school of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist thought, the other two being 
Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.3 However, the concept of buddha-nature reached its 
apogee not in India but in East Asia and Tibet where it became a cornerstone for 
Buddhist philosophy and religious practice. In Tibet, in particular, this concept was 
treated diversely by many scholars, all of whom were ambitious to fit it into the 
                                                 
1 For example in AN I.v, 9: “This mind, O monks, is luminous! But it is defiled by adventitious 
defilements.” (After Mathes 2008: ix.) See also Takasaki 1966: 34–35. 
2 A prevalent doxographical classification of Buddhist sūtras distinguishes between the so called “three 
turnings of the Dharma-wheel” (a concept introduced in the Sandhinirmocanasūtra). Scriptures of the 
first turning fundamentally discuss the four noble truths as expounded in Nikāya Buddhism which 
represents the common ground for all traditions and the basic framework for all Buddhist teachings. 
Sūtras from second turning emphasise the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) as expounded in the 
Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, and those of the third teach the about the three natures (trisvabhāva), the latter 
two being classified as belonging to the Mahāyāna corpus. The sūtras on buddha-nature are generally 
regarded as belonging to the third turning.   
3 As Seyfort Ruegg (1969: 2) remarks, the language used in the tathāgatagarbha treatises differs 
noticeably from that of the other two schools, and even comes suspiciously close to that of the Vedānta. 
Indeed, a number of modern scholars have accused this doctrine to be alien to Buddhist thought, an 
accusion refuted by others. For a collection of articles on this topic see Hubbard and Swanson 1997.  
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philosophical framework of their own respective schools. Rong-ston Shes-bya kun-rig 
(1367–1449) of the Sa-skya tradition of Tibetan Buddhism figures among the most 
influential of these scholars. In general, his commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga, the 
main Indian śāstra on buddha-nature, and in particular, a translation of his exposition 
of the subject by means of ten categories, will be the focus of this work.  
In the first chapter I will introduce the doctrine of buddha-nature, giving a brief 
account of its sources and formation. The second chapter will deal with the main 
treatise on buddha-nature, the Ratnagotravibhāga. Here, I will present the text itself, 
discuss the question of its authorship, as well as its transmission in India and early 
reception in Tibet. This chapter will also include a brief overview of previous studies 
on the Ratnagotravibhāga and the doctrine of buddha-nature. The third chapter will be 
devoted to the author of our treatise and his presentation of the subject. The final and 
main part of the work will consist of an annotated translation of a selected passage of 
his abovementioned commentary. 
Throughout this work I have used the transliteration system of Turrell Wylie for the 
Tibetan.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Cf. Wylie 1959. 
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1. The doctrine of buddha-nature 
1.1. Overview:  
The expression tathāgatagarbha is a Sanskrit compound consisting of the terms 
tathāgata (an epithet of the Buddha) and garbha which can signify “womb” (or simply 
“inside, interior”) and “embryo” (and semantically related concepts such as “essence”, 
“offspring” and so forth), as well as “to contain” when used at the end of a bahuvrīhi 
compound.5 According to Zimmermann, this last option is precisely the intended 
meaning tathāgatagarbha had in its earliest instances in the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, 
which he renders with “[sentient beings] contain a tathāgata.”6 For later treatises 
however, the tatpuruṣa interpretation of the term seems to be suitable in most cases. 
According to this interpretation, beings can be said to have the garbha of a tathāgata.7 
This twofold interpretation of the term is also reflected in the Ratnagotravibhāga, the 
main śāstra on the subject, which supports both concepts as we shall see below.8  
 
Why teach buddha-nature? 
Schmithausen has argued that Buddhist philosophical theories, in many cases, have 
their roots in spiritual practices, rather than in mere theoretical considerations.9  
One fact supporting his theory in the case of the doctrine of buddha-nature would be 
that the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra,10 the earliest sūtra to mention the term tathāgata-
garbha, illustrates the presence of buddha-nature in sentient beings by means of the 
nine similes, without giving theoretical explanations for this statement. Rather, it is 
                                                 
5 In the last case, the first part of the compound denotes what is being contained in the subject the whole 
compound refers to. Cf. Zimmermann 2002: 40–41. 
6 Cf. Zimmermann 2002: 43–44. 
7 For a detailed analysis of this term see Zimmermann 2002: 40–46 and Sefort Ruegg 1969: 507–514.  
8 It is interesting to note that the Tibetan translators rendered garbha in this expression with snying po 
(“essence, heart, core”), leaving no room for the “womb” meaning of the term. Chinese translators, on 
the other hand, usually used the term tsang (“storehouse”), which could be an indication for the 
promixity between the concepts tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna as attested in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra 
for example. Cf. Sefort Ruegg 1969: 501–505. 
9 Schmithausen illustrates this by showing how the Yogācāra doctrine of “Mind Only” (cittamatrā), the 
doctrine of the momentariness of all phenomena, as well as the “Mahāyāna illusionism,” all have been 
mentioned at their earliest instances in contexts related to spiritual practices and mystical experiences. 
Cf. Schmithausen 1973. 
10 See below for a short analysis of this sūtra. 
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presented as being the buddha’s own realisation, or as his special vision.11 In the 
Śrīmālādevīsūtra––another fundamental scripture for the formation of this doctrine––
the tathāgatagarbha is said to be a profound teaching beyond the reach of the intellect 
and accessible a tathāgata alone.12 Along these lines, the Ratnagotravibhāga states that 
the ultimate truth of the buddhas (which in this context stands for the buddhas’ 
realisation that all beings have buddha-nature) can be understood by faith alone.13 All 
of this, following Schmithausen, would indicate that some sort of spiritual experience 
must have predated the formulation of the buddha-nature theory.  
Furthermore, the Ratnagotravibhāga itself gives pedagogical legitimisation for the 
formulation of this doctrine.14 We read that buddha-nature has been taught in order to 
eliminate five faults or obstacles on the path, namely: the feeling of discouragement 
(līnaṃ cittam), contempt against inferior beings (hīnasattveṣvavajñā), holding the 
untrue [to be true] (abhūtagrāha), disparaging the true nature (bhūtadharmāpavāda), 
and attachment to the self (ātmasneha). These are the practical reasons for introducing 
this concept into the doctrinal system. In this way, the doctrine of buddha-nature can 
be viewed as being directly relevant for Buddhist practice.  
 
1.2.  Sources 
1.2.1. The sūtras: 
With the emergence of the Mahāyāna movement, between 300 and 400 years after the 
Buddha’s passing, the spiritual goal to be achieved by the followers of the Buddhist 
path was no longer reserved for the ordained members among his followers, but (in 
theory) made accessible to all, monks and nuns, laymen and laywomen alike.15 In a 
fundamental scripture of the Mahāyāna, the so-called Lotussūtra (Saddharma-
puṇḍarīkasūtra), the principal spiritual ideal of the arhat is replaced by that of the 
                                                 
11 Zimmermann 2002: 104ff. 
12 Cf. Wayman and Wayman 1974: 96. 
13 Cf. RGV I.153. 
14 Cf. RGV I.157 and I.161–167. 
15 This opposition ordained-lay excludes a third category of vow-holders called gomin, which, being of 
marginal importance, has been left out for convenience sake. Gomins have a somewhat ambiguous 
status, being celibate and wearing religious robes, without, however, holding the vows of novices or 
fully ordained monks. On this see Sefort Ruegg 2004: 24–27. 
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bodhisattva, who strives not to bring his personal suffering alone to an end, but rather 
to attain the state of buddhahood for the sake of all beings.16 Arhatship is presented as 
an inferior, temporary result offered by the Buddha to the tired spiritual adept, 
whereas in actuality all beings are to strive for the ultimate goal of buddhahood. 
Although the concept of buddha-nature does not appear in this sūtra, its roots can, 
according to Zimmermann, be traced back to it.17 One simile in particular (used in the 
Lotussūtra to illustrate sentient beings’ wish to attain omniscience) shows great 
similarity with a simile from the later Tathāgatagarbhasūtra.18  
Another early scripture important in the history of the formation of tathāgatagarbha 
doctrine is the Avataṃsakasūtra, the earliest portions of which were translated into 
Chinese in the early third century CE. A key concept found therein is that of the 
buddha’s gnosis (buddhajñāna) pervading and therefore being present in all sentient 
beings.19  
 
It is in the abovementioned Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, dated back to the second half of the 
third century CE,20 that we find the expression “tathāgatagarbha” for the first time.21 
The core of the text consists of the illustration of this concept by means of nine 
similes.22 According to Zimmermann, the idea conveyed by means of these similes is 
                                                 
16 In the early scriptures, where the term bodhisattva is mainly used to denote Buddha Śākyamūni when 
referring to his previous lives, not everyone is encouraged to become a bodhisattva. Of the three goals–
arhatship, pratyekabuddhahood and perfect buddhahood–the first is understood to be the most 
accessible one and the last the most exalted, reserved for rare individuals of superior capacity alone. 
However, arhats too are noted for their efforts for the benefit of beings. In the Jinna Sutta (SN 16.5) for 
instance, the Buddha praises his arhat disciple Mahākassapa for practising for the welfare and benefit of 
others. As noted by Rahula (1971: 70), references to the bodhisattva ideal can be found in the Pāli 
scriptures. They are, however, relatively rare and widely dispersed. 
17 Cf. Zimmermann 2006: 21–23. 
18 In the simile in question, a wealthy benefactor sews a jewel into man’s coat without the latter’s 
knowledge. The man then goes on a journey, loses his wealth and lives, ignoring his secret possession, 
in poverty until his long lost friend reveals it to him. The friend represents the Buddha who has 
awakened the wish to attain omniscience for all beings. 
19 This passage is quoted in RGVV I.25 (Cf. Johnston 1950: 22, 10–11). 
20 The original Sanskrit of this sūtra is no longer extant. The earliest translation of this sūtra into 
Chinese dates, according to ancient catalogues, from the end of the third century CE. Cf. Zimmermann 
2002: 69–74 and p. 77–79.  
21 For a analysis of this compound see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 499–516; and Zimmermann 2002: 39–46, 
for its use in the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra in particular. 
22 The tathāgatagarbha present within all sentient beings is said to be similar to: 1) tathāgatas, sitting in 
putrid lotus flowers; 2) honey, in a honeycomb protected by bees; 3) a kernel, in its husk; 4) a golden 
nugget, covered in excrement; 5) a hidden treasure, buried underneath a house; 6) the sprout of a tree, in 
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that of fully awakened buddhas being present within sentient beings, without their 
being aware of it.23 
Philosophically, other Mahāyāna sūtras were more important for the formulation of 
the tathāgatagarbha theory.24 Of them, the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra in particular 
adds a number of original and relevant points in this regard. In this scripture, 
translated into Chinese in the first half of the fifth century, the buddha’s dharmakāya 
(i.e. the buddha’s ultimate, non-dual realisation of reality),25 when not free from 
mental afflictions or defilements (kleśa), is referred to as tathāgatagarbha. This 
garbha is said to be empty of mental afflictions, while at the same time being endowed 
with innumerable and inseparable buddha-qualities.26 It is also said to be the very basis 
or support for both saṃsāra (in the sense that its being without beginning serves as a 
basis for the beginningless cycle of birth and death) and nirvāṇa (in the sense that it is 
the existence of this garbha that is the cause for one’s aspiration towards nirvāṇa).27  
Another important canonical source for the tathāgatagarbha theory is the Mahāyāna 
Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra.28 In it, the terms “self, permanent, blissful, and very pure” 
(ātman, nitya, sukha, pariśuddha) are brought up in relation with the tathāgatagarbha 
––the self referring to the buddha, the dharmakāya being permanent, the parinirvāṇa 
blissful, and the real dharma of the buddhas and bodhisattvas very pure.29 Also, 
buddha-nature is termed “self,” a self, however, that is explicitly differentiated from 
the self as understood by the non-Buddhist schools (tīrthika), the existence of which is 
denied. Later in the text, the whole exposition is unmasked as being merely of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
the seed; 7) a Tathāgata’s statue, in a tattered rag; 8) the embryo of a future world monarch, in his 
miserable mother’s womb; and 9) a golden sculpture, in its clay mold. Cf. Zimmermann 2002: 105–144. 
23 Cf. Zimmermann 2002: 34–39. Some Tibetan authors however, such as ’Gos Lo-tsā-ba Gzhon-nu-
dpal (1392–1481) or Rong-ston Shākya rgyal-mtshan (1367–1449), have tended to see in simile 6) and 
8), in particular, indications for their being the potential in sentient beings for the development into fully 
awakened buddhas. On Gzhon nu dpal see Mathes 2008: 8 and 342–343. On Rong-ston see below. 
24 Takasaki (1966: 32–45) traces a genealogy of the tathāgatagarbha theory, taking into account a great 
number of sources of which I will merely mention the most important ones. 
25 The definition of dharmakāya varies according to time and tradition. For a detailed analysis of this 
term and the controversies over it see Makransky 1997. For a brief overview of the buddha-bodies in 
the Mahāyāna see also Williams 1989: 167–184. 
26 Cf. Wayman, Wayman 1974: 98–99. 
27 Cf. Wayman, Wayman 1974: 106–107.  
28 There exist two Chinese versions of this sūtra, both of which have been translated in the first half of 
the fifth century. The two Tibetan sūtras of this name have been produced from the Sanskrit and the 
Chinese, respectively. Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 10–11. 
29 Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1973: 81–82. 
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didactical nature, aimed at converting non-believers, the actual meaning of buddha-
nature being unfathomable.30  
Finally, the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa, another scripture significant for the formation 
of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine, teaches the equality of tathāgatagarbha with the 
dharmakāya, which in turn is said to possess innumerable inseparable qualities.31  32 
 
The important Laṅkāvatārasūtra33 is yet another major Mahāyāna sūtra to mention the 
tathāgatagarbha. It can, however, be considered to be the first reaction to this 
doctrine, rather than a scripture important for its formation. In it, we find buddha-
nature being equated with emptiness on one hand, and with the ālayavijñāna on the 
other, aligning it thus with the Yogācāra doctrine.34 
 
1.2.2. The śāstras: 
The Tibetan tradition attributes the main śāstras related to the doctrine of buddha-
nature to Maitreya.35 Of them, only the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and the Ratnagotra-
vibhāga explicitly mention the term tathāgatagarbha, and only the latter is exclusively 
devoted to its doctrine.36 However, the influence of this last mentioned work can be 
noticed in the case of the other two Maitreya works found in the Cittamatrā section of 
the Tengyur. This influence is, according to Mathes, evident in the exposition of the 
mind’s natural luminosity and the adventitious nature of mental afflictions in both the 
Madhyāntavibhāga and the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga.37 
A term closely connected to buddha-nature is gotra to which the Mahāyāna-
sūtrālaṃkāra devotes its entire third chapter. Gotra (Tib. rigs: “lineage, family” also 
                                                 
30 For the translation of selected passages of this sūtra and an analysis of the hermeneutical methods 
given therein to understand the concept of buddha-nature see Ruegg 1989a: 19–44. 
31 This sūtra (no longer extant in the original Sanskrit) is quoted in RGVV I.1. Cf. Mathes 2008: 7–8. 
32 For futher sūtras related to this doctrine, especially those quoted in the RGV, see Takasaki 1966: 32–
33. 
33 The earliest form of this sūtra was translated into Chinese in the first half of the fifth century. For a 
study of this sūtra see Suzuki 1930. 
34 Cf. Mathes 2008: 17–21. 
35 The Tibetan tradition attributes five treatises to Maitreya: Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, 
Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Madhyānthavibhāga, Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, and Ratnagotravibhāga.   
36 In its only passage to mention the tathāgatagarbha, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (IX.37) equates 
buddha-nature with suchness.  
37 Cf. Mathes 2008: 19–20. 
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translated as “spiritual gene”) denotes the spiritual potential or propensity of sentient 
beings.38 The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra asserts the existence of different gotra-s or 
propensities leading beings to different resultant states, as well as the existence of a 
certain class of beings definitely cut-off from their spiritual potential. Thus, beings 
with a śrāvaka gotra can only attain arhatship (as opposed to the full awakening of a 
buddha), those with a pratyekabuddha gotra only pratyekabuddhahood and so forth, 
while some are said to be “doomed” to wander eternally in the cycle of existence.39  
This position––associated with Yogācāra philosophy––is, however, not maintained in 
the Ratnagotravibhāga.40 There, we rather read that all beings possess buddha-nature 
because the gotra “exists.”41 This gotra is said to be twofold––naturally present in all 
beings (prakr̥tistha) and generated (samudānīta)––and is explained to be the cause 
(hetu) for the attainment of buddhahood.42  
As a whole, the Ratnagotravibhāga (including the vyākhyā) seems to be in favour of 
the interpretation of buddha-nature as found in the Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra, 
identifying beings as buddhas obscured by adventitious mental afflictions. A subtle yet 
clear distinction between buddhas and sentient beings can, however, be made on the 
basis of stanza I.27. There, we read that all beings are said to possess buddha-nature 
by virtue of three reasons, one of them being that the result (i.e. the term “buddha”) 
has been “metaphorically” applied to the gotra.43 Thus, the term “buddha” in 
buddhagarbha (and related expressions) would only denote a potential present in 
beings, as opposed to a fully fledged resultant state merely covered by adventitious 
defilements. This, as we shall see below, became in important topic of debate for later 
                                                 
38 On the meaning of this term see Seyfort Ruegg 1976. 
39 See Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 77–86, as well as D’Amato 2003 for an analysis of the gotra-theory in the 
MSA. 
40 The Abhisamayālaṃkāra, a commentary on the implicit meaning of the Prajñāpāramitā literature and 
thus associated with Madhyamaka philosophy, similarly rejects a distinction between gotra-s on the 
ground of the undifferentiated nature of the dharmadhātu. Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1969, chapter 3.   
41 Cf. RGV I.27–28. One isolated stanza (RGV I.41) seems to indicate that, indeed, some beings are 
without the potential for liberation. Seyfort Ruegg (1969: 280) remarks that this is indeed surprising, as 
it contradicts its doctrine of tathāgatagarbha and universal awakening. At this point, the vyākhyā 
explains that such statements are used to convert those opposed to the Mahāyāna. For are translation of 
the relevant passage see Takasaki 1966: 222–224. 
42 The RGV also mentions another type of gotra which functions as a “mine” for the Three Jewels 
(Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha). Cf. RGV I.23–24 as well as Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 282–283. 
43 RGV I.27b:  bauddhe gotre tatphalasyopacārād […] (Cf. Johnston 1950: 26,3–4). 
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exegetes. It is important to note that throughout the text, garbha, dhātu (“element”),44 
and (prakr̥tistha) gotra are used synonymously to refer to defiled suchness (samalā 
tathathā), as opposed to  undefiled suchness (nirmalā tathatā) equalled with 
awakening (bodhi).45 
While the Ratnagotravibhāga played an important role in the history of Tibetan 
scholarship, it did not receive that much attention on its own home ground, as we shall 
see below. Takasaki lists four works known only through Chinese sources 
(Dharmadhātvaviśeṣaśāstra, Buddhagotraśāstra, Anuttarāśrayasūtra, and Mahāyāna-
śraddhotpādaśāstra) which possess similarities with the Ratnagotravibhāga.46  One 
can consider the first three in particular to be based to a great extent on the 
presentation of buddha-nature as found in the Ratnagotravibhāga. Since, however, 
their authorship and originality are uncertain, they can hardly be taken as examples for 
the continuation of the tathāgatagarbha literature in India. 
 
 
                                                 
44 With the exeption of the term tathāgatadhātu which can refer to the resultant state as well.   
45 “Suchness” stands for ultimate reality. This means that as long as mental afflictions (kleśa) are 
present, there is no liberating awakening to the actual state of things. Once freed from those afflictions, 
awakening is attained. On this, see also below (2.1.). 
46 Takasaki 1966: 45–54. 
13 
 
 
 
 
2. The Ratnagotravibhāga 
2.1. The text of the Ratnagotravibhāga 
The most important śāstra discussing the tathāgatagarbha theory is the 
Ratnagotravibhāga together which its commentary (the vyākhyā). It is the earliest 
systematic presentation of this doctrine, composed at latest towards the end of the 5th 
century by drawing from numerous sources.47 Takasaki has identified nineteen 
canonical sources for this treatise––including both sūtras and śāstras––and eight 
unidentified ones.48 The treatise itself is of a composite nature and consists of both 
verses––kārikā-s supplemented by explanatory verses and quotations drawn from 
canonical sources––and a prose commentary. Takasaki has identified an original text 
consisting of 27 verses from the first chapter.49 His theory, however, has been rejected 
by Schmithausen who assumes that this “Ur-Text” (identified by Takasaki and again 
reduced to consist of only 15 verses by Schmithausen himself) is only one building 
block of the original Ratnagotravibhāga, which in turn should be identical with the 
Chinese translation (the original Sanskrit being extant only together with its vyākhyā 
and not as a separate text).50  
 
The content of the treatise has been discussed in detail, among others, by Seyfort 
Ruegg.51 Following his presentation, I will give a brief outline of it here: 
The Ratnagotravibhāga basically deals with seven vajrapada-s (“adamantine topics”), 
so called because of their unfathomable nature. Those seven are: the Three Jewels 
(Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha), the element (dhātu, equivalent to tathāgatagarbha), 
awakening (bodhi), the buddha excellences (guṇa), and activity (kriyā).  
                                                 
47 The earliest extant Chinese translation was produced between 511 and 515 A.D. by Ratnamati, who 
had returned from India in 508. Mathes (2008: 1) dates the earliest layers of the RGV back to the third 
or fourth century, attributing them to Sāramati. On the question of the authorship of this treatise see 
below. 
48 The seven topics presented in the RGV (I. 1–2), for example, are taken from the Dhāraṇīśvara-
rājasūtra, and the set of nine similes for buddha-nature from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra are reproduced 
and expounded upon in RGV I.95–143 together with its commentary. Cf. Takasaki 1966: 32–33. 
49 This text is rendered in its entirety on pp. 393–395. 
50 Cf. Schmithausen 1971: 123–130. 
51 Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 247–259. 
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The first chapter––dealing with the first four topics––is by far the longest of the 
treatise. After presenting the topical outline of the text, it begins with an analysis of the 
Three Jewels, establishing buddha(hood) (buddhatva) as the single ultimate refuge for 
sentient beings. The text then goes on discussing the main topic of the treatise at great 
length. Having established all beings as buddhagarbha-s,52 the dhātu (i.e. defiled 
suchness) is explained by means of ten categories and nine similes. To end this 
section, the reasons for this doctrine are explained.  
The second chapter deals with awakening (bodhi)––equated with undefiled suchness––
by means of eight categories. Awakening is explained as the result of purification, 
attained by removing all adventious mental afflictions from the mind’s nature. (From 
this chapter onwards, almost no explanatory commentary is given in the vyākhyā.) The 
third chapter discusses the sixty four buddha excellences (guṇa) inseparable from 
undefiled suchness and the fourth covers the thirty two kinds of buddha activites 
(jinakriyā), which are said to be both effortless and uninterrupted. The final chapter 
describes the benefits of this teaching, explaining the advantages of adhering faithfully 
to it, and closes with a dedication of the merit obtained by this exposition. 
 
2.2. The question of the authorship of the Ratnagotravibhāga 
The question of the authorship of the Ratnagotravibhāga has remained unsolved to this 
day. According to the Chinese tradition, Sāramati (fl. about 250 A.D.) is identified as 
the author of the treatise. The Tibetan tradition, however, attributes the root text to the 
bodhisattva Maitreya––the future buddha residing in Tuṣita heaven––and the 
commentary to his human disciple Asaṅga (fl. 4th century). A Sanskrit fragment of the 
Ratnagotravibhāga in Saka script attributes the text also to Maitreya, indicating that 
his authorship was probably accepted in India as well.53  
Among modern scholars, Seyfort Ruegg favoured the Tibetan view, evoking, however, 
the possibility of Sāramati being an epithet of Maitreya.54 Frauwallner, on the other 
hand, follows the Chinese tradition, making of Sāramati the most important figure of a 
                                                 
52 Or as “containing a buddha” following Zimmermann. Seyfort Ruegg (1969: 249, n.5) remarks that the 
Tibetan translations state that beings “possess” (can) buddha-nature. 
53 Cf. Takasaki 1966: 7. 
54 Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 46. 
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distinct school which was to become very influential in the later developments of 
Mahāyāna philosophy.55  
With regard to Maitreya’s identity, scholars have put forth all possible explanations. 
Some see in him Asaṅga’s human teacher (Ui, Frauwallner), others a divine source for 
the latter’s inspiration (Demiéville, Seyfort Ruegg), and others still (Lévi, Obermiller) 
completely deny his existence, making Asaṅga the sole author of the work.56 This 
leaves us with dissenting traditional explanations woven into a net of modern theories 
and explanations, without there being enough historical evidence to form any 
conclusive opinion. Other, more recent publications (Mathes, Thurman)57 defend the 
traditional Tibetan account in so far as to consider the possibility of yogis acquiring 
exceptional powers by means of specialised training, enabling them to communicate 
with transcendent beings like bodhisattvas. This, of course, lies beyond the reach of 
historical evidence and belongs to the realm of religious belief and practice.  
At least, as Mathes points out, it is important to note that the works attributed to 
Maitreya (in the Tibetan tradition) differ in both form and content from Asaṅga’s 
writings to a degree that one can hardly attribute them altogether to a single author.58  
 
2.3. The Ratnagotravibhāga in India 
According to a most widely accepted Tibetan historiography, the text of the 
Ratnagotravibhāga was lost in India soon after its composition, only to be retrieved in 
the 11th century under mysterious circumstances, along with the Dharmadharmatā-
vibhāga (another work attributed to Maitreya), by the Indian adept Maitrīpa.59  This 
could explain the fact that neither are mentioned in later treatises until this time, nor 
listed in the Ldan-dkar-ma catalogue (dating from the 9th cent.) which does mention 
                                                 
55 Cf. Frauwallner 1994: 255. 
56 Cf. Mathes 1996: 11–17.  
57 Cf. Mathes 1996: 14–15 and Thurman 2004: xvii–xviii.  
58 Cf. Mathes 1996: 14. 
59For Gzhon-nu-dpal’s account see Roerich 1949 (1996): 347–350. 
Kano (2006: 27–31) mentions another account according to which a certain Aṇarakṣita, disciple of 
Paṇḍita Maitreyanātha, discovered both texts. This accounts stems from Rong-ston Shākya Rgyal-
mtshan’s (the author of our commentary) introduction to his commentary on the 
Dharmadharmatāvibhāga. 
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the other three works attributed to Maitreya.60 The earliest Indian works to quote or 
gloss either of these two treatises come from Maitrīpa’s own teachers Jñānaśrīmitra 
and Ratnākaraśānti (both 10th–11th century), who therefore must already have known 
these texts.61 In any case, it was mostly due to Maitrīpa’s efforts that these treatises 
were introduced and spread in scholastic circles. The teachings on buddha-nature as 
found in the Ratnagotravibhāga proved to be an ideal link between the tantric 
teachings of the mahāsiddhas, so important at that time, and mainstream Mahāyāna.   
Maitrīpa passed on the teachings on the Ratnagotravibhāga and the 
Dharmadharmatāvibhāga to *Ānandakirti,62 who in turn handed them over to Sajjana 
(fl. second half of 11th cent.), the great paṇḍit from Kashmir and author of one of the 
two only remaining commentaries on the Ratnagotravibhāga of Indian origin.63 
Kashmir subsequently became an important centre for the study of this treatise and, as 
it was a platform for Tibetan translation activity, it was from here that the treatise 
eventually found its way to Tibet.  
 
2.4. The Ratnagotravibhāga in Tibet64 
Prominent among Sajjana’s disciples, the Tibetans Rngog Blo-ldan shes-rab (1059–
1109) and Btsan Kha-bo-che (b. 1021), became known as the founders of the so-called 
analytical or epistemological school (thos bsam gyi lugs / mtshan nyid lugs) and the 
meditative school (sgom lugs) respectively. The fact that these two exegetical 
traditions can be traced back to a common source, namely Sajjana, indicates that they 
are by no means contradictory by nature. While the former is concerned with 
analysing the philosophical implications of the Ratnagotravibhāga in order to remove 
mistaken concepts about the nature of reality, the latter focuses on the “positive” 
                                                 
60 Those works being the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, the Madhyāntavibhāga, and the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. 
Cf. Mathes 1996: 163. 
61 As Kano (2006: 49) points out, either there was another line of transmission of these texts available at 
that time which does not pass through Maitripa, or they composed these works only after their common 
disciple had rediscovered them. See also Mathes 2008: 2–3. 
62 He is omitted in Rong-ston’s account of the lineage of those teachings. 
63 Those two are Sajjana’s Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa - edited by Takasaki in 1974 (Nyoraizō 
shisō no keisei. Tokyo: Shunjūsha), and Vairocanarakṣita’s Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī. Both have 
recently been edited by Kano (2006) as appendices to his dissertation. 
64 For this chapter I follow mainly Mathes’ presentations from 1996 (165–168) and 2008 (25–48), 
unless otherwise indicated. 
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aspect of this treatise, i.e. the luminosity of mind serving as a basis for the 
actualisation of the excellences of a buddha.65 
2.4.1. The analytical school of Blo-ldan shes-rab66 
Rngog Lo-tsā-ba Blo-ldan shes-rab67 was instrumental in the transmission of this 
treatise and its study in Tibet, for not only did he work in collaboration with his Indian 
teacher to produce the only surviving translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga,68 but he 
was also the author of the first Tibetan commentary on it, i.e. the Theg chen rgyud 
bla’i don bsdus pa.69   
His tradition stands at the origin of the so-called rang stong-Madhyamaka 
interpretation of buddha-nature. It can, however, for obvious reasons, not be equated 
with it. Firstly, the whole rang stong versus gzhan stong discussion was a Tibetan 
invention of a later date,70 and it is just natural for philosophical traditions to evolve 
over time and in response to new currents of thought. Also, “rang ston” does not equal 
“rang stong”, as we shall see below. That is, all schools who oppose themselves to the 
gzhan stong interpretation of buddha-nature cannot be thrown into the same basket. 
Taking the Ratnagotravibhāga to be a commentary on the sūtras of definitive meaning 
(nges don; nītārtha),71 Blo-ldan shes-rab equates buddha-nature, or the “element” 
(dhātu; khams), with the ultimate––an ultimate, however, which cannot be the object 
                                                 
65 This difference in emphasis, however, led to doctrinal disputes among later Tibetan authors as we 
shall see below. Cf. also van der Kuijp 1983: 43–44. 
66 This tradition will be analysed in more detail since the author of our treatise follows this 
interpretation quite closely.  
67 On the life of Blo ldan shes rab see Jackson 1994, as well as Kano 2006: 113–128. 
68 The work for this translation had been carried out in Kashmir during Rngog’s visit there some time in 
the late 11th century. In his Blue Annals, Gzhon-nu-dpal reports that six different translations of the 
RGV had been made. Of them, only the one by Rngog and Sajjana has entered the Tengyur and 
therefore survived. See Roerich 1949 (1996): 350. For a description of these six translations see Kano 
2006: 89–111. 
69 This text has been edited by David Jackson and was published 1993 in Dharamsala. The first chapter 
of this commentary and an analysis of its author's position and influence on later developments form the 
main part of Kano’s thesis (2006). 
70 Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan (1292–1361) was the first to use the term gzhan stong in a 
systematic fashion. See Mathes 1996: 160. 
71 The four remaining Maitreya works are regarded by him to be commentaries on sūtras with 
provisional meaning (drang don; neyartha). Kano (2006: 173) notes that this is probably due to the fact 
that the RGV is the only treatise among those five to teach the single-vehicle (ekayāna) theory. 
However, the AA does reject the existence of different gotra-s. Cf. Sefort Ruegg 1969: 189–205.  
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of conceptual thought (which by definition belongs to the realm of concealing truth).72 
Equating buddha-nature with the ultimate, it is explained to be emptiness, bringing the 
teachings on buddha-nature thus in line with Madhyamaka philosophy.73 To be more 
precise, buddha-nature is, for him, the nature of mind which is emptiness, or the 
absence of the two types of self––the self of person and the self of phenomena74 ––in 
sentient beings. Commenting on RGV I.13, he writes:  
Awareness of the extent refers to the “vision that a perfect buddha is present in 
all [sentient beings].” The awareness that the common defining characteristics–
–the very selflessness of phenomena and persons––are the nature of the 
tathāgata, [namely] buddha nature, and that [this reality] completely pervades 
[its] support, [i.e.,] the entire element of sentient beings, is the [awareness  of] 
the extent. Furthermore, the unmistaken awareness of mere selflessness, which 
exists in all beings, is the awareness of how [reality] is. [...]75  
Furthermore, emptiness is understood in the sense of a non-affirming negation (med 
par dgag pa), which means that while it negates the existence of that which does not 
exist (i.e. the superimposed sense of self), it does not affirm the existence of anything 
else in its place. Rngog writes: 
As to the [buddha] element that has become the conventional object of a 
nonaffirming negation, it is called the substantial cause that has become the 
conventional object of a nonaffirming negation; but something that amounts to 
human effort [as a substantial cause of buddhahood] does not actually exist. As 
to the conventional object, it has the meaning of a nonaffirming negation––
                                                 
72 The question, whether or not the ultimate can be an object of conventional language became an 
important topic of debate between later Dge-lugs-pa and Sa-skya-pa scholars. On this question see 
Tauscher 1995:  291ff. and Sweet 1979. 
73 This approach follows the interpretation of the doctrine of buddha-nature as found in the 
Laṅkāvatārasūtra as seen above. 
74 The self of person refers to the sense of personal identity attached to the five aggregates of human 
experience (skandha-s), and the self of phenomena to a superimposed essence inherent to all elements of 
existence (dharma-s). 
75 Quoted after Mathes 2008: 27. 
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namely that anything that is established as an own-being does not exist in 
reality.76 
Crucial for Blo-ldan shes-rab’s presentation of the dhātu is his commentary on RGV 
I.28 which gives three reasons for beings’ possession of buddha-nature. Those three––
namely (1) the pervasion of the body of the perfect buddha, (2) suchness (tathatā) 
being without differentiation, and (3) the gotra’s presence in sentient beings––are 
explained to refer to the resultant, the natural, and the causal buddha-nature 
respectively. By this, Blo-ldan shes-rab essentially means that while the actual 
buddha-nature pertains to a buddha only, this name (i.e. tathāgatagarbha) has been 
metaphorically applied to sentient beings because they have the potential to attain this 
aim. The link between those two states is suchness (a synonym for emptiness)––which 
is the nature of both equally––the full realisation of which results in buddhahood.  
This dhātu thus becomes the cause for realising buddhahood. This is so, because, 
firstly, only when emptiness is possible, are all other things possible as well.77 But 
more importantly, Blo-ldan shes-rab explains the dhātu to function as the seed for 
buddhahood because taking it (i.e. the ultimate or emptiness) as an objective support 
for one’s inferential cognition will result in the actualisation of a buddha’s excellences 
(guṇa; yon tan).   
 
Another fundamental question with regard to the interpretation of the 
Ratnagotravibhāga (and related the question of emptiness being taken as a non-
affirming negation) is whether those excellences are newly produced upon the 
attainment of buddhahood, or only revealed, in the manner of a buried treasure that 
has merely been unearthed.78 Commenting on RGV I.154 and 155––which state that 
                                                 
76 Quoted after Mathes 2008: 30.  
77 To clarify Rngog’s position here, Rong-ston, commenting on RGV I.26, quotes Nāgārjuna’s MMK 
XXIV.14 where it is explained that without emptiness nothing would be possible, while everything 
becomes possible when emptiness applies. Cf. Kano 2006: 150. 
78 Among the nine examples for buddha-nature taken from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra and reproduced in 
the Ratnagotravibhāga, two seem to be in favour of the former interpretation, namely the analogy of the 
tree growing from a tiny seed and the embryo of a future universal emperor growing in the womb of a 
destitute woman. According to Zimmermann (2002: 63–64), however, the main focus of those two 
examples does not so much lie in the aspect of growth, but in the idea that the future result is  already 
contained in the present state.  
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(a) nothing is to be removed from or added to reality (bhūta - referring here to the 
dhātu) and (b) that the dhātu is empty of impurities, while not being empty of 
inseparable qualities––Blo-ldan shes-rab introduces the topic of the two truths. He 
states that to see reality, one must neither superimpose an ultimate existence of an 
objective support for defilements (“nothing to add”), nor deny the existence of the 
objective support for purification on the level of concealing truth (“nothing to 
remove”).79 With regard to there being nothing to be added to reality he writes that no 
excellences need to be added, since the objective support for their attainment is present 
since beginningless time. This objective support for the attainment of the strengths and 
so forth––in other words the object focussed on in meditation––is, as seen above, the 
dhātu or emptiness itself. Thus, for him, “nothing to be added” does not refer to the 
excellences, but to the cause for their actualisation.  
Furthermore, Rngog also follows Asaṅga’s commentary on RGV I.51, where we read 
that the inseparable qualities pertain to the thoroughly purified state, in contrast to the 
impurities which appear in the impure and partially purified states only.80 
Commenting on this stanza he writes:  
                                                
[...] The realization of the ultimate is the cause of all qualities, because all 
buddha qualities are summoned as if called when you realize the 
dharmadhātu.81  
 
2.4.2. The meditative school of Btsan Kha-bo-che 
Btsan Kha-bo-che was the second major Tibetan heir in Sajjana’s transmission of the 
Ratnagotravibhāga. Due to the language barrier he was, however, unlike Blo-ldan 
shes-rab, forced to study under the master with the help of the translator Gzu Dga’-
ba’i rdo-rje. Having stayed in Kashmir for a number of years, he returned to Tibet 
before his compatriot and established a learning centre in Brag-rgya in Yar-stod, 
Central Tibet.82  
 
79 Cf. Mathes 2008: 31. 
80 Cf. Takasaki 1966: 234–235. 
81 Quoted after Mathes 2008: 31. 
82 Cf. Van der Kuijp 1983: 42. 
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This tradition takes the Maitreya works in general and the Ratnagotravibhāga in 
particular literally. Here, buddha-nature is positively described in the sense of an 
“affirming negation” (ma yin  dgag): the dhātu is indeed empty of defilements, but 
possesses all the excellences from the very beginning. Shākya mchog-ldan summarises 
the view of Btsan Kha-bo-che as follows: 
[T]he ultimate intent he obtained from having studied the ‘Teachings of 
Maitreya[nātha]’ [...] was [that of] the inherently pure originary cognitiveness 
(rang rig rnam dag gi ye shes) which pervades [everything] from Buddha[s] to 
sentient beings, and that this very natural luminosity [of mind] is what has been 
named tathāgatagarbha.83  
Relatively little is known of this tradition, the transmission of which has been 
interrupted at some point according to ’Gos Lo-tsā-ba Gzhon-nu-dpal.84 However, one 
can see a continuation of its doctrine in the Jo-nang school and the proponents of the 
gzhan stong view.85  
 
2.5. Previous studies and the aim of the present work: 
The Ratnagotravibhāga was first introduced to modern academia by Eugène 
Obermiller who translated it together with its vyākhyā from the Tibetan into English in 
1931. The Sanskrit text was edited only 19 years later by E. H. Johnston on the basis 
of two manuscripts found in Tibet by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana. This text was then 
translated by Jikido Takasaki in 1966. Later, the root verses were again translated 
several times from the Tibetan by western Tibetan scholars (most notably by 
Rosemarie Fuchs (2000), who translated Kong-sprul Blo-gros mtha’-yas’s commen-
tary together with the entire root-text, and by François Chenique (2001) into French, 
based on both the Sanskrit and the Tibetan versions.) 
Among Takasaki’s numerous publications on the tathāgatagarbha doctrine––most of 
which have, due to my inability to read Japanese, not been accessible to me––two 
                                                 
83 Quoted after van der Kuijp 1983: 43. 
84 The only teachings from Btsan available today are contained in a collection of instructions compiled 
by Jo-nang Kun-dga’ grol-mchog (1501–1566). They are, according to Stearns (1999: 42), the earliest 
extant writings dealing with the gzhan stong tradition in Tibet. 
85 On the gzhan stong interpretation of the RGV see Mathes 2008: 45–48 and Hookham 1991. 
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monographs represent his major contributions in this field: his study of the 
Ratnagotravibhāga (1966) including the lengthy introduction, a synopsis of the text, 
and the abovementioned translation of it together with its vyākhyā,86 and his work on 
the formation of the tathāgatagarbha theory in Indian Buddhism87 which, unfortu-
nately, is available only in Japanese.  
Among Seyfort Ruegg’s valuable contributions to this field, his famous La Théorie du 
Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra (1969) is the most important, presenting a detailed 
analysis of the doctrines of gotra, ekayāna, and tathāgatgarbha as found in the Indian 
commentarial literature, relying to a good extent on Tibetan, and in particular Dge-
lugs-pa, interpretation.88 Aside from his papers on this subject,89 another important 
work by Seyfort Ruegg is his annotated translation of Bu-ston’s mDzes rgyan (1973), a 
Tibetan commentary on the tathāgatagarbha doctrine from the 14th century consisting 
mainly of an anthology of canonical excerpts.  
Among the more recent important works related to the reception of this doctrine in 
Tibet in general and within the Bka’-brgyud tradition in particular are Susan 
Hookham’s (1991)90 work on the gzhan stong interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga 
and Klaus-Dieter Mathes’ (2008) analysis of ’Gos Lo-tsā-ba Gzhon-nu-dpal’s (1392–
1481) mahāmudrā interpretation of the same treatise.91  
Also available to me, although not yet published, were the dissertation by Ngawang 
Jorden (2005) on Go-rams-pa’s understanding of buddha-nature based on his 
supplement to Sa-skya Paṇḍita’s Sdom gsum rab byed and Kazuo Kano’s (2006) study, 
                                                 
86 De Jong (1968) and Schmithausen (1971) both have contributed reviews of Takasaki’s first 
mentioned work in which many of the latter’s philological mistakes are corrected. 
87 Takasaki Jikido (1974): Nyoraizō shisō no keisei [The formation of the tathāgatagarbha 
theory].Tokyo: Shunjūsha. 
88 For an extensive review of this work see Schmithausen 1973b. 
89 Cf. bibliography. 
90 Hookham’s presentation is mainly based on Kong-sprul Blo-gros mtha’-yas’s (1813–1899) 
commentary on the RGV and oral teachings by contemporary masters. A review of this work has been 
given by Franz-Karl Erhard (1994) in Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 144, pp. 
415–419. 
91 The latter includes in part 1 (on the Tibetan historical context) an interesting overview of various 
positions related to Gzhon-nu-dpal’s interpretation, including among others those of Rngog Blo-ldan 
shes-rab, Dol-po-pa, Sa-bzang Ma-ti paṇ-chen, and Klong-chen-pa. 
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annotated translation, and edition of Rngog Blo-ldan shes-rabʹs summary of the 
Ratnagotravibhāga, the first Tibetan commentary on this seminal work.92  
Until now, only one study of the Sa-skya school’s understanding of this fundamental 
chapter of Mahāyāna thought has been written,93 notwithstanding the fact that this 
tradition has known a glorious past in terms of scholarly achievements. Among its 
great luminaries figure such important names as Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga’ rgyal-
mtshan (1182–1251), Red-mda'-ba gzhon-nu blo-gros (1349–1412), Rong-ston Shes-
bya kun-rig (1376–1449), and Go-rams-pa Bsod-nams seng-ge (1429–1489). Among 
the Sa-skya commentaries on the Ratnagotravibhāga, it is Rong-ston’s extensive 
treatise that is regarded as the most important by contemporary scholars of the 
tradition.94  The aim of the present work is to help fill the gap in modern academia by 
providing an annotated translation of a crucial chapter of this treatise, namely its 
exposition of buddha-nature by means of ten categories.  
 
                                                 
92 An important article to be added to this list of monographs would be Dorji Wangchuk’s exposition of 
the Rnying ma tradition’s interpretation of the tathāgatagarbha theory (2004). 
93 I refer to Jorden 2003, which has yet to be published. 
94 Chos-rgyal 'phags-pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan (1235–1280) and Red-mda’-ba both composed 
summaries of the treatise. Khenpo Ngawang Jorden pointed out two other Sa-skya commentaries on the 
RGV to me: the Rgyud bla ma'i ṭīka by Ngag-dbang chos-grags (1572–1641) and the Rgyud bla ma'i 
bstan bcos kyi nges don gsal bar byed pa rin chen sgron by Gnas-phrug-pa (who lived sometime after 
Gorampa). Other masters with a Sa-skya background to comment on the RGV were Sa-bzang ma-ti 
paṇ-chen (1294–1376) and Dol-po-pa. Since his commentary expounds a gzhan stong position, 
however, it cannot be regarded as mainstream Sa-skya. For provisional lists of Tibetan commentaries on 
the RGV see Buchardi 2002: 55–73 and Kano 2006 (Appendix G).  
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3. Rong-ston and his presentation of buddha-nature 
3.1.  A short glimpse at the life of Rong-ston Shes-bya kun-rig  
Despite the fact that the intellectual luminaries of the Sa-skya Tradition of Tibetan 
Buddhism have received a relatively modest amount of attention within western 
academia up until now, we can be thankful to Professor David Jackson for having 
contributed as much as he did in this field.95  
In particular, with regard to the author of the text translated herein, Smra-ba’i seng-ge 
Rong-ston Shes-bya kun-rig, also known by his ordination name Shākya rgyal-mtshan, 
Jackson has published a number of historically very insightful papers, the most 
important of which is the introduction to his edition of a sub-commentary on the 
Abhisamayālaṃkāra by Rong-ston.96 In this article, Jackson bases his account of 
Rong-ston’s life on two extensive biographies written by two of the master’s disciples, 
namely Nam-mkha’ dpal-bzang (fl. 15th century) and Shākya mchog-ldan (1428–
1507). More recently, he has published a paper which has as its focus some 
overlooked details of Rong-ston’s scholastic career.97 
In addition to the information taken from Jackson’s research, I will include in my brief 
summary of this scholar’s life some details found in the short account given in ’Gos 
Lo-tsā-ba Gzhon-nu-dpal’s Deb ther sngon po (Blue Annals) reprinted in Khentsun 
Sangpo’s Biographical Dictionary,98 as well as other information gathered from 
writings of the tradition, to see how Rong-ston was perceived by his own people.  
 
Traditionally, the career of a Buddhist scholar should encompass the three domains of 
exposition, debate and composition (’chad rtsod rtsom gsum) called “the three 
activities of the learned” (mkhas pa’i bya ba gsum). Inspired by this format, my 
account of Rong-ston’s life will start with these three categories, supplemented by a 
small section about his activities as the founder of a monastic institution and another 
one on Rong-ston “the saint,” as he is perceived within his own tradition.  
                                                 
95 See bibliography.  
96 Jackson 1988. 
97 Jackson 2007. 
98 Khentsun Sangpo 1979: 379–381. 
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Rong-ston, the student and teacher: 
Born in 1367 in Rgyal-mo-rong in Far-Eastern Tibet into a Bon-po family, Rong-
ston’s religious path commenced, according to his biographer Shākya-mchog-ldan, by 
studying the Bon-po teachings from a young age. At the age of seventeen, he travelled 
to one of the greatest centres of Buddhist learning in Central Tibet, namely the 
seminary of Gsang-phu Ne’u-thog.99 It was there that he received monastic ordination 
and started his very thorough scholastic training, which would lead to his studying 
under more than twenty teachers.100  
He proved to be such a bright student that he was able to compose his first major 
commentary, a sub-commentary on the Pramāṇaviniścaya by Dharmakīrti, the age of 
twenty-one. Yet, it was not until the age of twenty-six that Rong-ston met the most 
prominent among his teachers, the Sa-skya scholar G.yag-ston Sangs-rgyas-dpal 
(1348–1414), whose successor he would eventually become. Under him Rong-ston 
studied extensively the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures along with many commentaries, as 
well as several treatises on logic and epistemology (tshad ma; pramāṇa),  
Among all the subjects he was trained in, which for all great Tibetan Buddhist scholars 
cover both sūtra and tantra fields of knowledge, he was particularly renowned for his 
mastery of, and commentaries on the Prajñāpāramitā philosophy of the 
Abhisamayālaṃkāra.  
During his professional career (which Jackson points out as one of the longest of any 
Tibetan teacher, lasting for about sixty years), Rong-ston’s two main seats in Central 
Tibet were the Gsang-phu seminary and the monastery of Nālendra (which he founded 
in 1436).101 Apart from his occasional travels to other seminaries and monasteries in 
the region, he made three visits to Gtsang which greatly contributed to his fame 
becoming widespread. These visits (which lead him repeatedly to Sa-skya) consisted 
mainly of teaching and debating tours, and earned him, among others, the title “Rong-
ston Smra-ba’i seng-ge, the Teacher from [Rgyal-mo]-rong, Lion among Expounders.” 
                                                 
99 On the history of this institution see van der Kuijp 1987. 
100 For the list of these teachers given by Shākya mchog-ldan see Jackson 1988: II–IV. 
101 See below for more details on his founding of Nālendra.  
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Rong-ston was able to confirm his academic status as a bka’ bcu pa (“master of ten 
scriptures”) on these tours,102 a challenge that had become a common practice to test 
the qualifications of advanced scholars in Central Tibet at that time. The ten scriptures 
in question, which the bearer of this title was supposed to have mastered, covered all 
major fields of monastic study, namely Prajñāpāramitā philosophy (based on the 
Abhisamayālaṃkāra), logic and epistemology (tshad ma; pramāṇa), Abhidharma, 
Vinaya, Cittamātra and Tathāgatagarbha-theory (based on the remaining four works 
attributed to Maitreya), as well as Madhyamaka.103   
Assuming that Rong-ston personally taught all the major treatises on which he 
composed commentaries (making about forty scriptures), we can say that he taught 
approximately sixty different classes during his long teaching career, to a vast number 
of disciples.104 According to Shākya mchog-ldan, he “had more students who 
understood philosophical texts than any Tibetan teacher of all time.”105 Many of the 
next generations’ great scholars, of all traditions (including the Bon tradition),106 were 
either direct or indirect disciples of Rong-ston, making him one of the most influential 
scholars of his time. Among these disciples are included such illustrious names as 
Mus-chen Sems-dpa’ chen-po Dkon-mchog rgyal-mtshan (1388–1469), ’Gos Lo-tsā-
ba Gzhon-nu-dpal (1392–1481), Shākya mchog-ldan (1428–1507), and Go-rams-pa 
Bsod-nams-seng-ge (1429–1489) (who studied under Rong-ston only very briefly), as 
well as many abbots from various great monasteries and seminars, such as those of 
Gsang-phu, Ngor, Se-ra, ’Bras-spungs and others.107 Even the name of the Mahāsiddha 
Thang-stong rgyal-po (1361–1485) appears in the list provided by Shākya mchog-ldan 
among “those who gained faith in the master, having made a connection with him.” 
                                                 
102 For an detailed explanation of this title see Jackson 2007. 
103 Jackson gives the following tentative list of ten treatises based on Rong-ston’s own studies and 
personal interests: 1) Abhisamayālaṃkāra; 2) Pramāṇaviniścaya; 3) Abhidharmasamuccaya; 4) 
Abhidharmakośa; 5) Vinaya; 6) Ratnagotravibhāga; 7–9) possibly the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, 
Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, Madhyāntavibhāga; 10) either a Madhyamaka treatise or another Pramāṇa 
scripture. Jackson 2007: 350. 
104 Jackson gives a list of twenty-one treatises Rong-ston taught during his career, which he did not 
compose commentaries on. Jackson 1988: V. 
105 Jackson 1988: IV. 
106 Such as Mnyam-med Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan (1356–1415), who studied Buddhist philosophy under 
Rong-ston.  
107 See the list given by Shākya mchog-ldan in Jackson 1988: VI–VIII. 
27 
 
 
 
 
According to Jackson, not only do almost all dialectical and scholastic lineages from 
the Sa-skya tradition pass through Rong-ston, but the majority of these lineages from 
the Bka’-brgyud and Rnying-ma traditions as well.108 
 
Rong-ston, the debater: 
In his own tradition, Rong-ston is remembered as an undefeated debater.109 By his 
rivals, however, he was probably remembered mainly for being the first scholar of 
major influence to directly oppose the ideas of Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzang grags-pa 
(1357-1419), who was to become one of the most important figures in the religious 
history of Tibet.110 In fact, Shākya mchog-ldan even mentions an account according to 
which both are supposed to have met and debated in Lhasa, with Rong-ston emerging 
from this debate as a winner. Although this event is not recorded in Tsong-kha-pa’s 
own biography,111 one cannot assume that it did not happen. It is, I believe, as much a 
common practice for followers of religious leaders not to include events in their 
teacher’s biography, which could “stain” their account, as it is for them to ornament 
and glorify their masters’ life-stories. 
Regardless of whether or not this debate took place, there were other sources of 
controversy between him and members of the Dga’-ldan tradition, particularly Mkhas-
grub-rje Dge-legs dpal-bzang (1385–1438),112 laid out in more detail by Jackson in his 
recent paper.113 For our purposes, it suffices to say that unfortunate outcomes of events 
lead to great sectarian disputes between these two schools after Tsong-kha-pa’s 
passing.  
 
Rong-ston, the writer: 
Jackson gives us two lists of Rong-ston’s writings: one by Shākya mchog-ldan 
included in his biography of the master and the other, more recent one, compiled by 
                                                 
108 Jackson 1989: 6. 
109 Jackson 1988: V. 
110 On Rong-ston’s critique of Tsong-kha-pa see Kobayashi 2005: 15–23. 
111 Tauscher 1995: 36–37. 
112 On the name given to this school and Mkhas-grub’s Sa-skya background see van der Kuijp 1985: 33–
35. 
113 See Jackson 2007: 352–356. 
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Khenpo Appey Rinpoche and others. Depending on the source, Rong-ston is said to 
have authored forty-one or forty-three major sub-commentaries and nineteen minor 
treatises, as well as many smaller works such as praises, sādhanas, personal 
communications and so forth. All in all, Rong-ston authored about three hundred 
works which are said to have filled either thirteen or twenty volumes.114  
Among his most important compositions are his commentaries on the 
Abhisamayālaṃkāra as well his commentaries on the treatises attributed to Maitreya 
(one of which is the focus of the present work).  
Unfortunately, only about half of his oeuvre is available to us today. And of these, 
Jackson notes, many are still difficult to access.   
 
Rong-ston, the founder: 
One of Rong-ston’s most significant achievements was his founding of the monastic 
institution of Nālendra in ’Phan-yul (Central Tibet) in the year 1436.  
Jackson points out 115 that this was assisted by the loss of power of his former patrons, 
the Phag-mo gru-pa.116 Until 1434, Rong-ston lived and taught either near their main 
seat, Sne-gdong near Lhasa. When, due to internal struggle for power, the Phag-mo 
gru-pa clan started to collapse and the political conditions got unstable (this continued 
until they eventually had to cede their sovereignty over Tibet to the Rin-spungs-pa 
clan), Rong-ston was invited to take up alternative residence in the ’Phan-yul valley, to 
the north of the capital. In 1435 he was offered a piece of land there by a local lord and 
soon the construction work on Nālendra began. Due to his fame and excellent 
reputation, Rong-ston’s efforts were greatly supported by the local nobility, as well as 
by monastic communities of the area.   
After serving as an abbot for about eight years, Rong-ston appointed his disciple 
Dwags-po paṇ-chen Bkra-shis rnam-rgyal (1399–1458) as his successor in 1442, but 
continued teaching at Nālendra until just a few days prior to his passing.  
                                                 
114 Jackson 1988: XIV. See also Chogay Trichen 1983: 30.  
115 Jackson 1988: x–xi; and 1989: 7–8. 
116 In the 14th century, the Phag-mo-gru-pa clan took over the sovereignty over Tibet from the Sa-skya-
pas, which lasted until internal instability lead to their collapse in 1434. 
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In a short account of Nālendra, the late Bco-brgyad khri-chen, Mkhyen-rab legs-bshad 
rgya-mtsho (1920–2007),117 states that, from the time during which Rong-ston served, 
to the time of the seventh abbot, between two and three thousand monks were usually 
in residence there.118 This number later varied, depending on the political stability of 
the region. In 1959, just prior to the take-over by the Chinese communists, the monks 
residing in Nālendra were said to have numbered seven hundred.119 
 
Rong-ston, the mystic and saint:120  
Traditionally, Rong-ston is regarded as an emanation of the future Buddha Maitreya, 
who resides in the Tuṣita heaven.121 He himself is supposed to have declared several 
times that his next incarnation will not take place in the human realm, but that he 
would rather be reborn as a god in the realm of Tuṣita.122  
Rong-ston is also believed to be the reincarnation of several paṇḍitas from India, such 
as Kamalaśīla and Haribhādra, with both of whom he shares academic interests. 123 124 
With regard to his spiritual practice, ’Gos Lo-tsā-ba mentions that he exerted himself 
in the path of “pacification” (zhi byed),125 the instructions on which he had received 
from his principal teacher G.yag-ston.126 From his intensive practice, which he was 
able to maintain while appearing to engage continuously in the activity of teaching, 
several signs of realisation are said have occurred. He was, for instance, able to see the 
                                                 
117 This master, who served as the last abbot of this monastery before the cultural revolution, was 
recognised as the eighteenth incarnation in the line of Mkhyen-rab chos-rje ( 1436–1497), the eighth 
abbot of Nālendra. 
118 Chogay Trichen Rinpoche 1983: 31. 
119 Jackson 1989: 63. 
120 This paragraph might not add anything to our understanding of the historic person Rong-ston as 
such, but it is important in order to understand how he was and still is perceived in his own tradition. 
Descriptions of a master’s inner signs of realisation and outward performances of miracles are as 
commonly intertwined with accounts of historically verifiable events in Tibetan religious biographies, 
called rnam thar, as they are in hagiographies of saints of other religious traditions.  
121 Chogay Trichen 1983: 30 
122 Khentsun Sangpo 1979: 381: rgyun ldan du gsung ba la ǀ nga khams pa phob phob ’di dra mi byed 
par  ǀ  dga’ ldan du lha’i bu bdud rtsi ’thung ba zhig byed gsung bas da lta dga’ ldan na bzhugs par nges 
so ǀǀ 
123 Kamalaśīla was a master of the Svātantrika Madhyamaka philosphy and author of the 
Madhyamakāloka (Dbu ma snang ba, Derge no. 3887), which Rong-ston studied at Gsang-phu; and 
Haribhādra was (like Rong-ston) an important commentator on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. 
124 Chogye Trichen 2003: 22. 
125 A tantric practice introduced to Tibet by the master Pha-dam-pa Sangs-rgyas (b. 11th cent.). 
126 Khentsun Sangpo 1979: 379. 
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colours of the five wind energies (rlung lnga) individually, and it is recorded that a 
fallen-off toe-nail of his transformed itself into a relic-like item.127 He was also able to 
foretell precisely the age at which he would pass away, namely eighty-three.128 All of 
these are considered to be great signs of spiritual accomplishment, indicating that 
Rong-ston had reached the sixth level of realisation (bhūmi).129 
One can confidently say that Rong-ston Shes-bya kun-rig was one of the most 
outstanding Tibetan scholars of his time. He became known as one of the “six 
ornaments of Tibet,”130 which refers to the six most illustrious teachers of the Sa skya 
tradition, after its five founding masters.131  
 
3.2. Rong-ston’s presentation of buddha-nature 
3.2.1. Introduction 
In the list of Rong-ston’s teachers provided by Shākya mchog-ldan, only one of them 
is mentioned as his teacher for the “Five Dharmas of Maitreya” (rje bstun byams pa’i 
chos lnga), namely Karma Dkon-mchog gzhon-nu (b. 1333),132 a disciple of the fourth 
Karma-pa Rol-pa’i rdo-rje (1340–1383). This master stood in the lineage of the 
meditation tradition (sgom lugs) of the Ratnagotravibhāga.133 Certain teaching records 
(gsan yig), however, also state that he received the reading transmission (lung) of 
Rngog’s commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga by one of his principal teachers, 
                                                 
127 Khentsun Sangpo 1979: 380: ’phral du chos bshad pa kho na la brtson pa ltar mdzad kyang rnal 
’byor la rgyun du gnas pas rlung lnga’i kha dog kyang so sor gzigs/ zhabs kyi mthe bong gi sen mo zhig 
lhung ba nya lcibs su gyur ǀǀ  
128 Khentsun Sangpo 1979: 380, 
129 Chogay Trichen 1983: 30. 
130 The six are: (Rong-ston’s teacher) G.yag ston Sangs rgyas dpal (1350–1414) and Rong-ston Smra-
ba’i Seng-ge (1367–1449), known for their mastery of the sūtra teachings; Ngor-chen Kun-dga’ bzang-
po (1382–1456) and Rdzong-pa Kun-dga' rnam-rgyal (1432–1496), known for their expertise in the 
tantras; and (Rong-ston’s students) Go-rams-pa Bsod-nams seng-ge (1428–1489) and Shākya mchog-
ldan (1428–1507) masters in both the sūtras and the tantras. See Chogay Trichen 1983: 27.  
131 Sa-chen kun-dga’ snying-po (1092–1158), Slob-dpon Bsod-nams rtse-mo (1142–1182), Rje-btsun 
Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan (1147–1216), Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga’ rgyal-mtshan (1182–1251), and ’Gro-
mgon Chos-rgyal ’phags-pa (1235–1280).   
132 Cf. Jackson 1988: III. 
133 This lineage, as discussed above, goes back to Sajjana’s Tibetan disciple Btsan Kha-bo-che. Dga’-ba 
rdo-rje, Btsan’s translator, had composed his own commentary on the RGV based on Sajjana’s 
teachings, based on which the third Karmapa Rang-byung rdo-rje (1284–1339) wrote a summary, which 
Karma Dkon-gzhon in turn composed a commentary on. Cf. Mathes 2008: 33.  
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G.yag-ston Sangs-rgyas-dpal (1348–1414).134 With regard to his study of Blo-ldan 
shes-rab’s treatises, he is said to have studied “many exegetical traditions of the 
Svātantrika Madhyamaka transmitted by Rngog Lo-tsā-ba”135 under Rkong-ston Blo-
gros dbang-phyug.  
Rong-ston composed exegetical treatises on all five Maitreya texts and, as mentioned 
above, was particularly renowned for his explanations of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, on 
which he is reported to have authored seven commentaries.136 His commentary on the 
Ratnagotravibhāga was composed at Gsang-phu (the date of composition is not given 
in the colophon).137 In his exposition, he follows Blo-ldan shes-rab’s analytical 
tradition of bringing the teaching on buddha-nature in line with the Madhyamaka 
doctrine of emptiness. Another important feature of his commentary is, as I will try to 
show below, his use of Asaṅga’s vyākhyā which he follows verbatim in many places. 
However, he persistently reinterprets and to greater part omits all passages and 
quotations in favour of a gzhan stong interpretation of buddha-nature. This comes 
without surprise considering his education at the monastery of Gsang-phu Ne’u-thog, 
the famous learning centre established by Rngog Legs-pa’i shes-rab (student of Atīśa 
and Blo-ldan she-rab’s paternal uncle) in 1073. On the other hand, it would be at odds 
with the exegetical tradition of the meditation school to which his teacher of the 
treatises attributed to Maitreya, namely Karma Dkon-gzhon, belonged.138 As stated 
above, the analytical school of Rngog followed by Rong-ston and the meditative 
school of Btsan both go back to Sajjana and are thus complementary according to 
Shākya mchog-ldan.139 However, the differences lying in those two approaches gave 
rise to doctrinal controversies already prevalent at Rong-ston’s time, which eventually 
lead to the rang ston vs. gzhan stong debate.  
                                                 
134 This is reported by the Fifth Dalai Lama and Zhu-chen Tshul-khrims rin-chen. Cf. Kano 2006: 218. 
135 Jackson 1988: II 
136 Cf. Jackson 1988: V. 
137 Kano (2006: 218) notes that he probably composed this commentary in the 1380s, around the time he 
was engaged in the study of Rngog’s tradition.    
138 Unfortunately no commentary by this master is available to us today. Mathes notes, however, that his 
RGV commentary has been supplemented by Karma Phrin-las-pa’s (1456–1539) notes, inserted as 
corrections in the text. This text––also unavailable to us––is mentioned next to Gzhon-nu-dpal’s RGV 
commentary in Kong-sprul’s presentation of the meditative school of Btsan. From this, Mathes 
concludes that looking at Gzhon-nu-dpal’s commentary would help understand this tradition of which 
no written commentary has turned up so far. Cf. Mathes 2008: 33.  
139 Cf. van der Kuijp 1983: 43. 
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In order to fathom Rong-ston’s final understanding of buddha-nature it would be 
necessary to read all his major treatises and especially those of later date, including his 
tantric commentaries (as can be seen with the example of Dol-po-pa as we will see 
below). Since this task is yet beyond my scope and certainly beyond the scope of this 
present work, I limit myself to his presentation of buddha-nature as found in his 
commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga. Considering his concise manual on the stages 
of meditation related to this treatise, however, we can estimate that his view on the 
subject did not substantially change. In this short text, the short title of which is 
“Ornament to Maitreya’s Intent” (Mi pham dgongs rgyan), he summarises the content 
of the Ratnagotravibhāga:  
The substantial cause for the attainment of perfect awakening is the defiled 
dhātu. Once the defilements have been purified, undefiled suchness is 
obtained, this is awakening. From the attainment of awakening, the 
excellences, such as powers and so forth, are obtained, and one accomplishes 
others’ benefit [by means of] enlightened activities. This teaching subsumes 
the whole meaning of this [treatise].140 
In the following, I will try to present Rong-ston’s interpretation of buddha-nature 
systematically, at times contrasting his views on the main topics with those of other 
influential scholars.  
 
3.2.2. The buddha excellences and the dharmakāya 
To be sure, an important doctrinal claim of Dol-po-pa’s brand of gzhan stong, namely 
the presence of the dharmakāya and the buddha excellences (guṇa) in sentient beings, 
is explicitly rejected by Rong-ston. For Dol-po-pa, the teachings on the 
tathāgatagarbha represent the crucial bridge between sūtra and tantra. He thus 
presents his final view of buddha-nature in accord with the mantrayāna teachings in 
general and with the Kālacakratantra in particular, rather than with the common 
                                                 
140 MG: 105,4–6: rdzogs pa’i byang chub thob pa’i rgyu’i nyer len ni dri bcas kyi khams yin la ǀ dri ma 
sbyangs nas dri med de bzhin nyid du gyur pa thob pa ni byang chub yin la ǀ byang chub thob pa nas 
stobs sogs kyi yon tan brnyes te ǀ gzhan don phrin las ’grub ces pa ni ǀ ’di’i don thams cas bsdus te bstan 
pa’o ǀǀ  
33 
 
 
 
 
interpretation as found in treatises such as the Ratnagotravibhāga.141 In his 
“extraordinary” presentation (in accord with the tantras), he distinguishes between two 
sets of buddha bodies (kāya-s) and excellences, one pertaining to ultimate truth and the 
other to the level of concealing truth.142 While the former are present in all sentient 
beings’ ultimate nature since beginningless time, the latter are to be generated on the 
path and are therefore, in the final analysis, not really existent.143   
Commenting on RGV I.51 (and following Asaṅga’s vyākhyā)  Rong-ston states that in 
the impure state adventitious defilements cover the dhātu, while in its purified state 
alone it is endowed with the excellences.144 He then goes on saying: 
Explaining that “naturally endowed” means to be endowed from the beginning 
is simply wrong. In brief, when the dhātu is free from defilements it 
inherently possesses the excellences, similar to fire which naturally possesses 
heat. This is called “naturally endowed.” 145 
Thus, for Rong-ston, the buddha excellences are not present in sentient beings. They 
are, however, inseparable from the perfected state and in this way are called “naturally 
endowed.”  
 
The stanzas RGV I.154–155, so crucial for the gzhan stong interpretation of buddha-
nature, state that nothing needs to be added to the dhātu since, while empty of 
adventitious defilements, it is not empty of inseparable qualities. Rong-ston’s take on 
this fundamental passage is the following:  
                                                 
141 Dol-po-pa’s understanding of buddha-nature seems not to be fully revealed in his RGV commentary. 
Rather, as Mathes (2008: 76) remarks, his ultimate gzhan stong view is fully laid out in his Ri chos nges 
don rgya mtsho which, in turn, repeatedly quotes the RGV.   
142 To be more precise, Dol-po-pa identifies the fruit of dissociation (i.e. the ten strengths, the four 
fearlessnesses, and the eighteen exclusive features of a buddha) as the unproduced excellences present 
in all beings. That which is produced on the level of concealing truth is the fruit of maturation (i.e. the 
thirty-two major and minor marks). Cf. Mathes 2008: 81–82.  
143 Cf. Mathes 2008: 78–80. 
144 Note that regarding this crucial point, both commentaries directly contradict the verses of the root 
text, which do not differentiate between the three states at this point. 
145 LS: 56,5–6: rang bzhin gyis ldan zhes pa’i don dang po nas ldan par ’chad pa ni nor ba kho na’o ǀǀ 
mdor na khams dri ma dang bral ba na me la tsha ba rang chas su ldan pa bzhin du yon tan rang chas su 
ldan pas na de la rang bzhin gyis ldan zhes bya’o ǀǀ 
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Also, the meaning of “not empty of unsurpassable qualities” must be 
explained as “not empty of unsurpassable qualities, [i.e.] the two types of 
selflessness.” But to maintain that [it means] “not empty of the excellences 
such as the powers and so forth” is not acceptable.146  
He could not be more explicit. It is in this way that, for Rong-ston, the dhātu is related 
to the philosophical view of emptiness which does not superimpose a self to either the 
person or phenomena. Since those two types of self do not exist there is nothing to be 
removed from the dhātu, and since, on the other hand, it by nature lacks the two types 
of self nothing needs to be added to it either.  
 
Regarding the dharmakāya, Rong-ston, referring back to Blo-ldan shes-rab’s 
commentary on RGV I.27–28, remarks that it is the essence of beings only nominally, 
since their actual essence is the gotra, which is the potential to attain the ultimate 
result. He writes:  
[...] while the dharmakāya is the actual Tathāgata, [saying it is] “the essence 
of sentient beings” is nominal, and since it is attainable by sentient beings it is 
said to be pervasive.147  
Further below in the commentary he again explicitly states that the term dharmakāya 
exclusively applies to the thoroughly purified state alone, while gotra pertains only to 
the impure state of ordinary beings and to the partially purified state of bodhisattvas. 
Of the three aspects of buddha-nature––dharmakāya, suchness, and gotra––only 
suchness actually pervades all states: 
The first two (i.e. ordinary beings and bodhisattvas) do not participate in the 
dharmakāya, while the latter (i.e. buddhas) do not participate in the gotra. 
Therefore natural suchness manifests [in all three]. 
In the commentary [of Asaṅga it is stated that] the pure suchness of all 
phenomena is that which is taught to be the general characteristic.148  
                                                 
146 LS: 97,3–4: bla na med pa’i chos kyis mi stong pa’i don yang ǀ bla na med pa’i chos bdag med gnyis 
kyis mi stong pa la bshad par bya ba yin gyi ǀ stobs sogs kyi yon tan gyis mi stong pa la ’dod pa ni mi 
’thad do ǀǀ 
147 LS: 34,2: chos sku ni de bzhin gshegs pa dngos yin la ǀ sems can gyi snying po ni btags pa ba yin zhing 
ǀ sems can rnams kyis thob tu rung ba’i phyir khyab par bshad pa’o  ǀǀ 
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3.2.3. The dhātu as a cause  
The dhātu’s most prominent feature, according to Rong-ston, is its function as a cause 
for achieving perfect awakening. By taking it as the focal object for the one’s 
meditation practice––which is called “individual correct mental engagement” (so so 
rang gi tshul bzhin yin la byas pas)––it becomes a cause for buddhahood. Since the 
dhātu, as seen above, by nature lacks the two types of self, fully realising its nature is 
tantamount to achieving the ultimate result. By realising that the person (gang zag) is 
empty of a self the obscuration of defilements (nyon mongs pa’i sgrib pa) is removed, 
and by realising that all phenomena are devoid of self one removes the obscuration of 
knowledge (shes bya’i sgrib pa).149 Along these lines, Rong-ston, commenting on 
RGV I.26 which identifies the dhātu as the cause for the achievement of the Three 
Precious Jewels, writes:  
                                                                                                                                                        
In this way, since one is liberated when the dhātu is realised, the dhātu is the 
object (gnas) to be realised. When it is not realised, however, one will not be 
liberated. [...] since this dhātu is the seed for beyond-worldly qualities the 
Three Precious Jewels arise based on total purity from defilements [achieved] 
by means of individual correct mental engagement. Thus it is the cause.150  
In other words, by focussing on the dhātu one achieves perfect purity which in turn is 
the basis for the Three Precious Jewels to arise. This understanding is in line with 
Rngog’s presentation of buddha-nature in terms of a non-affirming negation 
summarised by Mathes in the following way: “The buddha nature or element, which is 
repeatedly said to be the emptiness of each mindstream, can become the objective 
support of inferential cognitions that negate without affirming anything. As such it 
becomes the substantial cause for the attainment of buddha qualities.”151   
 
148 LS: 52,3–4: chos sku la ’jug pa snga ma gnyis dang rigs la phyi ma med pas rang bzhin de bzhin nyid 
kyis ’jug pa ste ǀ ’grel par chos thams cad de bzhin nyid rnam par dag pa spyi’i mtshan nyid bstan pa 
gang yin pa de la zhes pa’o ǀǀ 
149 Cf. LS: 96, 2–3. 
150 LS: 32,1 & 3–4: ’di ltar khams ni rtogs bya’i gnas te ǀ khams rtogs na grol bar ’gyur la ǀ mi rtogs na 
mi grol bas so ǀǀ [...] khams de ni ’jig rten las ’das pa’i chos kyi sa bon yin pas so so rang gi tshul bzhin 
yin la byas pas dri mas rnam par dag pa la brten nas dkon mchog gsum ’byung bas rgyu’o ǀǀ 
151 Mathes 2008: 29. 
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3.2.4. The gotra and the luminous nature of the mind 
As seen above, the gotra––the third aspect of the tathāgatagarbha––exclusively relates 
to sentient beings in the impure state and to bodhisattvas who have partially purified 
the dhātu from adventitious defilements. The gotra has a twofold nature representing: 
(a) sentient beings’ fundamental potential for perfect awakening called naturally 
abiding gotra (prakr̥tisthagotra; rang bzhin gnas rigs), and (b) its activated form which 
becomes the cause for the actualisation of buddhahood called the accomplished or 
generated gotra (samudānītagotra; bsgrubs pa [las gyur pa]’i rigs). Following Rngog 
Blo-ldan shes-rab, Rong-ston therefore calls the gotra the “causal sugatagarbha” 
(’bras bu’i bde gshegs snying po). 
In his commentary on RGV I.40, Rong-ston defines the natural gotra as being 
composed of both aspects of the mind, namely cognisance (rig pa) and emptiness 
(stong pa): 
For those who maintain that the naturally abiding gotra is the unconditioned 
dharmatā only, an awakening through conditions does not make sense. 
Therefore, it is necessary to maintain [that the natural gotra comprises] the 
cognitive aspect [of mind] as well. Consequently the cognitive aspect creates 
the appropriating cause of the buddha-wisdom. Moreover, if it (i.e. the 
cognitive aspect) were not empty of an own-being it would not change, and on 
that account it would not make sense to nurture it [through conditions].  
For this reason, since the result arises from the mind qualified by being empty 
of an own-being, it is necessary to maintain the non-differentiation of expanse 
and cognisance.152  
In other words, a twofold nature of the gotra is necessary for it to be awakened on one 
hand and for there being room for change (and eventually the actualisation of 
buddhahood) on the other hand.153   
                                                 
152 LS: 46,6–47,3: rang bzhin gnas rigs ’dus ma byas chos nyid ’ba’ zhig tu ’dod pa la ni rkyen gyis sad 
pa’i don med pas rig pa’i cha’ang ’dod dgos so ǀǀ des na rig pas ni sangs rgyas kyi ye shes kyi nyer len 
gyi rgyu byed la  ǀ de yang rang bzhin gyis mi stong na mi ’gyur bas rkyen gyis gsos btab par mi rung ngo 
ǀǀ des na rang bzhin gyis stong pas khyad par du byas pa’i sems las ’bras bu ’byung ba’i phyir  ǀ dbyings 
rig dbyer med pa ’dod dgos so ǀǀ 
153 The second aspect relates to Nāgārjuna’s teaching in MMK  XXIV,14. See also n.77. 
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The view Rong-ston refutes here is based on Rngog Blo-ldan shes-rab’s position 
which equates the naturally abiding gotra with emptiness.154 It found its followers 
among the Dge-lugs-pa school and has been formulated, among others, by Rong-ston’s 
younger contemporary Mkhas-grub-rje (1385–1438), a disciple of Tsong-kha-pa 
(1357–1419):   
Voidness (śūnyatā) which is void of the citta established in reality (sems bden 
par grub pas stongs pa) is what we call the citta’s naturally pure 
(prakr̥tipariśuddha) dharmatā. The citta’s naturally pure dharmatā in the 
condition (avasthā) which is not free from the adventitious impurities 
(āgantukamala) we call the tathāgatagarbha, or the prakr̥tisthagotra [...].155 
In other words, the naturally abiding gotra and tathāgatagarbha are synonymous for 
Mkhas-grub-rje and both refer to the mind’s mere emptiness.  
 
From Rong-ston’s commentary on two later verses one can infer that he too maintains 
a non-separation of gotra and tathāgatagarbha, albeit in a different manner:  
(1) Commenting on RGV I.41, he states that it is the Mind-only school which 
separates the gotra and the tathāgatagarbha claiming that some beings, although 
possessed of the garbha, lack the cause for liberation.156 Refuting the idea of the so-
called cut-off gotra, Rong-stong says that such statements found in the sūtras are 
intended to convert those opposed to the Mahāyāna teachings and are thus not of 
definitive meaning.  
(2) In a second step he also refutes the assertion of the Ratnagotravibhāga belonging 
to the Mind-only school. In his commentary on I.87b he writes that since in this 
treatise there is no nirvāṇa apart from buddhahood, it cannot belong to the Cittamātra 
corpus.157  
                                                 
154 Cf. Kano 2006: 157–158. 
155 Quoted after Seyfort Ruegg 1968: 505. 
156 To justify this statement, he calls the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra to witness. Indeed, in the third chapter 
of this treatise (III.11) we read of some beings lacking the cause for liberation (i.e. the gotra), while 
IX.37 states that all beings possess the [tathāgata]garbha.  
157 Seyfort Ruegg has shown in various places that Yogācāra treatises do accept the idea of there being 
three gotra-s (or four, if those of uncertain gotra are counted separately), as well as a class of beings 
with a cut-off gotra, implying the existence of three definitive vehicles (i.e. śrāvaka-, pratyekabuddha-, 
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In his commentary on the third chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, Rong-ston 
discusses the Ratnagotravibhāga’s stance on buddha-nature in a section on the 
Madhyamaka’s interpretation of the gotra and says that in this treatise, the gotra 
equals the sugatagarbha of sentient beings’ continuum.158 He further argues that 
sometimes the sugatagarbha is explained from the point of view of dharmatā, while at 
others it is taught from the point of view of the dharmin or “bearer of the quality” 
(chos can),159 which he explains to be the mind’s cognitive aspect (sems rig) and mere 
luminosity (gsal tsam).160 In other words, the mind’s cognitive aspect or luminosity 
has emptiness as its nature. On can therefore speak of the non-differentiation of 
“awareness” and emptiness (rig stong) or luminosity and emptiness (gsal stong) with 
regard to the mind’s nature and this is indeed what Rong-ston does in his commentary 
on RGV I.64.161    
One has to note, however, that since the cognitive aspect of mind is contrasted with the 
unconditioned dharmatā, the former should be accepted as conditioned. I could not 
identify any passage in the course of my research where Rong-ston addresses this 
point directly. On the other hand, he writes about the dhātu:  
The nature of the mind which is emptiness, is similar to the element of space 
[in that it] has neither a substantial cause nor an assisting condition, nor the 
combination of both. Therefore, it has no arising in the beginning, no 
disintegration in the end, and no abiding in between. [...] Therefore this dhātu 
is not conditioned by causes and conditions, and is established as emptiness 
free from elaborations.162  
                                                                                                                                                        
and bodhisattva-vehicles) leading to three corresponding definitive results (i.e. arhatship, 
pratyekabuddhahood, and buddhahood). See for example Seyfort Ruegg 1976. 
158 In other words, it is the causal sugatagarbha as explained in his commentary on RGV I.28. 
159 In general, the term chos can (Skt. dharmin) denotes the bearer of a specific characteristic or dharma. 
In particalur, it can refer to the subject of a syllogism. In my translation, I usually rendered chos can 
with “subject.” When it is used to mark the subject of a syllogism, however, I kept the Sanskrit term to 
mark this subject.  
160 Cf. NG: 49,1–4.  
161 See also below (3.2.4.). 
162 LS: 60,5–61,1: sems kyi rang bzhin stong pa nyid ni nam mkha’ ltar nyer len gyi rgyu med cing lhan 
cig byed pa’i rkyen med de ǀ de gnyis tshogs pa’ang med cing ǀ des dang po skye ba dang mthar ’jig pa 
dang bar du gnas pa’ang yod pa min no ǀǀ [...] zhes gsungs pas kyang khams ’di rgyu rkyen gyis ’dus ma 
byas shing stong nyid spros bral du grub bo ǀǀ  
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I take this to mean that in this case dhātu refers to the natural tathāgatagarbha, i.e. 
unconditioned suchness, while the gotra does have a conditioned aspect to it which is 
the cognitive aspect of mind.  
   
3.2.5. Rong-ston and the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā 
In many places, Rong-ston follows the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā up to the point of 
giving the same quotations to support specific claims with authoritative scriptures. 
However, some passages of the root text and the vyākhyā are clearly in favour of the 
gzhan stong interpretation of buddha-nature. In those cases, Rong-ston either interprets 
the meaning of given passages in light of the Madhyamaka view or simply leaves them 
out. (Of course, it would have been extremely redundant for him to reinterpret every 
controversial passage once his position has been clearly laid out.)  
For instance, on RGV I.50, in the chapter on the all-pervasive nature of the dhātu, the 
vyākhyā quotes the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta:  
“[...] living beings and the Absolute Body are not different from each other. 
[...] These two are non-dual by meaning, and different merely by letters.” 163   
Since this quote goes against Rong-ston’s explanation given on RGV I.28––namely 
that the dharmakāya is the essence of beings only nominally––he chose to ignore it.164 
Rather, he chose to elaborate on the simile of the all-pervasive nature of space given in 
the root text. After explaining how the naturally pure expanse (i.e. suchness), on 
account of being pervasive to all dharmin-s on one hand and its undifferentiated nature 
on the other, is neither a singular phenomenon nor multiple in nature, he goes on to 
say:  
While the example of space pervading all forms [of vessels] should be applied 
to the naturally pure characteristic pervading all [states], it should not be 
                                                 
163 Transl. Takasaki 1966: 234. Cf. Johnston 1950: 41, 15–17.  
164 It has to be noted that a similar point was made already in relation to RGV I.48, where Asaṅga’s 
commentary also quotes the same scripture. Commenting on this stanza, Rong-ston refers back to Blo-
ldan shes-rab’s explanation of the gotra being the actual essence of sentient beings. Cf. LS 53,6–54,1. 
Therefore, it would have been redundant to repeat the same arguments.  
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applied to the total purity from adventitious [defilements] pervading all 
[states].165  
In other words, natural purity (i.e. suchness) pervades all dharmin-s, but the state of 
total purification of the adventitious defilements, i.e. the dharmakāya, does not 
pervade ordinary sentient beings or bodhisattvas. This directly contradicts the 
quotation given in Asaṅga’s commentary.  
Another example for Rong-ston’s procedure is his commentary on RGV I.61–63 
which establishes the nature of the mind as luminosity devoid of mental afflictions 
within the chapter on the dhātu’s immutability. On RGV I.62, Rong-ston defines the 
nature of mind as being emptiness free from elaborations on account of it not being 
conditioned by causes and conditions. Neither the root text nor the vyākhyā mention 
emptiness at this point. Again, on RGV I.63 which defines the mind’s nature as 
luminosity, Rong-ston comments:  
The nature of the mind, the very luminosity-emptiness, is similar to space [in 
that] it does not change into something else.166 
On the next stanza he then omits the quotation from the Gaganagañjāparipr̥cchā given 
in Asaṅga’s commentary in support of the root verses, which explains the nature of the 
mind as luminosity owing to it being untainted by defilements.167 In this way he adds a 
crucial detail––namely the nature of the mind to consist of both luminosity and 
emptiness––necessary for his particular non-gzhan stong interpretation of buddha-
nature. This luminosity (’od gsal), as seen above, is also the called the cognitive aspect 
(rig cha) of mind which Rong-ston identifies as one part of the naturally abiding gotra 
all beings are said to be endowed with.  
 
3.2.6. Summary 
                                                 
165 LS: 55,4–5: nam mkha’ gzugs can thams cad la khyab pa’i dpes kyang spyi’i mtshan nyid rang bzhin 
rnam dag gis thams cad la khyab pa la sbyar bar bya yi ǀ  glo bur rnam dag gis thams cad la khyab pa la 
sbyar bar bya ba ma yin no ǀǀ 
166 LS: 61,2: sems kyi rang bzhin ’od gsal stong pa nyid gang yin pa de ni nam mkha’ bzhin du gzhan du 
’gyur ba med de ǀ 
167 Cf. Takasaki 1966: 239 and Nakamura 1967: 87. 
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To sum up: Rong-ston’s position regarding buddha-nature as expressed in his 
commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga follows Rngog Blo-ldan shes-rab’s analytical 
tradition in that he brings it in line with the Madhyamaka view of the ultimate. Since 
this would be the claim of other later Tibetan exegetes (such as Dol-po-pa) as well, 
one has to be more specific. In his view, the qualities the tathāgatagarbha is said to be 
endowed with are the two types of selflessness, as opposed to the fully fledged 
strengths and fearlessness of a buddha as Dol-po-pa claims (or their subtle form, 
which would be Gzhon-nu-dpal’s take on this issue). Thus the buddha’s dharmakāya 
and sentient beings’ gotra are mutually exclusive terms. 
Following Rngog, Rong-ston lays out three distinct usages of the term 
“sugatagarbha.” It can relate to: (a) a resultant aspect which is the actual buddha-
nature, called dharmakāya; (b) natural suchness (i.e. emptiness) pervading ordinary 
beings’ minds and buddhas alike; or (c) sentient beings’ potential to attain 
buddhahood, i.e. the gotra. Unlike Rngog (and his heirs in the Dge-lugs-pa tradition), 
however, Rong-ston accepts buddha-nature to comprise in its causal aspect––more 
precisely, as the naturally abiding gotra––not only the unconditioned dharmatā 
equivalent to emptiness, but the cognitive aspect of mind as well. One might want to 
interpret this as the remains of Rong-ston’s inheritance from his affiliation with Btsan 
Ka-bo-che’s meditation tradition, which emphasises the luminous aspect of the mind. 
Being as firmly grounded in scholastic training as he was, however, I would rather 
think that this was for him a question of proper reasoning and not an attempt to 
reconcile differing views.   
Be that as it may, Rong-ston was certainly one of most influencial Tibetan luminaries, 
to honor the Ratnagotravibhāga as a fundamental śastra by composing a detailed 
commentary on its meaning.  
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4. Translation of Rong-ston’s commentary on RGV I.27–95[a] 
4.1. Notes on the translation 
Aside from the Sanskrit edition of the text by Johnston, the most notable academic 
publications in European languages relating to the root verses of the 
Ratnagotravibhāga (including the vyākhyā) are Takasaki’s English translation based 
on the Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese, and the publications by de Jong and 
Schmithausen including numerous annotations and corrections. The translation of the 
root verses in this present work is primarilly based on the Tibetan168 to agree with 
Rong-ston’s commentary. Whenever I found deviations in meaning from the Sanskrit I 
noted them in the footnotes, referring back to the above mentioned articles as well as 
Takasaki’s translation. Footnotes also include significant terminological differences 
with Takasaki.   
Regarding Rong ston’s commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga entitled Theg pa chen 
po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos legs par bshad pa, I have had three editions at my 
disposal: (the sigla used throughout the translation are given first) 
- G: Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos legs par bshad pa. A detailed exegesis 
of the Uttaratantraśāstra (Ratnagotravibhāga) by Roṅ-ston Śes-bya-kun-rig. 
Reproduced from a rare manuscript from Jakhar Tshang. Gangtok, 1979: (G). This is a 
manuscript of 96 folios (192 pages) written in dbu med script. 
- LS: Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos legs par bshad pa bzhugs so. In: Rong 
ston bka’ ’bum: vol. JA. Skye dgu mdo: Gangs ljong rig rgyan gsung rab par khang, 
2004. A modern printed edition of 100 folios (199 pages). 
- K: Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos legs par bshad pa bzhugs so. In: Theg 
pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos rtsal ´grel bzhugs so. Khreng tu’u (Chengdu): Si 
khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1995. A book in western format including a consice 
account of Maitreya’s career, the root verses of the Ratnagotravibhāga, Rong-ston’s 
commentary, and its outline.  
 
                                                 
168 I used Nakamura’s edition of this text. Cf. Nakamura 1967. 
43 
 
 
 
 
Since this last publication was the first edition I had access to, my translation was, at 
the beginning, based on this version. I did, however, manage to acquire the other two 
editions later, the first from University of Vienna and the second from the 
International Buddhist Academy in Kathmandu. The latter turned out to offer the most 
correct reading. As I did not intend to produce a critical edition of this commentary, it 
was not necessary for me to collate the three editions. Whenever I found the meaning 
of a passage altered by the readings found in the other editions, the variants got 
marked and indicated at in a footnote. Since the edition from Skye-dgu-mdo has the 
best reading of the text and is widely available today (via the Tibetan Buddhist 
Resource Centre, New York) I found it sensible to base the page references throughout 
my translation on this edition. A partial facsimile reproduction of this edition is given 
in appendix III.  
 
 
44 
 
 
 
 
4.2. The translation 
 
The extensive explanation of the dhātu  
[33,3] This first chapter [of the individual explanation of the four last Vajra Points] has 
five divisions: (1) the explanation that all sentient beings have buddha-nature (sangs 
rgyas kyi snying po), (2) determining the dhātu by means of ten categories (rnam 
gzhag), (3) explaining the way the essence (snying po; garbha) is obscured by 
defilements [by means of nine analogies], (4) the explanation of the person who 
realises (rtogs pa) this dhātu, and (5) the purpose of explaining the dhātu.169 
 
 
1. The explanation that all sentient beings have buddha-nature (buddhagarbha) 
 
Concerning this first chapter: 
  rdzogs sangs sku ni 'phro phyir dang ||  
 de bzhin nyid dbyer med phyir dang || 
 rigs yod phyir na lus can kun ||   
 rtag tu sangs rgyas snying po can ||      (I.28)170 
  
sangs rgyas ye shes sems can tshogs zhugs phyir ||  
 rang bzhin dri med de ni gnyis med de ||  
 sangs rgyas rigs la de 'bras nyer btags phyir ||   
 'gro kun sangs rgyas snying po can du gsungs || (I.27) 
 
All embodied beings are permanently endowed with the buddhagarbha, 
due to the pervasion171 of the body of the perfect buddha, 
because suchness is without differentiation, and  
because the gotra is present [in sentient beings].     
 
All migrators are said to possess the buddhagarbha, because 
the buddha’s wisdom is present in the multitude of sentient beings,  
this stainlessness is non-dual by nature, and  
its fruit has been “metaphorically” applied to the buddhagotra.172     
                                                 
169 The translation covers points (1) and (2) of this chapter. 
170  As Takasaki (1966: 197, n. 2) and Chenique (2001: 99) both point out, the order of this and the 
following verse in the Sanskrit text are reversed in the Tibetan versions. For further details consult 
Takasaki. I have kept the order as given in the Tibetan text, since I am following Rong-ston’s 
commentary.   
171  Skt. spharaṇa. Takasaki (1966: 197) reads: “The Buddha’s Body penetrates everywhere, […].”  
Edgerton (repr. 1998: 613) gives suffusion and pervasion as possible translations for spharaṇa.  
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In terms of defiled suchness (dri bcas de bzhin nyid; samalā tathatā), what is the 
meaning of the statement “all sentient beings possess the tathāgatagarbha,” found in 
many sūtras? 173 
[All beings possess the tathāgatagarbha] because (1) the dharmakāya of the perfectly 
awakened ones pervades, (2) because [sentient beings] are endowed with suchness 
which is inseparable from the naturally pure aspect of the suchness of the dharmakāya, 
and (3) because the gotra of the dharmakāya, [i.e.] the potential (nus pa) of the dhātu, 
exists.  
[34] Because of these three reasons it is said that all embodied beings are permanently 
endowed with the buddhagarbha.  
 
Mahā174 states that these three [reasons refer] to the resultant, the natural, and the 
causal sugatagarbha (bde gshegs snying po) respectively:   
The first (i.e. the resultant sugatagarbha, dharmakāya) is explained [thus]: while the 
dharmakāya is the actual tathāgata, [saying it is] “the essence of sentient beings” is 
nominal, and since it is attainable by sentient beings it is said to be pervasive.  
The second (i.e. the natural sugatagarbha, suchness) is explained as actually being the 
essence of both the tathāgata and sentient beings. From the point of view of the 
naturally pure suchness alone, it exists in both. 
With regard to the third (i.e. the causal sugatagarbha, gotra), it is explained that since 
it is the cause of that Tathāgata, it is named after it, but [in this case] it is the actual 
“essence of sentient beings.”175  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
172 Takasaki (1966: 197) reads: “Its result manifests itself on the Germ of the Buddha; […].” Takasaki 
bases this reading on the Chinese version, stating himself that it is difficult to identify it with the 
Sanskrit reading. See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 273 and Mathes 2008: 11.  
173 For a sūtra reference see TGS 248b2–6, for śāstra see MSA 9.37. See also Takasaki 1966: 31–45. 
174 “Mahā” refers to Rngog Blo-ldan shes-rab, “the great translator from Rngog” who, in addition to a 
translation of the RGV accomplished in collaboration with the Indian scholar Sajjana, also composed an 
important commentary on it entiteled Rgyud bla ma'i don bsdus pa. Cf. Introdution. For an edition and 
translation of the first chapter of this treatise see Kano 2006.  
175 For Rngog’s explanation of the three aspects of the tathāgatagarbha see Kano 2006: 331–332 (transl. 
444–446), and Mathes 2008: 28. 
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Further commenting on this, [another translation of RGV I.27 reads]: 
The buddha’s wisdom abides inside sentient beings’ aggregates. That [wisdom] 
is by nature non-dual and undefiled. Having given the buddhagotra the name of 
the result, it is said that all embodied beings [are] buddhagarbhas.176   
Further, since it is explained in the commentary [by Asaṅga] that “these three are 
explained below, following the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra”177, it is said below: 
Its own-being is the dharmakāya,  
suchness, as well as the gotra.  
These are to be known by means of  
three, one, and five examples respectively.178 
[35] This is in connection with the nine examples [used] for the [tathāgata]garbha.179 
 
As for “the dharmakāya of realisation180 pervading all sentient beings” in the extensive 
explanation of the commentary [by Asaṅga], the meaning of “dharmakāya of the 
tathāgata suffuses181 all sentient beings” is further [explained] in the commentary [on 
verse I.147]:  
In reference to the meaning of “the dharmakāya pervades the element (khams, 
dhātu) of all sentient beings without exception,” [the fact] that these sentient 
beings are endowed with the tathāgatagarbha is explained by means of these 
three examples, i.e. the body of a buddha (abiding in a putrid lotus), the honey 
(hidden by the bees), and the husk (enclosing a seed).182     
                                                 
176 sems can phung po'i nang na sangs rgyas ye shes gnas || de ni rang bzhin gnyis med phyir na dri ma 
med || sangs rgyas rigs la 'bras bu rnam par brtags nas ni || lus can thams cad sangs rgyas snying por 
brjod pa yin ||.  This alternative translation is given in Bu-ston’s mDzes rgyan, 17b2–3. For a tranlation 
of this passage see Seyfort Ruegg 1973: 102. 
177 See Johnston 1950: 26,9–10; Nakamura 1967: 49,14; and Takasaki 1966: 198.  
178 RGV I.144 
179 For their analysis from the TGS see Zimmermann 2002: 34–39. 
180 This refers to RGV I.145, where the dharmakāya is explained to have two aspects: (1) the perfectly 
pure aspect, and (2) its natural outflow, i.e. the teaching. The perfectly pure aspect of the dharmakāya is 
the dharmadhātu, which is the domain of non-conceptual wisdom - it is the truth to be realised. The 
dharmakāya’s second aspect is the natural outflow of this realisation, namely the teaching given to the 
various types of disciples according to their needs and capacities. See also Takasaki 1966: 284–285. 
181 Skt. pariṣpharana; Tib. 'phro ba. 
182 See Johnston 1950: 70,16–18; Nakamura 1967: 137,20–22; and Takasaki 1966: 286 
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In addition to this, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra is cited as a scriptural source: 
Just as space is accepted to be all-pervasive at all times,  
Likewise this [transmutation] is accepted to be always all-pervasive.  
Just as space pervades all forms,  
Likewise this [transmutation] also pervades  
the multitude of sentient beings.183      
The meaning of those [lines] is: 
“The naturally pure aspect [of the dharmakāya] pervades all sentient beings,” means 
that [it is] the cause for attaining the transmutation of the basis of both the dharmakāya 
of realisation and the teaching [aspect of the] dharmakāya.184  
 
Concerning the meaning of “suchness being without differentiation:” 
Because [all phenomena] are empty of a true essential nature (bden pa’i ngo bo nyid), 
[suchness] is explained as being indivisible because it pervades the entire basis and 
result, as well as everything outside and inside. 
 
Concerning “the gotra pervades:” 
The potential of the mind which is to be awakened by means of [certain] conditions is 
the cause for taking hold of the buddha’s wisdom. [36] As it is said:  
[...] the undefiled knowledge present in embodied beings is similar to honey 
[...]185 
                                                 
183 MSA IX.15. The ninth chapter of the MSA gives an analysis of a buddha’s awakening in general, and 
an explanation of the “transmutation of the basis” (Skt. āśrayaparivr̥tti, Tib. gnas gyur) in particular. 
This transmutation is achieved when the obscuration of mental afflictions (hindering liberation) and the 
obscuration to knowlegde (hindering omniscience) are completely abandoned. In his MSABh 
Vasubandhu adds that the transmutation of the basis equates buddhahood, the pervasion of which is 
explained in verses IX.4 and 6. He further states that the reason for buddhahood’s pervasion of sentient 
beings in particular, is the “perfection of (a buddha’s) acceptance of all beings as himself.” Cf. Thurman 
2004: 74–80.   
184 Seyfort Ruegg has shown how, in the RGV, the “basis” refers to the dhātu or defiled suchness, while 
“transmutation” denotes awakening or undefiled suchness. Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 422. 
185 RGV I.104. The whole stanza reads : ji ltar sbrang rtsi srog chags bye ba khrag khrig stong bsgribs 
sbrang rsti don gnyer mis | sbrang ma de dag bsal te ji ltar ’dod pa bzhin du sbrang rtsi’i bya byed pa | 
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Explaning the dhātu to be purified and explaning that the function of the gotra is to see 
the faults of suffering and the benefits of happiness, is the function of precisely this 
[verse?].   
  
Here, [with regard to] the meaning of “the dharmakāya pervades,” the ascertainment 
that enlightened activities pervade is not acceptable because it is in contradiction with 
the [abovementioned] meaning derived from the scripture of the 
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.  
Therefore, the naturally pure [aspect of the dharmakāya] refers to that which is 
encompassed by mental continuums only, while suchness pervades all inner and outer 
[phenomena]. For this reason there is no fault of repetition. 
Suchness and the naturally pure aspect [of the dharmakāya] exist in the manner of the 
excellences and that which possesses these excellences. Furthermore, it says in this 
text: “the excellences are naturally pure.”186  
 
“The suchness of the buddha is present in all sentient beings without differentiation”187 
means that the suchness of the tathāgata is undifferentiated in all sentient beings. In the 
commentary [of Asaṅga this is illustrated] by [using] the one example of gold.188 
“Undifferentiated suchness” means that the suchness of the tathāgata is [equal to the 
suchness of] these sentient beings. As a quotation in support [of this]:  
Even though suchness is undifferentiated in all,  
having become purified it is the Tathāgata.  
Therefore [37] all living beings possess its essence (garbha). 189 
                                                                                                                                                        
de bzhin lus can la yod zag pa med pa’i shes pa sbrang ma’i rtsi dang ’dra | nyon mongs sbrang ma 
dang ’dra de ’joms pa la mkhams pa’i rgyal ba skyes bu bzhin |  
186 RGV I.164. The whole stanza reads: bcos ma glo bur ba nyid phyir | sems can skyon de yang dag min 
| yang dag nyes de bdag med pa | yon tan rang bzhin dag pa yin ||. 
This stanza seems to say that sentient beings’ faults, i.e. their mental afflictions, are not truly existent 
because they are fabricated and adventitious, while the selflessness of these faults truly exists. The last 
quarter of this stanza is, however, more difficult to interpret. The question is to know whether this 
selflessness is to be equated with the naturally pure excellences (as Rong-ston’s commentary, as well as 
Takasaki’s translation of the root text suggest) or not. This is, of course, a dividing point for the rang 
stong and gzhan stong interpretations of the RGV. Asaṅga himself does not comment on this stanza. 
187 Cf. MSA IX.37. 
188 See RGV I.108–114 as well as I.148 along with Asaṅga’s commentary. See Johnston 1950: 71; 
Nakamura 1967: 139; and Takasaki 1966: 287–288. 
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That is to say, in dharmatā, [i.e.] the emptiness of own-being, there is no difference 
[with regard to sentient beings and the Tathāgata].  
 
“The gotra which generates the three types of buddha-bodies is present in sentient 
beings,”190 means that the gotra of the tathāgata is present in all sentient beings.  
In the commentary, the remaining five examples––the treasure, the tree, the precious 
statue, the universal emperor, and the golden sculpture––refer to the existence of the 
gotra which generates the three types of buddha-bodies.  
 
This dhātu of the tathāgata is taught to be the essence of all sentient beings.  
In the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra191 it is stated: 
The dhātu which exists since time without beginning 
is the basis of all phenomena.  
Due to its existence all modes of existence,  
as well as the attainment of nirvāṇa come about.192 
The brief and extensive explanations explained that [sentient beings] possess the 
[Tathāgata]garbha for three given reasons. [This presentation] is most agreeable and 
undoubtedly his (i.e. Maitreya’s) very intention.  
 
 
2. Determining the dhātu by means of ten categories   
This second division has three [subdivisions]: a brief explanation by means of  
summarizing terms, an extensive exposition, and a summary.  
 
 2.1. A brief exposition by means of summarizing terms  
 ngo bo rgyu 'bras las ldan 'jug pa dang ||     
                                                                                                                                                        
189 MSA IX.37. Cf. Mathes 2008: 19. 
190 Here, Rong-ston paraphrases the meaning of RGV I.150 along with its commentary by Asaṅga. See 
Johnston 1950: 72; Nakamura 1967: 137–139; and Takasaki 1966: 290. 
191 This text, important for the formation Vijñānavāda, is no longer extant in either Sanskrit, Tibetan, or 
Chinese. Cf. Takasaki 1966: 290, n. 175.  
192 This verse quoted by Asaṅga in his commentary to RGV I.152. Cf. Johnston 1950: 72,13–14; 
Nakamura 1967: 141,14–15; and Takasaki 1966: 290–291, n. 175. 
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 gnas skabs de bzhin kun tu 'gro ba'i don ||   
 rtag tu mi 'gyur yon tan dbyer med ni ||  
 don dam dbyings kyi dgongs don yin shes bya || (Skt.I.29) 
 
Essential nature,193 cause, result, function, connection,194  
manifestation, states, all-pervasiveness, unchangeability,  
and inseparable excellences.195  
With regard to these [ten points] one should know that  
the intended meaning [is that] of the ultimate expanse (dbyings).196 
 
The last five issue from [the first five] one by one [respectively].  
 
   2.2. Extensive explanation  
 This second [part] has eight points: 
(1) The meaning of essential nature and cause, (2) the meaning of result and function, 
(3) the meaning of connection, (4) the meaning of manifestation, (5) the meaning of 
states, (6) the meaning of all-pervasiveness, (7) the meaning of unchangeability, and 
[38] (8) the meaning of inseparable excellences.  
  
  2.2.1. The meaning of “essential nature” (ngo bo) and “cause” (rgyu) 
 
For this first [presentation] there are two [points]: a common explanation and an  
individual exposition. 
 
       2.2.1.1. Common exposition  
    rin chen nam mkha' chu dag bzhin ||  
    rtag tu rang bzhin nyon mongs med || 
    chos mos lhag pa'i shes rab dang ||  
    ting 'dzin snying rje las byung ba || (I.30) 
 
Just as a jewel, space and water are pure,  
[the essential nature of the dhātu  
in terms of dharmakāya, suchness and gotra]  
                                                 
193 The term svabhāva has two Tibetan equivalents, namely ngo bo and rang bzhin. Since the focus of 
this work is the Tibetan text, I decided to maintain this distinction by rendering the first with “essential 
nature” and the second with “own-being.” 
194 Takasaki (1966: 199) reads “union.” 
195 Takasaki (1966: 199) associates “immutability” with the qualities, making it “unchangeable quali-
ties”. 
196 This whole verse is included in Rong-ston’s commentary.  
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is ever naturally free of mental afflictions.  
[They] arise from adherence to the teachings,  
superior supreme knowledge,  
meditative concentration and compassion. 
 
The essential nature:  
The essential nature of the three points (i.e. the dhātu in terms of the dharmakāya, 
suchness and the gotra) has both an individual and a general characteristic.  
The individual characteristics of the dharmakāya, suchness, and the gotra are like a 
jewel, space, and water [respectively]. With regard to the general characteristic, just as 
the three examples are by nature pure, similarly [these three are] by nature 
permanently free of mental afflictions.  
The cause: 
[The dharmakāya, suchness, and the gotra] arise from the adherence to the teachings 
of the great vehicle, from superior supreme knowledge, from meditative concentration 
and from great compassion [respectively].  
In what manner are they the causes for the three points?  
Because they are the causes of the dharmakāya endowed with four excellences, for the 
purification of the defilements [covering] suchness, for the purification of the 
defilements [covering] the actualised gotra,197 and for increasing the potential 
[respectively].  
 
                                                 
197 The text reads:  yon tan bzhi ldan gyi chos sku dang | de bzhin nyid kyi dri ma sbyong ba dang | mngon 
du byed pa’i rigs kyis mi byong ba dang | nus pa ’phel ba’i rgyu yin pas so ||  
mi byong ba (“not purifying”) does not seem to make sense in this context. Although all other editions 
of this text available to me have the same reading, it is probably a typing fault. This was further 
confirmed in a meeting with the Venerable Khenpo Appey Rinpoche in Kathmandu in August 2006. 
Being careful enough not to give a definite alternative reading of this passage, Appey Rinpoche 
confirmed the possibility of reading the text as translated above, in which case it has been amended to 
conform to the foregoing statement (de bzhin nyid kyi dri ma sbyong ba dang | mngon du byed pa’i rigs 
kyi dri ma byong ba dang [...]). Alternatively, omitting the negation particle mi one would read mngon 
du byed pa’i rigs kyis byong ba dang [...] (“the purification through the actualised gotra”).  
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   2.2.1.2. Individual explanation  
This second [part] has two: the explanation of the essential nature and the explanation 
of the cause. 
      2.2.1.2.1. Explanation of the “essential nature”  
    mthu dang gzhan du mi 'gyur dang ||  
    brlan pa'i ngo bo rang bzhin phyir || 
    'di dag nor bu rin chen mkha' ||  
 chu yi yon tan chos mthun nyid ||   (I.31) 
 
Due to the essential nature198 of power,  
not changing into something else,199 and being moist -  
Those [three, i.e. the dharmakāya, suchness and the gotra]  
correspond to the excellences of a wishfulfilling jewel, the sky, and 
water.200  
 
The individual characteristics of the three objects:  
The dharmakāya of the tathāgata [is like] [39] a wishfulfilling jewel, for it is endowed 
with the power to accomplish the aspirations [of sentient beings]. Suchness [is said to 
be like] the sky because it does not change into something else. The gotra, due to its 
nature of being moist, [that is] due to its compassion for sentient beings, has a feature 
in common with the attributes of water. 
The general characteristic of these three objects corresponds to all three examples 
since all are pure by nature. From the explanation of the general and individual 
corresponding features in the root [text], it is evident [that they] mutually supplement 
[each other]. 
 
    2.2.1.2.2. Explanation of the “cause” (rgyu)  
This second [point] has three [subdivions]: (1) that which is to be abandoned, (2) the 
antidote, and (3) the temporary result. 
 
                                                 
198 Tib. ngo bo rang bzhin; Skt. svabhāvataḥ 
199 Tib. gzhan du mi ’gyur; Skt. ananyathābhāva. Takasaki (1966: 200): “identity.” 
200 Cf. Mathes 2008: 395 
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     2.2.1.2.2.1. That which is to be abandoned (spang bya)  
chos la khong khro bdag lta dang ||     
’khor ba’i sdug bsngal gyis ’jigs dang || 
sems can don la ltos med nyid || 
’dod chen mu stegs nyan thos dang ||   (I.32) 
 
rang ’byung rnams kyi sgrib rnam bzhi || 
dag rgyu lhag par mos pa201 la || 
sogs pa’i chos ni rnam bzhi nyid ||   (I.33) 
 
(1) Enmity towards the Dharma,  
(2) a view [asserting the existence of a] self,  
(3) being frightened by the sufferings of saṃsāra, and  
(4) being without concern for the purpose of sentient beings: 
These are the four types of obscuration of  
[those afflicted by] great desire,202  
tīrthikas, śrāvakas, and pratyeka[buddhas]. 
The causes for [their] purification are the four aspects  
[mentioned above, namely:]  
exceptional adherence [to the Dharma] and so forth.  
 
In general, there are three types of sentient beings: those who desire existence (srid 
pa), those who desire to be free from existence, and those who desire neither of these 
two.203   
With regard to the [obscurations] to be abandoned present in the [mental] continuum 
of these supports: 
Those who are hostile to Mahāyāna teachings [are obscured by] the obscuration of 
great desire, which is the desire for existence itself.  
Those who view a self in phenomena, although they wish to be free from existence, 
engage in [a path which] does not have the [correct] means. [Thus they are obscured 
by] the obscuration of the tīrthikas.  
                                                 
201 Nakamura (1967: 53,3): lhag par smos pa.  
202 Tib. ’dod chen ; Skt. icchantika 
203 While Rong-ston does not really elaborate on these three types, Asaṅga gives a detailed description 
of them in RGVV I.33. Interestingly, Rong-ston identifies those three types of beings as the supports for 
the four types of obscurations to be abandoned (rten de dag gi rgyud la yod pa’i spang bya la […]). 
Asaṅga, on the other hand, identifies “those who desire neither existence, nor the release from it” as 
those of the highest faculty, firmly rooted in the Mahāyāna. In other words, the bodhisattvas who 
remain fixed neither in saṃsāra, nor in nirvāṇa. See Johnston 1950: 28,14–18; Nakamura 1967: 55,1–6; 
and Takasaki 1966: 204. See also this commentary on RGV I.66–72. 
54 
 
 
 
 
Those who, with regard to themselves alone, are frightened by the sufferings of cyclic 
existence and those who are without concern for the purpose of sentient beings, 
gradually enter the [correct] means [for those who] desire freedom from existence. 
[These beings are obscured by] the obscurations of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas 
[respectively].    
[40] These are the four types [of obscurations which are to be abandoned].   
 
     2.2.1.2.2.2. The antidote (gnyen po)  
theg mchog la mos sa bon shes rab ni || 
sangs rgyas chos bskyed ma dang bsam gtan gyi || 
bde ba’i mngal gnas snying rje’i ma ma can || 
gang yin de dag thub pa’i rjes skyes sras ||  (I.34)  
 
Whoever is endowed with 
(1) the seed of adherence to the supreme vehicle, 
(2) supreme discriminating knowledge, the mother giving birth to the 
qualities of a buddha,204  
(3) the blissful womb of meditative concentration, and  
(4) the nurse, which is compassion -  
those are heirs,205 born in the succession of the Sage.206 
 
The causes for attaining the dharmakāya of utmost purity endowed with four qualities 
(i.e. great purity, great self, great happiness, great permanence) are: 
1) exceptional adherence to the Mahāyāna of the bodhisattvas’ lineage, who have no 
desire for either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa;  
2) the pāramitā of supreme knowledge which realises the non-existence of a self; 
3) the meditative concentration of ‘space treasure’207; and  
4) the cultivation of great compassion.  
                                                 
204 Takasaki (1966: 206) “On account of the origination of the Buddha’s Doctrine [...].” Schmithausen 
(1971: 142) corrects this mistaken reading.  
205 Lit. “sons” (Skt. putra; Tib. sras)   
206 Takasaki (1966: 206, n. 62) takes this verse to be a quotation from an older source. As this verse 
indeed hints at the buddha qualities’ production, Schmithausen (1971: 142–143) agrees that this 
assumption is not unfounded. 
207 This particular type of meditative concentration enables the bodhisattva to extract from space, for the 
benefit of beings, whatever resources are necessary. In his commentary on the MSA, Thogs-med bzang-
po writes (RP: 63b3): nam mkha’ mdzod kyi ting nge ’dzin thob nas sems can rnams la yo byad rin che 
ba dpag tu med pa’i char ’bebs pa yo byad la dbang [...]. This control over resources is included in the 
ten types of controlling powers (vaśitā) the bodhisattva attains on the eighth stage (bhūmi) of the path. 
See Thurman 2004: 58, n. 11.  
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In this regard, through [the qualities of] adherence and so forth, [pertaining] to  the 
bodhisattva’s mental continuum, the four obscurations of his own mental continuum, 
which are similar to those present in the [abovementioned] four types of persons, are 
abandoned. Although [the bodhisattva] does not actually abandon the obscurations of 
the mental continuum of the four [types of persons mentioned earlier, such as] those 
with great desire and so forth, since these obscurations are predominant in the persons 
with strong desire etc., it is explained in that way. 
 
     2.2.1.2.2.3. The temporary result   
From the four causes of (1) the seed of the father king, (2) his pure queen, (3) her 
faultless womb, and (4) a special nurse that brings him up, there emerges a son with 
the capacity to become the king’s successor.  
In the same way, [one] who is endowed with: (1) the seed of buddhahood, which 
adheres to the supreme vehicle, (2) supreme knowledge realising the non-existence of 
a self, the mother which gives birth to the qualities of a buddha, (3) dwelling in the 
blissful womb of meditative concentrations such as the “space treasure” etc., and (4) 
the cause which develops the realisation, the nurse which is compassion, [such a 
person] is an heir born in the footsteps of the Sage and becomes capable of being his 
successor.208  
 
  2.2.2. The meaning of “result” (’bras bu) and “function” (las)  
For this second point, [41] the meaning of “result” and “function,” there are two parts. 
       2.2.2.1. Common exposition  
        
    gtsang bdag bde dang rtag nyid kyi || 
    yon tan pha rol phyin pa ’bras || 
    sdug bsngal yid ’byung zhi thob par || 
    ’dun dang smon pa’i las can no ||   (I.35)    
 
The result is the perfection of the excellences of 
purity, self,209 happiness, and permanence.  
The function is [feeling] discontent  
                                                 
208 LS (40,6) and K (87,14) both read gdung ’tshob. G (41,3) has gdung ’tsho ba. 
209 Tib. bdag; Skt. ātman. Takasaki (1966: 207) “unity.” 
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with suffering and unsatisfactoriness,210  
and the longing and aspiration to obtain peace.211  
 
The result: 
The body of the Tathāgata212––[i.e. having reached] the perfection of the four 
excellences of purity, self, happiness, and permanence––is the result of the four 
[abovementioned causes], [namely:] adherence to the Dharma and so forth.  
If it is asked how these four results are the results of the three points (dharmakāya, 
suchness, and gotra): 213 
From the dharmakāya of previous buddhas stems the teaching of Dharma, from that 
stems adherence to the Dharma, and from that arises purity. Therefore purity is the 
cause and the result of the dharmakāya. From supreme knowledge having suchness as 
its object, arises the true self. Therefore it is presented as the result of suchness, the 
object. The result of the gotra: since the two perfections of true happiness and true 
permanence arise from meditative concentration and compassion, they are the result of 
the gotra.   
 
The function: 
To possess the function of feeling discontented with the suffering and 
unsatisfactoriness of saṃsāra and the longing desire and the aspiration to attain the 
pacification of suffering and unsatisfactoriness, i.e. nirvāṇa. [This] is the function of 
the actual awakening of the gotra.  
Furthermore, the awakening of the gotra manifests because of the predominant 
condition of the dharmakāya [of the buddhas] and by the power of being endowed with 
the naturally pure dhātu. For these reasons it is presented as the function of these (i.e. 
dharmakāya and the existence of the dhātu) as well.  
                                                 
210 When the general condition of saṃsāra is explained, I decided to use “suffering and 
unsatisfactoriness” to translate sdug bsngal, since the meaning would not be totally covered by using 
one term alone. However, when later in the text obvious sufferings are mentioned, such as those of 
aging, sickness, and death, and the like, I use “suffering” alone. 
211 See also Mathes 2008: 403. 
212 de bzhin gshegs pa’i sku is here synonymous to chos sku. 
213 Here, Rong-ston follows Rngog’s exposition very closely. Cf. Rngog’s don bsdus pa (Kano 2006: 
332–333; transl. 447) 
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   2.2.2.2. Individual explanation  
For the individual explanation, there is the explanation of the “result” and the 
explanation of the “function.”  
       
    2.2.2.2.1. Explanation of the “result”  
This first part has two subdivisions: [42] a brief exposition and a detailed explanation. 
     2.2.2.2.1.1. Brief exposition  
  ’di dag ’bras ni mdor bsdu na || 
    chos kyi sku la phyin ci log || 
    rnam pa bzhi las bzlog pa yi || 
    gnyen pos rab tu phye ba nyid ||   (I. 36) 
 
In brief, the result of these [qualities]  
is divided by means of the antidotes  
which counteract the four types of mistaken [views]  
with regard to the dharmakāya.214  
 
The four mistaken [views] and their opposites, the four unmistaken [views]: 
Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas regard the aggregates as having four [attributes, 
namely] impurity and so forth. 
The antidote to this is that the dharmakāya is endowed with the four [attributes of] 
purity and so forth. While only the buddha himself possesses these four excellences of 
purity etc., others do not. In this way, arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and even bodhisattvas 
who have obtained powers215 have the four characteristics of condition, cause, coming 
into being, and disintegrating, which are hindrances for the attainment of the 
excellenes of the Tathāgata’s dharmakāya. 
                                                 
214 Takasaki (1966: 208) reads: “Because of the change of value in the Absolute Body, the result of these 
[4 causes] are, in short, [the Purity, etc.] represented as the Antidote to the four kinds of delusions.” See 
also Mathes 2008: 403. 
215 Tib. dbang thob pa’i byang sems. According to Thurman (2004: 58), the powers referred to here are 
the ten masteries, or controlling powers, taught in the DBhS in the context of the eighth bodhisattva 
stage. In this case “bodhisattvas who have obtained powers” would refer to those abiding on the eighth 
stage onward. Basing himself supposedly on the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, Takasaki (1966: 214, n. 109) 
remarks that this expression is an epihtet for bodhisattvas in general. However, in his Studies in the 
Laṅkāvatārasūtra Suzuki confirms the attainment of what he calls “the tenfold Self-mastery” by 
bodhisattvas on the eighth stage. See Suzuki 1999: 210. (De Jong (1968: 44) remarks that the quote 
Takasaki bases his assumption on actually comes from the Lalitavistara.) 
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Of these, the “condition” is the ground of the imprints of ignorance, and is similar to 
ignorance. The “cause” is uncontaminated karma216 caused by that condition, and is 
similar to formative factors (’du byed; saṃskāra). The “coming into being” is the 
coming into being of the three bodies of mental nature217 which have the two 
[abovementioned] as condition and cause, and it is similar to the three realms of 
existence which have acquisition as their condition. The “disintegration” is the 
completely inconceivable death and transference conditioned by those bodies, and is 
similar to aging and death conditioned by birth.218 
 
Arhats and so forth [i.e. pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas], all three do not obtain 
[true] purity, because there is no abandonment [of the hindrances] due to the imprints 
of ignorance. Conditioned by that ground the true self [is not obtained], since they 
have subtle application of the conceptual elaborations of [grasping] signs. [43] In 
dependance on uncontaminated karma caused by these subtle signs, the aggregates of 
mental nature arise. Therefore the [true] happiness of cessation [is not attained]. And 
as long as these [aggregates] do not cease, [they] are not free from inconceivable death 
and transference. For this reason, [true] permanence is not obtained.  
In the Dpal phreng [gi mdo] (Skt. Śrīmāladevisiṃhanādasūtra) it is stated: 
Bhagavan, just as for example the three realms of existence arise, produced 
through the cause of contaminated karma and conditioned by grasping, likewise 
Bhagavan, the three bodies of mental nature of arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and 
bodhisattvas who have attained powers arise, produced through the cause of 
uncontaminated karma and conditioned by the ground of the imprints of 
ignorance. 219 220  
                                                 
216  LS (42,4) and G (42,6) both read zag med kyi las. K (89,11) has bag med kyi las. 
217 The “three bodies of mental nature” refer to the mental bodies of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and 
bodhisattvas. The detailed explanation follows below. 
218 This passage follows closely Asaṅga’s RGVV I.3 where the steps of the process which hinder the 
attained of the dharmakāya are related to specific links of the twelve links of dependent arising 
(pratītyasamutpāda) which binds beings to saṃsāra. See Johnston 1950: 32,14–33,3; Nakamura 1967: 
63,8–17; and Takasaki 1966:  214–216.  
219 ŚMS 265b7–266a1, quoted in RGVV I.36. See Johnston 1950: 33,15–34,4; Nakamura 1967: 65,10–
15; and Takasaki 1966: 217.  
220 The passage I found in D is identical, except for the following terminological differences:  
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And so forth, [this] appears extensively.  
In this regard, in the auto-commentary of the [Dbu ma la] ’jug pa,221 in the Snying po 
mchog,222 as well as in others places, the ground of the imprints of ignorance is 
explained as being the hindrance for completely cutting through knowable objects.223 
The essential nature [of the ground of the imprints of ignorance] is the imprints of the 
mental afflictions. Since they act as the basis for the obscurations, they are explained 
to be the “ground.” 
The conceptual elaborations of [grasping at] signs is the subtle clinging which is the 
activator of uncontaminated karma.  
In the Blo gros rgya mtshos zhus pa’i mdo (Sāgaramatiparipr̥cchāsūtra) it is stated that 
the virtuous roots of those skilled in means (i.e. bodhisattvas) are labelled “mental 
afflictions.”224 Explaining [this] to be the subtle clinging to phenomena has the same 
meaning.  
 
In the ’Bum tikā225 [44] it is stated:  
That which is explained as the cooperative condition226 of uncontaminated 
karma, this is precisely the ground of the imprints of ignorance.227 The karma 
                                                                                                                                                        
LS: mi rig pa’i bag chags kyi sa, D: mi rig pa’i gnas kyi sa; LS: zag ma med pa’i las, D: zag pa ma 
mchis pa’i las; LS: yig kyi rang bzhin gyi lus, D: yid kyi lus. Especially the first of these terminological 
differences is noteworthy. According to Seyfort Ruegg (1969: 182), the term mi rig pa’i gnas kyi sa 
(avidyāvāsabhūmi), used in the ŚMS refers to a plane of existence (consisting of those subtle imprints) 
to which arhats and pratyekabuddhas would “retreat”, instead of reaching the definitive release of 
nirvāṇa. The LAS, on the other hand, uses mi rig pa’i bag chags kyi sa (avidyāvāsanabhūmi), which is 
the term Rong-ston uses in his quotation from the ŚMS. He therefore either had an edition different 
from Derge, Peking, or Narthang (I checked all three), or else he quoted from memory and switched 
terminology. I would exclude the possibility of him deliberately altering the wording from the printed or 
written Kangyur out of personal preference. 
221 Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya by Candrakīrti, D 3862. 
222 I was unable to identify this text. 
223 This means it is a hindrance for gaining omniscience. 
224 Here, Rong-ston refers to a quote from the Sāgaramatiparipr̥cchāsūtra found in Asaṅga’s commen-
tary. For this quote see Johnston 1950: 47,7–16; Nakamura 1967: 91,11–93,3; and Takasaki 1966: 245–
246.  
225 This probably refers either to the shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ’bum pa rgya cher ’grel ba (D 
3807), or to the shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ’bum pa dang | khri brgyad stong pa’i rgya cher bshad 
pa (D 3808), both by Daṃṣṭrāsena. Rong-ston himself composed a commentary on the Śatasahasrika-
Prajñāpāramitāsūtra entiteled Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag brgya pa’i rnam ’grel, called 
’Bum tikā.  However, it seems unlikely that he would quote himself here.  
226 lhan cig byed rkyen 
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of the noble bodhisattvas’ uncontaminated intention which possesses the 
condition of the imprints of ignorance is uncontaminated karma.              
                                                                                                                                                        
The body of mental nature is the result produced through the cause and condition 
taught above, appearing as an unobstructed body, which is similar to mind. 
The inconceivable death and transference is the intentional discarding and taking up of 
the body of mental nature.  
 
     2.2.2.2.1.2. Extensive explanation  
    de ni rang bzhin dag phyir dang  || 
    bag chags spangs phyir gtsang ba yin || 
    bdag dang bdag med spros pa dag || 
    nye bar zhi ba dam pa’i bdag ||   (I.37) 
   
    yid kyi rang bzhin phung po dang || 
    de rgyu log phyir bde ba nyid || 
    'khor ba dang ni mya ngan 'das || 
    mnyam pa nyid du rtogs phyir rtag ||   (I.38) 
 
That [dharmakāya] is pure due to  
its natural purity and because of having discarded the imprints.  
It is the supreme self228 because  
conceptual elaborations in terms of self and  
non-self are thoroughly pacified.229 
   
It is happiness because  
the aggregates of mental nature and their causes are reversed.   
It is permanence because  
saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are realised as equal.  
 
 
The general characteristic of the Tathāgata’s dharmakāya is its naturally purity. Its 
special characteristic is its freedom of adventitious defilements along with their 
imprints. For these [two] reasons it is the “perfection of true purity.” In terms of its 
general characteristic, it is empty of an essential nature (ngo bo) of defilements. This is 
a [characteristic] it has in common with every mind which is pure and impure due to 
227 K (90,14–15) reads ma rig bag chags kyi sa de nyid do ||. LS (44,1) and G (44,3) both have ma rig 
bag chags kyis de nyid do ||. 
228 Tib. dam pa’i bdag; Skt. paramātma. Takasaki (1966: 218): “highest Unity.” 
229 On this verse see also Schmithausen 1971: 143 and Seyfort  Ruegg 1969: 369. 
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defilements.230 While this is the case, with regard to the special characteristic, it is 
[also] free of adventitious defilements. This is a special feature common only to a 
mind free from contamination.   
Due to the thorough pacification of the entirety of conceptual elaborations concerning 
the two [types of self]231, the self of person imputed by the tīrthikas and the self of 
phenomena imputed by the śrāvakas, it is the “perfection of true self.”232 In this regard, 
to the non-existence of a self, [the term] “self” has been given, which is similar to [the 
expression] [45] “abiding in the manner of non-abiding.”233 
Due to the abandonment and absence of the aggregates of mental nature and their 
causes, the ground of the imprints of ignorance, and erroneous uncontaminated karma, 
it is the “perfection of true happiness” itself.  
Not conceptualising saṃsāra and nirvāṇa to be accepted and rejected separately, due to 
realising [them] as equality, it is the “perfection of true permanence.” 
 
    bdag sred ma lus shes rab kyis bcad de || 
    sems can sred phyir brtse ldan zhi thob min || 
    de ltar blo brtse byang chub thabs brten nas || 
    ’phags pa ’khor ba’am mya ngan ’da’ mi ’gyur ||   (I.39) 
 
[Though] having completely severed all attachment to a self  
                                                 
230 LS (44,4–5) and G (45,1) read: dri mas dag ma dag gi sems thams cad […]. K (91,5) has: dri mas ma 
dag pa’i sems thams cad […]. 
231 Nakamura’s (1967: 67,4) edition of the corresponding passage from the RGVV reads: rgyu rnam pa 
gnyis kyi bdag gis pha rol tu phyin par rig par bya ste ǀ. Based on the Sanskrit (Johnston 1950: 34,13–14: 
dvābhyāṃ kāraṇābhyām ātmapāramitā veditavyā ǀ), I think that Nakamura, against the Derge variants, 
did not edit this passage correctly. However, the edition of the RGVV available to Rong-ston probably 
had exactly this reading. Since there is a mention of “two types of self” according to this reading (rnam 
pa gnyis kyi bdag), Rong-ston identifies them as shown above. Asaṅga in his commentary, however, 
mentions the two reasons (rgyu rnam pa gnyis kyis) for which the dharmakāya is to be known as the 
perfection of self (bdag gyi pha rol tu phyin par rig par bya), namely the removal of the concepts of self 
and no-self. See also next footnote.  
232 Here, Rong-ston deviates from the root text as well as Asaṅga’s commentary which identify the two 
hindrances to the attainment of the true self as (1) the tīrthikas’ concept of a self, and (2) the śrāvakas’ 
concept of non-self. (Nakamura 1967: 67,4–6: […] mu stegs kyi mtha’ dang bral bas bdag gi spros pa 
dang bral ba’i phyir dang ǀ nyan thos kyi mtha’ spangs pas bdag med pa’i spros pa dang bral ba’i phyir 
ro ǀǀ. Note that Nakamura reads:  bdag gis spros pa.)  He precisely follows Rngog’s interpretation of the 
verse. Cf. Kano 2006: 335 (transl. 451). 
233 This comment, referring to bodhisattva’s way of abiding in the manner of abiding neither in the 
extreme of saṃsāra, nor in that of nirvāṇa (cf. RGVV I.39), comes from RGVV I.36: bdag med pa nyid 
bdag tu byas pa ste ǀ ji skad tu ǀ mi gnas pa’i tshul gyis gnas pa zhes gsungs pa lta bu’o ǀ. See Nakamura 
1967: 61,3–4; Johnston 1950: 31,16; and Takasaki 1966: 211. In my opinion, Takasaki’s translation of 
this passage lacks in clarity at this regard. 
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by means of supreme knowledge, 
those endowed with affectionate love do not attain peace  
out of the strong desire to [help] sentient beings.  
Thus, having relied on intelligence and affectionate love,  
the means [for attaining] awakening,  
the noble ones remain neither in saṃsāra, nor in nirvāṇa. 
  
The cause for realising saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as equal is twofold: means and supreme 
knowledge. These two are the root for the unsurpassable awakening.  
If it is asked in what ways they are the root:  
It is so because the supreme knowledge which realises the non-existence of a self has 
severed all attachment to a self without remainder. In this way, the intellect or the 
supreme knowledge becomes the means for [attaining] unsurpassable awakening. The 
dharmin, the noble bodhisattva, does not dwell in saṃsāra because he has firmly 
established that supreme knowledge which realises the non-existence of a self in [his] 
mental continuum.  
That bodhisattva endowed with affectionate love does not attain nirvāṇa, [i.e.] the 
peace which would interrupt the benefit of others, out of strong desire. [That is to say] 
he does not give up sentient beings out of compassion. In this way, affectionate love 
becomes the means for [attaining] unsurpassable awakening. This noble bodhisattva 
will not abide in nirvāṇa because he has firmly established great affectionate love and 
compassion in [his] mental continuum.  
     
    2.2.2.2.2. Explanation of the meaning of “function”  
[46] The explanation of the meaning of “function” has two [subdivisions]: Establishing 
the existence of the function of the gotra by means of [excluding] the opposite (ldog 
pa), and establishing [it] by means of positive concomitance and excluding [the] 
opposite (rjes su ’gro ldog gnyis). 
 
    2.2.2.2.2.1. Establishing the existence of the function of the gotra by  
                     means of [excluding] the opposite (ldog pa)   
        
 gal te sangs rgyas khams med na || 
    sdug la’ang skyo bar mi ’gyur zhing || 
    mya ngan ’das la ’dod pa dang || 
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    don gnyer ’pa’ang med par ’gyur ||   (I.40) 
 
If the buddhadhātu were not existent,  
There would be no aversion to suffering,   
And [beings] would neither desire a state beyond sorrow (nirvāṇa),  
Nor [develop] the effort and the aspiration towards it.  
 
For an eternalist, if the buddhadhātu were not present in sentient beings, nobody 
would ever feel aversion to the suffering and unsatisfactoriness of saṃsāra because 
[its] awakening would be impossible. Also, the desire which is the mind’s inclination 
to attain nirvāṇa, exerting effort in the search for the means to attain [it], as well as the 
aspiration thinking: “May I attain [it]!” would not come about.   
This [verse deals with] the resultant aspect [of the presence of the dhātu]: aversion234 
to the suffering and unsatisfactoriness of saṃsāra, and desire for nirvāṇa.  
 
With regard to the following [verse, i.e. I.41]: 
The cause for the aversion [towards saṃsāra] is to see the fault of the suffering and 
unsatisfactoriness of saṃsāra, and the cause for the desire [to attain nirvāṇa] is to see 
the benefits of the happiness of nirvāṇa. This is the distinction of the function of the 
previous and the following ślokas (I.40–41). These [two] are actually also the function 
of the accomplished gotra.235  
Furthermore, the naturally abiding gotra236 arises from being nourished237 by the 
[necessary] conditions. In this regard one should not be confused.  
Hence [Asanga states] in the commentary:  
The gotra of purity, which is the buddhadhātu, calls forth the twofold function 
for sentient beings, even when they are fixed in falsehood.238 239 
                                                 
234 LS (46,3) and K (92,17) both read skyo ba. G (46,7) has skyob (“to protect”). 
235 bsgrubs pa’i rigs (Skt. samudānītagotra). This is the second aspect of the gotra, the first being  
236 LS (46,5) and G (47,1) both read rang bzhin du gnas pa’i rigs. K (93,3) has rang bzhin gyis gnas pa’i 
rigs. 
237 LS (46,5) and K (93,4) both read gsos pa. G (47,1) has gsol ba, “to request, to wear, to offer.” 
238 Tib. log pa nyid du nges pa’i sems can; Skt. mithyātvaniyata. The technical translation is taken from 
Edgerton 1953 (vol. 2): 432.  
239 Johnston 1950: 36,2–3; Nakamura 1967: 69,13–14; Takasaki 1966: 221 
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For those who maintain that the naturally abiding gotra is the unconditioned dharmatā 
only, [47] an awakening through conditions does not make sense. Therefore, it is 
necessary to maintain [that the natural gotra comprises] the cognitive aspect (rig pa’i 
cha) [of mind] as well. Consequently the cognitive aspect creates the appropriating 
cause of the buddha-wisdom. Moreover, if it (i.e. the cognitive aspect) were not empty 
of an own-being it would not change, and on that account it would not make sense to 
nurture it [through conditions].  
For this reason, since the result240 arises from the mind qualified by being empty of an 
own-being, it is necessary to maintain the non-differentiation of expanse and 
cognisance (dbyings rig dbyer med). 
 
     2.2.2.2.2.2. Establishing [it] by means of positive concomitance and  
     [excluding] its opposite (rjes su ’gro ldog gnyis)  
 
    srid dang mya ngan ’das la de’i || 
    sdug bde’i241 skyon yon mthong ba ’di || 
    rigs yod las yin gang phyir de || 
    rigs med dag la med phyir ro ||   (I.41) 
 
Seeing the faults of the suffering of [cyclic] existence  
and the benefits of nirvāṇa’s happiness 
stems from the existence of the gotra.  
Why? Because it is not present in those without gotra.242  
        
Relying on a holy being, living in a favourable country, having performed virtues in 
the past, and making pure aspirations: a person endowed with [these] four wheels sees 
the faults of the suffering and unsatisfactoriness of this existence, and the benefits of 
the happiness of nirvāṇa. This [seeing results] from the existence of a gotra and its 
awakening. But, it is not the case that there are no causes and conditions for the 
awakening of the gotra.  Why? Because, if [for] you the gotra exists even without 
causes and conditions for its awakening, [it follows that it] exists before its awakening 
                                                 
240 The result being the dharmakāya endowed with the two purities.  
241 Nakamura (1967: 69,20): sdug bde 
242 This statement contradicts RGV I.28, where we read that all beings possess the buddhagarbha due to 
three reasons, the gotra being present (in them) being one of them. This apparent contradiction is 
addressed and resolved by Rong-ston, following Asaṅga, in the commentary below. 
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even in those attached to falsehood, who possess the gotra of not passing beyond 
sorrow (i.e. who will not attain nirvāṇa). But it doesn’t.  
By being connected to the four wheels (i.e. relying on a holy being, etc.), even for 
those attached to falsehood the functions [of the gotra] will arise from the time of the 
gotra’s awakening, having produced adherence to the ground of any of the three 
vehicles. 
In the Ye shes snang ba rgyan gyi [48] mdo (Jñānālokālaṃkārasūtra) it is stated: 
After that, the light of wisdom of the Tathāgata’s sun will strike even the bodies 
of those sentient beings who have become constantly fixed in falsehood. This 
will benefit them and when the cause of future [happiness] has correctly arisen, 
[it will cause] the virtuous qualities to thoroughly increase.243 
In regard to “after that” mentioned [above]:  The sun, for example, having first 
gradually illuminated the high mountains and so forth, later on also illuminates the 
lower regions of this world. Likewise [the Tathāgata’s sun] will benefit in the first 
instance those endowed with a gotra fixed in [one of] the three vehicles, and then 
those endowed with an uncertain gotra.244 After that, it accomplishes the benefit of 
sentient beings attached to falsehood too.  
 
However, one may wonder why it is stated in the Myang ’das chen po[’i mdo] 
(Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra) that those constantly attached to falsehood possess the quality 
of not passing beyond sorrow at all. This is [a statement] of provisional meaning 
[given] with a [certain] intention.  
The purpose is to utterly terrify those who are hostile towards the Mahāyāna by saying 
[they] will never be liberated. Having [achieved that], the basic intention [is that] of 
                                                 
243 This quote, attributed by the Chinese tradition to the Avataṃsakasūtra, is taken from the RGVV. See 
Johnston 1950: 36–37; Nakamura 1967: 71,6–8; and Takasaki 1966: 223, n. 177. The passage from the 
JAĀ  285b6–7: de’i og tu de bzhin gshegs pa nyi ma’i dkyil ’khor hyi ye shes kyi ’od zer dag than sems 
can log pa nyid du nges pa’i sems kyi rgyud dang ldan pa rnams kyi lus la ’bab par ’gyur zhing/ de dag 
la ma ’ong pa’i rgyu yang dag par skyed pas phan ’dogs pa dang/ dge ba’i chos rnams kyis yang dag par 
’phel bar yang byed do || .  
244 LS (48,4) and K (94,13) both have [...] dang ma nges pa’i rigs can [...]. This passage is omitted in G. 
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reversing [their path]. It is stated with the [hidden] intention of another time (i.e. long 
time), since they will not [be liberated] for a long time.245  
With regard to the refutation of the explicit meaning: because of the existence of the 
naturally, totally pure [aspect of the] gotra, [49] it is not right [to say that] those 
attached to falsehood never become purified.  
Why? Considering the fact that all sentient beings without distinction have the aptitude 
for complete purity the Bhagavān said:  
Although it [i.e. saṃsāra] is without beginning, it has an end.  
[That which is] naturally pure and  
has the quality of being permanent,  
is externally obscured by a cover without beginning  
and cannot be seen,  
just as a golden statue that is covered.246    
In this way, the [assertion] of sentient beings with a cut-off gotra is negated by means 
of scripture and reasoning. With regard to the naturally abiding Mahāyāna-gotra, this 
is called the dharmadhātu of the mind associated with defilements. In the Mngon rtogs 
rgyan (Abhisamayālaṅkāra) it is said:  
[…] the foundation of accomplishment,  
[which has] the nature of the dharmadhātu […].247  
Therefore there cannot be beings with a cut-off gotra. 
In the [Theg pa chen po] mdo sde'i rgyan (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra) the sugatagarbha 
and the gotra are taught as being separate. While the sugatagarbha is explained to be 
present in all sentient beings, beings with a cut-off gotra are [also] taught to exist.248  
                                                 
245 Again, Rong-ston follows Asaṅga’s RGVV very closely here. See See Johnston 1950: 37,8–9; 
Nakamura 1967: 71,14–15; and Takasaki 1966: 224. According to Takasaki (1966: 40) the idea of this 
teaching being a skilful means to convert others to the Mahāyāna stems from the Mahāyāna-
Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra. See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 10–11. 
246 This quote, the origin of which remains untraced, comes from Asaṅga’s commentary. (Obermiller’s 
attribution of this passage to the ŚMS could not be confirmed.) See Johnston 1950: 37,8–9; Nakamura 
1967: 71,14–15; and Takasaki 1966: 224. 
247 AA I.6b (D: 2a2–3): sgrub pa yi ni rten gyur pa | chos kyi dbyings kyi rang bzhin dang |; K (95,8) 
reads sgrub pa yin [...].  See also AA I.40 (D: 3b2) 
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Therefore, to maintain that the sugatagarbha and the gotra are distinct is the view249 of 
the followers of the Cittamātra [school].  
 
  2.2.3. The meaning of “connection” (ldan pa)  
The third point, the meaning of “connection” has two [subdivisions]: a brief 
exposition and a detailed explanation.  
   2.2.3.1. Brief exposition  
    rgya mtsho che bzhin dpag med pa’i250 || 
    yon tan rin chen mi bzad gnas || 
    dbyer med yon tan dang ldan pa’i || 
    ngo bo nyid phyir mar me bzhin ||   (I.42) 
Similar to the great ocean, it is an inexhaustible repository of jewels,  
the excellences of which are immeasurable.  
Because its essential nature is endowed with inseparable excellences, 
it is similar to a butter lamp.  
  
[50] Just as the vast and extensive vessel of the great ocean contains immeasurable 
[quantities of] jewels and water, likewise the dhātu of the Tathāgata, which is the 
vessel of adherence, is the repository of the immeasurable jewel-[like] excellences of 
supreme knowledge and meditative concentration, and the inexhaustible waters of 
compassion.   
The connection [of the dhātu] with the result: Because it is endowed with the 
inseparable excellences of the first five types of supernatural knowledge (mngon 
shes),251 of uncontaminated wisdom, and of abandonment,252 it is similar to the three 
inseparable characteristics of a butter lamp.253  
                                                                                                                                                        
248 Rong-ston refers here to MSA III.11, where it is mentioned that some beings lack the cause for 
liberation; and to MSA IX.37, where it is stated that all beings possess the [tathāgata]garbha. 
249 Lit.: tradition (lugs) 
250 Nakamura (1967: 71,18): dpag med pa. RGVV (D: 94b5): dpag med pa’i. 
251 This refers to: 1) divine eye (lha'i mig eye); 2) divine ear (lha'i rna ba); 3) knowledge of other's 
minds (gzhan gyi sems shes pa); 4) recollection of past abodes (lives) (sngon gyi gnas rjes su dran pa); 
5) miracle (rdzu 'phrul). See MSA VII.1 (Thurman 2004: 55); as well as Nyānatiloka (1999:13–15): 
“Abhiññā.” 
252 On “abandonment” refer to the commentary on verse I.44.  
253 These three qualities are light, warmth and colour (see I.44).  
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 Here, the cause is the connection with the gotra, and the result is both the connection 
with the dharmakāya254 and the connection with suchness.  
 
   2.2.3.2. Extensive explanation  
chos sku rgyal ba’i ye shes dang || 
thugs rje’i khams ni bsdus pa’i phyir || 
snod dang rin chen chu yis ’di || 
rgya mtsho dang ni mtshungs par bstan ||    (I.43) 
 
Because it comprises the causes255 for the dharmakāya,  
the Conqueror’s wisdom, and compassion,  
it is taught to be comparable to the ocean,  
Due to [its being] a vessel [containing] jewels and water.  
 
In [this] explanation, with regard to the causal connection [of the dhātu]: 
(1) As to the cause for attaining the dharmakāya of the Tathāgata, which is the 
cultivation of adherence to the Mahāyāna Dharma, it is similar to a vessel because 
within it are contained the jewels of supreme knowledge and meditative concentration, 
and the waters of compassion. 
(2) The causes of the Conqueror’s wisdom, which is the cultivation of supreme 
knowledge and meditative concentration, are similar to jewels. This is because just as 
jewels do not conceptualise and possess great power, through supreme knowledge one 
does not conceptualise the two types of self, and the power of meditative concentration 
and the five types of supernatural knowledge are inconceivable.  
(3) The cause [of the Tathāgata’s] dhātu of great compassion, which is the cultivation 
of great compassion, is similar to water [51] because it has the natural single taste of 
extreme moisture with regard to all beings.  
Accordingly, these three points are taught as being similar to a great ocean.  
 
The individual similarities for the resultant connection: 
dri med gnas la mngon shes dang || 
ye shes dri med de nyid dang || 
                                                 
254 LS (50,3) and G (50,5) both read chos sku’i ldan pa; K (96,8) has chos sku’i bden pa.  
255 Lit. “elements” (Skt. dhātu; Tib. khams). According to Takasaki (1966: 225, n. 194), in this case 
dhātu is to be taken as hetu, cause.  
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rnam dbye med phyir mar me yi ||  
snang dang dro mdog chos mtshungs can ||    (I.44) 
 
Since the supernatural knowledges, stainless wisdom,   
and suchness are totally inseparable on the stainless basis,256  
[these] properties are comparable to the light, the warmth,  
and the colour of a butter lamp.  
 
The five types of supernatural knowledge (mngon shes) in the expanse, which is the 
state free from the stains of the two obscurations, correspond to the illumination of a 
butter lamp, because they destroy the darkness which is opposed to the experience of 
the respective objects.  
Uncontaminated wisdom corresponds to [its] warmth, since it consumes the entire 
‘fire-wood’ of karma and mental afflictions.  
The undefiled transmutation of the basis257 corresponds to [its] colour. Due to the 
abandonment of the obscuration of mental afflictions it is stainless, and due to the 
abandonment of the obscuration of knowledge it is pure. Since both are adventitious, 
they are not the own-being [of the dhātu]. Thus it is luminous.  
The general similarities are similar to the inseparability of a butter lamp and the 
illumination of the butter lamp.258 This is because the stainless expanse and these 
seven characteristics259 of the mental continuum of a no-more-learner are completely 
inseparable.  
 
  2.2.4. The meaning of “manifestation” (’jug pa)  
   2.2.4.1. Brief exposition  
In regard to the [brief] exposition: 
so so’i skye ’phags rdzogs sangs kyi || 
de bzhin nyid dbye’i ’jug pa las || 
                                                 
256 Takasaki (1966: 227, n. 206) remarks that here, following the RGVV, āśraya (Tib. gnas) is to be 
understood as synonymous with dhātu (which is the word used in the Chinese version at this place). The 
“undefiled basis” is therefore, according to him, the dharmakāya. This understanding is in line with 
Rong-ston’s commentary. 
257 Tib. gnas gyur pa dri ma med pa  
258 LS (51,4) and G (51,6) both read: mar me dang mar me’i snang ba […]. K (97,8–9) has: mar mar me 
dang mar me’i snang ba […]. 
259 These seven are the five types of higher knowledge, uncontaminated wisdom, and the twofold 
abandonment.  
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de nyid gzigs pas sems can la || 
rgyal ba’i snying po ’di bstan ni ||   (I.45) 
 
The perceiver-of-suchness taught  
the buddha-nature (jinagarbha) to sentient beings,  
based on the different manifestations of suchness260 
of ordinary beings, noble ones, and perfect buddhas.261  
  
 
Buddha-nature (lit. “essence of the victorious one”) is taught to be present in sentient 
beings.  
By whom? By the buddha who sees reality.  
How? [From] the point of view of the divisions of the manifestations of suchness of 
the possessors of the quality:262 ordinary beings, noble ones [on the path of] learning, 
and perfect buddhas.  
Where? [52] In the Prajñāpāramitā[sūtras] and so forth.  
For what purpose? For the purpose of generating non-conceptual wisdom.  
For whom? It is taught for bodhisattvas.  
The last three [statements] are taken from the commentary [of Asaṅga].263  
 
   2.2.4.2. Extensive explanation  
so so’i skye bo phyin ci log || 
bden pa mthong ba bzlog pa ste || 
de bzhin gshegs pa ji lta bzhin || 
phyin ci ma log spros med nyid ||    (I.46) 
 
Ordinary beings have mistaken [views],  
those who have seen the truth have reversed [them],  
and the Tathāgatas [see things] as they are,  
without mistake and without mental elaborations.  
 
 
                                                 
260 Takasaki (1966: 229) reads: “The Ordinary People, the Saints, and the Buddhas, - They are 
indivisible from Reality, […]” based on the Skt.: pr̥thagjanāryasambuddhatathatāvyatirekataḥ (Cf. 
Johnston 1950: 39,10).  
261 Schmithausen (1971: 147) translates RGV 45a: “(Der jinagarbhaḥ ist gelehrt worden) als 
unterschiedlich auftretend, [insofern er] die Soheit der Weltmenschen, der Heiligen und der 
vollkommen Erleuchteten [ist] [...].” 
262 chos can (Skt. dharmin): in this case chos (rendered as “quality”) stands for suchness (Tib. de bzhin 
nyid, Skt. tathatā), which is present in ordinary sentient beings and buddhas alike.  
263 See Johnston 1950: 39,15–16; Nakamura 1967: 77,5–6; and Takasaki 1966: 229–230. 
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What are the three manifestations? 
The manifestation by:  
1) Ordinary beings with perception (’du shes), mind (sems), and wrong views (lta ba 
phyin ci log);  
2) Noble ones [on the path of] learning who, having seen the truth, turned away from 
being mistaken, and [no longer] have mistaken views; and  
3) Tathāgatas, who, having abandoned the two types of obscurations together with 
their imprints, see things as they really are, without mistake (phyin ci ma log pa) and 
free from [conceptual] elaborations (spros pa med pa).  
The first two do not participate (’jug pa) in the dharmakāya, while the latter do not 
participate in the gotra. Therefore natural suchness manifests [in all three]. 
In the commentary [of Asaṅga it is stated that] the pure suchness of all phenomena is 
that which is taught to be the general characteristic.264  
 
 
 2.2.5. The meaning of “states” (gnas skabs)  
2.2.5.1. Brief exposition  
ma dag ma dag dag pa dang  || 
shin tu rnam dag go rim bzhin ||     
sems can byang chub sems dpa’ dang || 
de bzhin gshegs pa zhes brjod do ||    (I.47) 
 
Impure, impure and pure, and completely pure.  
[These three states] are called sentient being,265  
bodhisattva and tathāgata respectively.  
 
[Objection:] If there is the distinction of suchness into three [states], it follows that 
suchness is multiple. 
[Response:] Dharmatā (chos nyid), which is classified into three from the [point of 
view of the] three states of the possessors of this quality, is not differentiable from the 
                                                 
264 Concerning this point, the RGVV reads: sarvadharmatathatāviśuddhisāmānyalakṣaṇam upadiṣṭam. 
See Johnston 1950: 39,15; Nakamura 1967: 77,6–7; and Takasaki 1966: 229–230. 
265 As Schmithausen (1971: 148) remarks, the Skt. reads sattvadhātu, not just sattva (Tib. sems can). 
Thus he renders this passage with: “[Je nachdem, ob der jinagarbhaḥ] (a) unrein, (b) [teils] unrein und 
[teils] rein und (c) vollkommen rein ist, wird er respektive ,sattvadhātuḥ‘, ,bodhisattvaḥ‘ und 
,tathāgataḥ‘ genannt.” 
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point of view of its natural purity. Therefore there is no contradiction. Thus it is 
taught.  
This dhātu is given the name “dhātu of sentient beings” in its defiled, impure state. 
In the state of being impure due all the discards [to be abandoned on] path of 
cultivation,266 and pure through the various discards of the [paths of] seeing and 
cultivation,267 [53] it is given the name “bodhisattva.” 
It is called “tathāgata” in the state in which the two types of obscurations are 
completely purified along with their imprints. 
While it is differentiated into three [states] due to the three states of possessors of this 
quality, there is no distinction from the point of view of [its] natural purity. Therefore, 
[these statements] do not contradict [each other].  
 
 
   2.2.5.2. Extensive explanation 
ngo bo nyid la sogs pa’i don || 
’di drug gis ni bsdus pa yi || 
khams ni gnas skabs gsum dag tu || 
ming gsum gyis ni bstan pa nyid ||    (I.48) 
 
The dhātu, which is summarised by means of these six points:  
essential nature and so forth,  
is explained according to the three states  
by means of three names.  
 
The dhātu, taught by the Bhagavan in many divisions of [his] teachings and 
summarized by these six topics, essential nature and so forth,268 is divided into three 
states. The purpose of [this] is that it is taught by means of three particular names due 
to the three [types of] subjects (chos can; dharmin). 
In a sūtra of this [section]269 the dharmakāya itself is referred to as “dhātu of sentient 
beings,” as well as “bodhisattva” and “perfect buddha.” Thus it is stated in [Asaṅga’s] 
commentary, that the dhātu of sentient beings and the dharmakāya are not different.270  
                                                 
266 LS (52,6) and G (53,2) both read: sgom spang kun; K (99,3) has: sgom spong kun.  
267 mthong sgom gyi spang bya ci rigs pa 
268 The complete list is given in Asaṅga’s commentary: essential nature, cause, fruit, function, 
connection, and manifestation. See Johnston 1950: 40,13; Takasaki 1966: 231. 
269 This refers to the Anūnatvāpurṇatvanirdeśasūtra quoted by Asaṅga. See Johnston 1950: 41,1–5; 
Takasaki 1966: 231–233. 
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In the sūtra which relates to the Vajra Points271 too the so called “dhātu of sentient 
beings” is an expression for buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha), and the so called 
“buddha-nature” stands for the dharmakāya, and so forth. Therefore, even the so 
called dharmakāya is taught to exist in all [beings].  
Some scholars say that Mahā’s (i.e. Blo-ldan shes-rab’s) explanation of the gotra as 
being the essence of sentient beings, and so forth [54] is a self-fabricated [doctrine].272 
This is not acceptable because if it were a self-fabricated [doctrine], it would follow 
that the repeatedly recurring expression “dhātu of sentient beings” is a self-fabricated 
[doctrine as well].  
 
 
  2.2.6. The meaning of “all-pervasiveness”  
The meaning of "all-pervasiveness" has two [subdivision], a brief exposition and an 
extensive explanation.  
 
2.2.6.1. Brief exposition  
ji ltar rtog med bdag nyid can || 
nam mkha’ kun tu rjes song ltar || 
sems kyi rang bzhin dri med dbyings || 
de bzhin kun tu ’gro ba nyid ||    (I.49) 
 
Just as space, which is by nature without discrimination,273  
pervades everything,  
Similarly the mind’s nature, the undefiled expanse,  
is all-pervasive.  
 
Why is [there] a distinction [with regard to] the states only and not [with regard to] the 
nature? 
                                                                                                                                                        
270 This refers to another quotation from the Anūnatvāpurṇatvanirdeśasūtra in Asaṅga’s commentary: 
sattvadhātur nānyo dharmakāyaḥ | sattvadhātur eva dharmakāyaḥ | dharmakāya eva sattvadhātuḥ | 
advayametadarthena | vyacchanamātrabheda iti  ||. See Johnston 1950: 41,15–17; Nakamura 1967: 
79,1–3; and Takasaki 1966: 234. 
271 Dhāranīśvararājasūtra, see RGV I.2. 
272 Rong-ston refers again to Blo-ldan shes-rab’s commentary on RGV I.28, where buddha-nature is 
explained in view of its three aspects, namely the resultant dharmakāya, natural suchness, and the causal 
gotra. The latter is said to be the actual essence of sentient beings, while the first is only nominally 
attributed to them. See Kano 2006: 331–332 (transl. 444–446). 
273 Tib. rtog med; Skt. nirvikalpa. When relating directly to mind, this term is often best rendered with 
“non-conceptual.” In this case however, following Takasaki (1966: 233), I chose to render it as “without 
discrimination,” since this seems to be more appropriate in this context.  
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[This] is taught because the general characteristic, [i.e.] the naturally pure [aspect], 
pervades the three states. Just as space, which is by nature is without discrimination, 
pervades all vessels––whether made of clay, copper, or gold––so too, the naturally 
pure expanse, which is the nature of the mind, primordially free of defilements, 
similarly like space, pervades all three states.  
 
   2.2.6.2. Extensive explanation 
de’i spyi’i mtshan nyid nyes pa dang || 
yon tan mthar thug khyab pa ste || 
gzugs kyi rnam pa dman pa dang || 
bar ma mchog la nam mkha’ bzhin ||    (I.50) 
 
The general characteristic pervades the faulty [ones],  
[Those possessing] excellences, and [those who have] reached the end.   
It is like space [which pervades] the various types of forms,   
inferior, middling, and superior [equally].  
 
The naturally pure expanse is present in all three states, [i.e.] the pure [state], the 
impure, and so forth. Since it is the general characteristic [of the dhātu], it pervades all 
states, [i.e.] ordinary beings possessing faults, bodhisattvas endowed with excellences, 
and buddhas who have reached the ultimate state of pure excellences.  
It is similar to space which, for example, pervades all three vessels, those made of an 
inferior kind of material - clay, [those made of a] middling [kind] - copper, and [those 
of a] supreme [kind] - gold. Furthermore, [55] while the space in the three vessels is 
just space without distinction, [it] is not the same [space]. Similarly, while the 
naturally pure dharmatā of the three subjects (chos can) is only that which is without 
the distinction of different gotras, it is [also] not the same.  
Some say that an indivisible, single dharmatā pervades all [three] subjects.274 Since 
this is similar to saying “there is a universal, permanent, indivisible, single [principle] 
which pervades everything manifest,”275 it must be refuted using the logic refuting 
                                                 
274 LS (55,2) and G (55,5) both read: chos nyid cha med cig gis chos can thams cad la khab par [...]. K 
(101,9) has: [...] chos thams cad la [...].  
275 The concept of a universal, permanent principle pervading all manifest phenomena is found in the 
Sāṃkhya idea of prakr̥tiḥ (“nature”), representing the universal ground for all phenomenal 
manifestation. Cf. Frauwallner 2003 (vol. I): 225ff. For a refutation of this view by Dharmakīrti see 
75 
 
 
 
 
universals.276 Even those who claim the substantial [existence] of universals are like 
them.277  
Although there is a distinction between defiled suchness and undefiled suchness, due 
to the difference of subjects who are pure or impure due to [the presence or absence 
of] defilements, there is no [distinction to be made] from the point of view of the 
essential nature (ngo bo). Still, due to the difference of subjects, who are pure or 
impure due to [the presence or absence of] defilements, [suchness] it is not a singular 
[entity] either.   
While the example of space pervading all forms [of vessels] should be applied to the 
naturally pure characteristic pervading all [states], it should not be applied to the total 
purity from adventitious [defilements] pervading all [states].278  
 
 
  2.2.7. The meaning of “immutability”  
The meaning of "immutability"279 has two [points]: a brief exposition and an extensive 
explanation. 
2.2.7.1. Brief exposition 
nyes pa glo bur dang ldan dang || 
yon tan rang bzhin nyid ldan phyir || 
ji ltar sngar bzhin phyis de bzhin || 
’gyur ba med pa’i chos nyid do ||    (I.51) 
                                                                                                                                                        
Dreyfus 1997: 95 and 155. On the concept of universals in the Vaiśeṣika school of thought see 
Frauwallner 2003 (vol. II): 96ff. For its Buddhist refutation see Dreyfus 1997: 127ff. 
276 K (101,11) spyi ’gog pa’i rigs pa sbyar nas dgag par bya’o || [...]; G (55,5): skye ’gog pa’i [...]; LS 
(55,3): skya ’gog pa’i [...]. Here, my translation follows K. G and LS (LS erroneously reading skya), 
however, would prefer: “[...] must be refuted using the logic of the refutation of arising [of 
phenomena].” Based on the teaching of the non-arising of all phenomena as expounded in the 
Prajñāpāramitā literature, this topic constitutes the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s famous 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. A famous example for this type of refutation used in Madhyamaka reasoning 
can also be found in the Madhyamakāvatāra by Candrakīrti (MA VI.8–36), were the author uses the 
four-limbed reasoning (catuṣkoṭi) to refute the four possible dialectical positions concerning the arising 
of phenomena.  
277 This is most certainly a reference to the Dge-lugs-pa view of universals advanced by some scholars–
termed “moderate realism” by Dreyfus (1997: 104)–which is an important topic of debate between this 
school and the Sa-skya-pas. On the various interpretations of universals see Dreyfus 1997, chapters 6–
10. 
278 In other words, the state of total purification of the adventitious defilements, i.e. the dharmakāya, 
does not pervade ordinary sentient beings or bodhisattvas.  
279 LS (55,5) reads: mi ’byung ba’i don, which is obviously a mistake.  
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Because it is adventitiously associated with faults,  
and because it is naturally endowed with the excellences,  
it is later just as it was before.  
[This is] the immutable dharmatā (i.e. nature of phenomena).280  
 
If the properties of the excellences did not pervade the three different states, then the 
[dhātu] would be endowed with faults in the two impure states. [56] And in the 
thoroughly purified state, having become free from faults, [it] would be endowed with 
newly [created] excellences. Therefore, one may wonder whether the dharmatā is not 
immutable, since it would become pure from a previously impure [state].  
[Response:] In the state of ordinary beings dharmatā is said to be impure, due to it 
being associated with the faults of adventitious defilements.  
In the state of noble ones [on the path of] learning, it is said to be pure and impure281 
due to having abandoned the defilements to be abandoned [by means of the path] of 
seeing and because the defilements to be abandoned [by means of the path] of 
cultivation are not [yet] abandoned.  
In the state of buddhahood, it is said to be thoroughly purified because the excellences 
which are free from defilements are undifferentiable and inseparably endowed, in the 
manner of a nature and that which possesses this nature.  
The defilements are said to be adventitious because they exist in an obliterable way.   
The excellences are explained to be naturally endowed due to being endowed in an 
unobliterable way.   
Further below, it says that it is similar to a precious jewel, its radiance, colour, and 
shape, because they are inseparable.282  
Explaining that “naturally endowed” means to be endowed from the beginning is 
simply wrong.  
                                                 
280 Takasaki (1966: 234) renders dharmatā (Tib. chos nyid) with “character.” 
281 dag la ma dag pa. Compared to the state of ordinary beings, where the dharmatā is totally covered, it 
is said to be pure, since by reaching the first bhūmi upon entering the path of seeing, the bodhisattva 
perceives suchness for the first time directly. This seeing is the result of the bodhisattva’s elimination of 
mental afflictions. Since, however, the imprints of these afflictions remain to be purified through the 
path of cultivation, the bodhisattvas’ state is said to be impure. 
282 RGV III.37: guṇā dvātriṃśadityete dharmakāyaprabhāvitāḥ | maṇiratnaprabhāvarṇasaṃsthāna-
vadabhedataḥ  ||.  The second half of this stanza is quoted below. 
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In brief, when the dhātu is free from defilements it inherently possesses the 
excellences, similar to fire which naturally possesses heat.283 This is called “naturally 
endowed.”  
 
One may say: 
[Objection:] In that case it follows that dharmatā changes, because: [57] 
a) it changes from previously not being endowed with excellences, into being endowed 
with excellences later, and  
b) it changes from previously possessing defilements, into being free from defilements 
later.  
[Response:] From the point of view of the basis, [i.e.] the subject (i.e. the possessor of 
dharmatā), there is the difference of being pure or impure due to defilements, and 
being or not being endowed with excellences. But since the own essential-nature (rang 
gi ngo bo) of the dharmatā is later just as it was before, it does not change.  
It is like, for example, [the sky]: although the sky changes from a previous [state] of 
having clouds into a later [state] free of clouds, the essential nature (ngo bo) of the sky 
before and after is not different.  
Previously, in the state of being endowed with defilements, [the dhātu] does not have 
the excellences; and later, it is endowed with the excellences.   
Similarly, with regard to a jewel for example, if an expert in jewels, although [it may 
be] covered with dirt when not purified, purifies it from the dirt, it possesses the 
radiance, the colour and so forth, of the jewel in an undifferentiable or inseparable 
way.  
Just as it is stated:  
[...] because [the 32 properties of the dharmakāya] are indivisible [from it], as 
with the jewel, its radiance, colour, and shape.284 285 
                                                 
283 This simile is used by Candrakīrti in his commentary on MMK XV.2ab which refutes the possibility 
of a created or fabricated own-being (svabhāva). Cf. Mathes 2008: 352. 
284 RGV III.37cd: nor bu rin chen ’od mdog dang || dbyibs bzhin dbye ba med phyir ro || 
285 Here, the example means that there are no excellences perceivable in the unpurified state. Once the 
dhātu has been purified and the dharmakāya is attained however, these excellences are inseparable from 
this purified state, i.e. the dharmakāya, just as radiance, colour, and shape are not separable from a 
diamond, once it is cut and polished. 
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   2.2.7.2. Extensive eplanation  
The extensive exposition has three parts: (1) immutability in the impure state, (2)  
immutability in the partially purified (dag la ma dag pa) state, and (3) immutability  
in the utterly pure (shin tu rnam dag) state. 
     
    2.2.7.2.1 Immutability in the impure state  
This first part has four [subdivisions]: (1) a [brief] exposition, (2) a [detailed] 
explanation, (3) a summary, and [58] (4) the explanation of the corresponding features 
of the analogy and the meaning of destruction (’jig pa’i dpe don gyi chos mthun bstan 
pa).  
  2.2.7.2.1.1. Brief exposition  
This first [subdivision] has two [parts]: (1) [the exposition of not being sullied by] 
wrong-doing; and (2) the exposition of not being sullied by production and 
disintegration. 
 
      2.2.7.2.1.1.1. The exposition of not being sullied by wrong-doing  
ji ltar nam mkha’ kun song ba || 
phra phyir nye bar gos pa med || 
de bzhin sems can thams cad la || 
gnas ’di nye bar gos pa med ||    (I.52)  
 
Just as all-pervasive space is never sullied due to its subtlety,  
Similarly this [dhātu] present in every sentient being is never sullied.  
 
Even though space pervades material objects, it is completely unsullied by forms due 
its subtlety which stems from not having a physical form. Similarly, although this 
[naturally] abiding dhātu pervades all sentient beings, is not sullied by their mental 
afflictions because it is naturally pure.  
 
      2.2.7.2.1.1.2. The exposition of not being sullied by production and  
                           disintegration  
 
In regard to this second [part]: 
79 
 
 
 
 
ji ltar ’jig rten thams cad du || 
nam mkha’ la ni skye zhing ’jig || 
de bzhin ’dus ma byas dbyings la || 
    dbang po rnams ni skye zhing ’jig ||    (I.53) 
 
Just as worlds, in every instance,  
arise and disintegrate in space,  
Similarly the sense faculties  
arise and disintegrate in the unconditioned expanse.286  
 
Although in all worlds containing [beings], [phenomena] arise and disintegrate in 
space space [itself] is not sullied by the arising and disintegration [of phenomena]. 
Similarly, although the aggregates, constituents and sources [of perception], 
characterised by faculties of sentient beings arise and disintegrate in the unconditioned 
expanse of phenomena (chos dbyings; dharmadhātu), the expanse [itself] is not sullied 
by [this] arising and disintegration.  
In this regard, the four elements and space, [making] five, are the examples. Improper 
mental activity (tshul bzhin min pa’i yid byed); karma and mental afflictions; 
aggregates, constituents and sources [of perception]; death and aging; and the expanse: 
these five are the meaning [related to the five examples]. From these, the four 
elements are [used as] examples for both production and disintegration, and space is 
[used as] an example for not having both production and disintegration.   
 
     2.2.7.2.1.2. Extensive explanation  
The second [subdivision], the extensive explanation, has two parts: (1) not being 
sullied by wrong-doing (nyes pa), and (2) not being sullied by production and 
disintegration.  
 
      2.2.7.2.1.2.1. Not being sullied by wrong-doing   
In regard to the first part:  
 ji ltar nam mkha’ me rnams kyis287 || 
sngon chad nam yang tshig pa med || 
de bzhin ’di ni ’chi ba dang || 
                                                 
286 Tib. ’dus ma byas dbyings ; Skt. asaṃskr̥ta-dhātu. Takasaki (1966: 236) “Innate Essence.”  
287 Nakamura (1967: 83,1): kyi. 
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    na dang rga ba’i mes mi ’tshig ||    (I.54) 
 
Just as space has until now never been bruned by fires,  
Similarly this [dhātu] is not burnt  
by the fires of death, sickness, and aging.  
 
Just as space has until now never been burnt by the three fires of the end of time and 
so forth,288 [59] similarly this dhātu is not burned by the fires of death, sickness, and 
aging.  
 
      2.2.7.2.1.2.2. Not being sullied by production and disintegration  
The second part has three [subdivisions]: (1) analogy and meaning, (2) joining the 
analogy with its meaning, and (3) The explanation of the corresponding features [of 
the analogy and the meaning] (chos mthun bshad pa). 
 
       2.2.7.2.1.2.2.1. Analogy and meaning  
In regard to the first [subdivisions]: 289 
sa ni chu la chu rlung la || 
rlung ni mkha’ la rab tu gnas || 
mkha’ ni rlung dang chu dag dang || 
sa yi khams la gnas ma yin||    (I.55) 
 
de bzhin phung po khams dbang rnams || 
las dang nyon mongs dag la gnas || 
las dang nyon mongs tshul bzhin min || 
yid la byed la290 rtag tu gnas ||    (I.56) 
 
tshul bzhin ma yin yid byed ni || 
sems kyi dag pa la rab gnas || 
sems kyi rang bzhin chos rnams ni || 
    thams cad la yang gnas pa med ||    (I.57) 
 
Earth rests upon water, water upon air, and air upon space.  
Space does neither rest upon the element of air,  
nor upon those of water or earth. 
 
                                                 
288 See RGV I.65.  
289 In this chapter the analogy of the world’s creation is used to illustrate the dhātu’s unconditioned 
purity. For a brief presentation of Buddhist cosmogony in general see Khongtrul 1995: 107–111. 
290 Nakamura (1967: 83,6): byed pa. 
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Similarly the aggregates, the constituents, and faculties291  
rest upon karma and mental afflictions.  
Karma and mental afflictions always rest upon 
improper mental activity.292  
 
Improper mental activity rests upon the purity of the mind.  
The nature of the mind, however,  
does not rest upon any phenomenon whatsoever.  
 
The earth maṇḍala is based on the water maṇḍala, that water is based on the wind 
maṇḍala, and this wind is based on and depends on space. Space [however], does not 
depend on the elements of wind, water, and earth.  
Likewise, the five aggregates, the eighteen constituents [of perception], and the six 
faculties together with their [respective] objects contained by a person, [all] depend 
upon karma and mental afflictions. Karma and mental afflictions depend upon 
improper mental activity. Improper mental activity depends entirely upon the natural 
purity of the mind. The properties which are the nature of the mind [however] do not 
depend in any way upon improper mental activity and so forth.  
 
       2.2.7.2.1.2.2.2. Joining analogy and meaning  
In regard to the second [subdivisions]: 
sa dang ’dra bar phung po dang || 
skye mched khams rnams shes par bya || 
chu khams dang ’dra lus can gyi || 
    las dang nyon mongs shes bya ste ||    (I.58) 
 
tshul bzhin ma yin yid byed ni || 
rlung gi khams dang ’dra bar blta || 
rang bzhin nam mkha’i khams bzhin du || 
    de gzhi can min gnas pa med ||    (I.59) 
 
The aggregates, the sources [of perception], and the constituents 
should be understood to be similar to earth.  
Karma and mental afflictions of embodied beings  
should be understood to be similar to the element of water.  
 
                                                 
291 Tib. ’phung po khams dbang ; Skt. skandha-dhātv-indriya. Takasaki (1966: 236): “all the component 
elements [of Phenomenal Life].”  
292 Tib. tshul bzhin min yid la byed pa; Skt. ayoni-manaskāra. Takasaki (1966: 236): “Irrational 
Thought.” 
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Improper mental activity should be viewed  
as being similar to the air element. 
The [mind’s] nature, like the element of space,  
is without basis and without support.  
 
The aggregates, constituents, and sources [of perception] should be understood as 
being similar to the element of earth. The karma and mental afflictions of embodied 
beings should be understood as being similar to the element of water. Improper mental 
activity should be seen as similar to the element of wind. The nature of the mind, 
similar to the element of space [60] [not depending upon the other elements], does not 
depend upon improper mental activity and so forth, since it is without the basis of 
improper mental activity.  
 
      2.2.7.2.1.2.2.3. The explanation of the corresponding features  
                               (chos mthun bshad pa)  
 
In regard to the third [subdivisions]: 
tshul bzhin ma yin yid byed ni || 
sems kyi rang bzhin la gnas te || 
tshul bzhin ma yin yid byed kyis || 
    las dang nyon mongs rab tu phye ||    (I.60) 
 
    las dang nyon mongs chu las ni || 
phung po skye mched khams rnams ’byung || 
de ’jig pa dang ’chags pa ltar || 
    skye dang ’jig par ’gyur ba yin ||    (I.61) 
 
Improper mental activity rests upon the mind’s nature. 
Improper mental activity causes karma and  
mental afflictions to come forth.293 
 
From water[-like] karma and mental afflictions   
arise the aggregates, the sources [of perception], and the constituents.  
Just as this [world is subject to] disintegration and formation,  
     Those [also] arise and disintegrate.  
 
Just as wind depends upon space, similarly, improper mental activity such as clinging 
to purity, happiness, permanence, and so forth entirely depends upon the nature of the 
                                                 
293 Tib. rab tu phye; Skt. prabhava. 
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mind [which is] emptiness. Just as wind is the support for water, similarly, from 
improper mental activity, karma and mental afflictions have spread. Just as from the 
churning of the water maṇḍala the ground of the earth arises, similarly, from the 
water-like contaminated karma and mental afflictions arise the aggregates, sources [of 
perception] and constituents. Just as the container of the ground of the earth itself and 
so forth is [subject to phases of] disintegration and formation, similarly, the impure 
aggregates, constituents, and sources [of perception] and the like arise and 
disintegrate.294  
 
Thus, having explained that which has the characteristic of arising [and 
disintegration], the expanse and space are explained as that which has the 
characteristic of not arising and not disintegrating: 
sems kyi rang bzhin nam mkha’ yi || 
khams ltar rgyu med rkyen med de || 
tshogs pa med cing skye ba dang || 
 ’jig dang gnas pa yod ma yin ||    (I.62) 
The nature of the mind is, like the element of space,  
without cause, without conditions,  
and without the combination [of those]. 
[It] has no arising, no disintegration, and no dwelling as well.  
 
The nature of the mind which is emptiness, is similar to the element of space [in that 
it] has neither a substantial cause nor an assisting condition,295 nor the combination of 
both. Therefore, it has no arising in the beginning, no disintegration in the end, and no 
abiding in between.  
It is stated in a sūtra [quoted] here [by Asaṅga]:  
                                                 
294 As Takasaki notes, this passage refers to two of the four phases in which the formation and 
disintegration of the universe are divided. The first being the kalpa of formation (chags pa’i bskal pa), 
followed by the kalpa of abiding (gnas pa’i bskal pa), which is then is replaced by the kalpa of 
disintegration (’jig pa’i bskal pa).  The last kalpa is termed “empty kalpa” (stong pa’i bskal pa), which 
ends with the formation of a new universe.  
295 The Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo gives following examples to illustrate the function of the 
“substantial cause” (nyer len gyi rgyu) and the “assisting condition” (lhan cig byed pa’i rkyen): in 
relation to growth of a sprout, the substantial cause would be the seed, and the assisting condition would 
be water, manure, warmth and moisture. (Cf. Zhang 1993) 
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All phenomena are completely devoid of foundation. They possess a foundation 
devoid of essence, an unstable foundation. The foundation [of all phenomena] 
is pure, [61] a foundation devoid of foundation.296  
Therefore this dhātu is not conditioned by causes and conditions, and is established as 
emptiness free from elaborations.  
 
     2.2.7.2.1.3. Summary   
The third [part], the summary, has two [subdivisions]:  (1) the exposition of not being 
sullied by wrong-doing, and (2) the exposition of not being sullied by production. 
 
       2.2.7.2.1.3.1. The exposition of not being sullied by wrong-doing  
In regard to this first [part]: 
sems kyi rang bzhin ’od gsal gang yin pa || 
de ni nam mkha’ bzhin du ’gyur med de || 
yang dag min rtog las byung ’dod chags sogs || 
    glo bur dri mas de nyon mongs mi ’gyur ||    (I.63) 
The mind’s nature, which is luminosity,  
is similar to space, it is immutable.  
It does not become afflicted by the adventitious defilements of  
desirous attachment and so forth,  
which arise from impure thoughts.297 
 
                                                 
296 Gaganagañjāparipr̥cchā (321a6–321a7): de’i phyir chos thams cad ni rtsa ba yongs su chad pa zhes 
bya ste | snying po med pa’i rtsa ba | mi gnas pa’i rtsa ba | dag pa’i rtsa ba | rtsa ba med pa’i rtsa ba’o || 
Asaṅga’s quotation from the Gaganagañjāparipr̥cchā including this passage is found in his commentary 
on RGV I.64. See Johnston 1950: 45,8–9; Nakamura 1967: 87,16–18;and Takasaki 1966: 241 (n. 308). 
The end of this passage differs slightly in Rong ston’s version who has med pa’i rtsa ba (“a non-existent 
foundation”, or “foundation of non-existence”), instead of rtsa ba med pa’i rtsa ba (“a foundation 
devoid of foundation”). 
297 The second half of this verse reads differently in Sanskrit. Where we find “not afflicted by 
adventitious defilements” (glo bur dri mas de nyon mongs mi ’gyur) in the Tibetan, the Sanskrit has "to 
approach, to obtain" (upaiti). Takasaki’s translation (1966: 237) reads: “It bears, however, the impurity 
by stains of desire, etc. which are of accident and produced by wrong conception.” (Emphasis mine.) 
According to Takasaki, this negative interpretation is usual for the Tibetan tradition. See Takasaki 1966: 
237, n. 280 and p. 240, n. 305.  
Commenting on this verse, Chenique remarks that while this negative interpretation is the one usually 
followed in the Tibetan reading, it is the question whether the mind’s nature can or cannot be sullied by 
the adventitious afflictions, which splits the different schools of thought. (See Chenique 2001: 145, n. 
54b) 
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The nature of the mind, the very luminosity-emptiness,298 is similar to space [in that] it 
does not change into something else. That nature does not become afflicted by the 
adventitious defilements of attachment and the like, which arise from impure thoughts.  
 
       2.2.7.2.1.3.2. The exposition of not being sullied by production  
                           and destruction  
 
In regard to the second [part]: 
las dang nyon mongs chu sogs kyis || 
’di ni mngon par ’grub min te || 
’chi dang na dang rga ba’i me || 
    mi bzad pas kyang ’tshig mi ’gyur ||    (I.64) 
 
It is not brought forth by means of water[-like] karma  
and mental afflictions, and so forth.  
Neither is it burnt by the unbearable fires of death, sickness, and aging.  
 
The nature of the mind is not produced by the water-like collection of karma and 
mental afflictions, and the wind-like improper mental activity and so forth. Because of 
being unfabricated, although [one is] burned by the unbearable and violent fires of 
death, sickness, and aging, [it] does not get destroyed.  
 
     2.2.7.2.1.4. The exposition of the corresponding features of the  
                  analogy and the meaning of disintegration 
 
In regard to the exposition of the corresponding features of the analogy and the 
meaning of disintegration: 
dus mtha’ dmyal ba tha mal pa’i || 
me gsum ’chi dang na ba dang || 
rga ba’i me gsum rim bzhin du || 
    de dang ’dra bar shes par bya ||    (I.65) 
 
The three fires of the end of time, of the hells, and ordinary fire,  
should be known to be similar to the three fires of  
death, sickness, and aging respectively.  
                                                 
298 It is important to note that in order to characterize the nature of mind Rong-ston added the term 
“emptiness” where the root verse only speaks of luminosity. This is important in order to align this 
teaching with the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness, following the tradition of Blo-ldan shes-rab. 
See part 3.2 of this work. 
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At the end of time, the fire of the disintegration of the kalpa destroys the [material] 
container-world. The fire of the hell realm creates suffering, and the ordinary [element 
of] fire brings the formative factors (’du byed) to maturation. Similarly, death destroys 
or disintegrates the aggregates of this life, sickness creates suffering, and aging brings 
the aggregates to maturation. [62] [Thus] they are to be known as being similar to 
those three fires.  
 
 
    2.2.7.2.2. Immutability in the partially purified state  
[The explanation of] the immutability in the partially purified state has two parts: a 
brief exposition and a detailed explanation. 
 
  2.2.7.2.2.1. Brief exposition  
In regard to the first [part]: 
skye ’chi na dang rga ba las grol ba || 
’di yi rang bzhin ji bzhin nyid rtogs te || 
skye sogs phongs dang bral yang de yi rgyus || 
    blo ldan ’gro la snying rje skye phyir bsten ||    (I.66) 
 
Free from birth, death, sickness, and aging  
[a bodhisattva] has realised its nature as it is. 
Although free from the miseries of birth, and so forth,  
the intelligent one attends299 [the world]  
because he has generated compassion for beings due to this [realisation].300 
 
A noble bodhisattva is free from birth, death, sickness, and aging because he has 
directly realised the nature of this dhātu exactly as it is. By this [statement] it is taught 
that [for bodhisattvas] having attained the first [bodhisattva-]stage, there is no birth 
and death by the power of karma and mental afflictions. Therefore, it is made clear 
that there are no mental afflictions once the first stage [is attained]. Although [they 
                                                 
299 Tib. bsten; Skt. bhajante (usually “to partake, assume” etc.). It is interesting to note that Rong-ston 
replaced this verb by bstan (to show) in his commentary. The meaning then equals that of RGV I.68. 
300 The Skt. has tan nidānam where the Tib. reads de’i rgyus. Schmithausen (1971: 150) translates: “... 
nehmen die Bodhisattvas, obwohl [bei ihnen] die [normale] Ursache adfür fehlt, [dennoch] aus Mitleid 
mit der Welt das Ungemach der Geburt usw. auf.” 
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are] free from the destitution of birth, death, and so forth of saṃsāra, the intelligent 
bodhisattvas display being born and so forth in saṃsāra for the benefit of others. [They 
do this] because they have generated compassion for beings caused by that seeing of 
the dhātu. 
 
     2.2.7.2.2.2. Extensive explanation  
The extensive exposition has three [subdivisions]: (1) the manner of being untainted 
by the suffering of birth and death, (2) the manner of being impure by displaying birth 
and death for others, and (3) the manner of performing conduct for the benefit others. 
 
      2.2.7.2.2.2.1. The manner of being untainted by the suffering of birth and  
                     death  
In regar
    ’phags pas ’chi dang na ba dang || 
d to the first [subdivision]: 
    rga ba’i sdug bsngal rtsad nas spangs || 
    las dang nyon mongs dbang gis skye ||  
    de la de med phyir de med ||    (I.67) 
 
Noble (bodhisattvas) have discarded the sufferings of death,  
sickness, and aging from the root.  
Birth [occurs] by the power of karma and mental afflictions.  
Since these are absent for those [bodhisattvas],  
this [birth] does not occur.301 
 
The noble bodhisattva, the dharmin, has abandoned the sufferings of death, sickness, 
and aging from their root because he has directly seen the nature of the dhātu.  
For such a noble bodhisattva, the dharmin, this [type of] birth and death which come 
about by the power of karma and mental afflictions did not occur, [63] because [he] 
does not have such karma and mental afflictions.  
 
                                                 
301 This stanza is translated in light of Rong-ston’s commentary. However, the Skt. does not allow this 
reading. Johnston 1950: 46,12: karmakleśavaśāj jātis, tadabhāvān na teṣu tat || Being a neuter 
demonstrative pronoun, tat cannot refer to birth (jāti), which is femine. Thus, Schmithausen (1971: 150) 
reads jāti (Tib. skye) not as “birth”, but as “the arising [of suffering].” Inserting the implied subject 
“suffering” from the first part of the verse, he translates the second part: “[Das Leid] entsteht [nämlich] 
aus Taten und Lastern; weil diese [Taten und Laster] bei den Bodhisattvas] (sic) nicht vorhanden sind, 
ist auch das [Leid] bei ihnen nicht vorhanden.” He adds that although the commentary understands jāti 
as “birth,” this is probably a mistake indicating a possible difference in authorship. 
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      2.2.7.2.2.2.2. The manner of being impure by displaying birth and death  
         for others  
In regard to the second [subdivision]: 
ji bzhin yang dag mthong ba’i phyir || 
skye sogs rnams las ’das gyur kyang || 
snying rje’i bdag nyid skye ba dang || 
 ’chi dang rga dang na bar ston ||    (I.68) 
 
Although they have gone beyond birth and so forth,  
due to seeing that which truly is just as it is, 
the personifications of compassion display being born,  
dying, aging, and becoming sick.  
 
The noble bodhisattva, the dharmin, personification of compassion, has gone beyond 
the suffering of birth and death and so forth, because of perfectly and directly seeing 
the dhātu exactly as it is. Although he is beyond birth and so forth, [he] displays birth, 
death, sickness, and aging for the benefit of others because he is the personification of 
compassion.  
 
      2.2.7.2.2.2.3. The manner of performing conduct for the benefit of others  
The third [subdivision], the manner of performing conduct for the benefit of others, 
has four parts: (1) the conduct of one who has first given rise to [bodhi]citta (sems 
dang po bskyed pa), (2) the conduct of one who engages in untainted conduct, (3) the 
conduct of one who is irreversible in all aspects, and (4) the conduct of one who is 
impeded by one life. 
 
      2.2.7.2.2.2.3.1. The conduct of one who has first given rise to bodhicitta 
The first [part] has two subdivisions: (1) the wonderful conduct of a noble one, and (2) 
through precisely this [conduct] he becomes the friend of sentient beings. 
 
       2.2.7.2.2.2.3.1.1. The wonderful conduct of a noble one  
In regard to the first [subdivision]: 
rgyal sras ’gyur med chos nyid ’di || 
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rtogs nas ma rig ldongs rnams kyis302 || 
skye ba la sogs dag tu ni || 
    mthong ba gang yin de rmad do ||    (I.69) 
 
Having realised this changeless dharmatā,  
the heir of the Victorious Ones 
is seen by those blinded by ignorance  
as being born and so forth. How wonderful! 
 
Having realised this changeless dharmatā, the heir of the victorious ones abiding on 
the first [bodhisattva-]stage is free from [the sufferings of] birth and so forth of 
saṃsāra. Still, he is seen by disciples whose eyes of supreme knowledge are blinded 
by ignorance as [experiencing] birth, death, and the like. How wonderful!  
 
       2.2.7.2.2.2.3.1.2. Through precisely this [conduct] they become friends  
         of sentient beings  
 
In regard to the second [subdivision]: 
’phags pa’i spyod yul thob pa gang || 
byis pa’i spyod yul du ston te || 
de nyid phyir ni ’gro ba yi || 
    gnyen gyi thabs dang snying rje mchog ||    (I.70) 
 
Having attained the domain of the noble ones,  
[he] show [himself] in the domain of the childish.  
Therefore means and compassion of the friends of beings are supreme.  
 
This bodhisattva, the dharmin, is the friend of beings because he displays birth and so 
forth, even though he has attained the domain of the noble ones. [64] This is because 
he possesses skilful means for the sake of others as well as supreme compassion. 
Because of this very [reason, he is called friend of beings].  
  
 2.2.7.2.2.2.3.2. The conduct of one who engages in untainted conduct  
In regard to the second [part], the conduct of one who engages in untainted 
conduct: 
                                                 
302 Nakamura (1967: 101,1), following most of the editions he used, reads kyi. However, the Derge 
edition of the RGV has kyis (47b5), which is in line with the Sanskrit avidyāndhair (Johnston 1955: 
51,12).  
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de ni ’jig rten thams cad las || 
’das kyang ’jig rten las ma g.yos || 
’jig rten don du ’jig rten na ||  
’jig rten dri mas ma gos spyod ||    (I.71)  
 
ji ltar padma chu nang du ||  
skyes pa chu yis gos pa med || 
de bzhin ’di ni ’jig rten du || 
 skyes kyang ’jig rten chos mi gos ||    (I.72) 
 
In this regard, although [they have gone] beyond all worlds,  
[they do] not depart from the world.  
[They] act in the world, for the benefit of the world,  
unsullied by worldly defilements.  
 
Just as the lotus, growing in water,  
is unsullied by the water;  
Similarly this [bodhisattva], although born in the world,  
is unsullied by worldly phenomena.  
 
This bodhisattva abiding on the second [stage] up to the seventh has gone beyond all 
the worlds due to his supreme knowledge. Still, he pretends not to depart from the 
world out of compassion.303  
One may wonder: If [he] has gone beyond the world, wouldn’t it contradict [his] not 
departing from the world? There is no contradiction, because even though he abides in 
the world for the benefit of the world, [his] activity is unsullied by wordly defilements. 
Just as a lotus is not sullied by the water, although it grows out of water, similarly, the 
bodhisattva who has entered the conduct is not sullied by the things of the world, even 
though he is born in the world. 
 
       2.2.7.2.2.2.3.3. The conduct of one who is irreversible in all aspects 
In regard to the third [part], the conduct of one who is irreversible in all aspects: 
 
bya ba sgrub la rtag tu blo || 
me bzhin du ni ’bar ba dang || 
zhi ba’i bsam gtan snyoms ’jug la || 
    rtag tu snyoms par zhugs pa yin ||    (I.73) 
 
                                                 
303 This means, he does not enter the cessation of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, although he has 
completely relinquished all mental afflictions. 
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To accomplish [his] task,304 his fire-like intelligence ever burns,  
and he constantly enters peaceful mental concentrations  
and meditative absorbtions. 
 
With regard to manner in which the bodhisattva abiding on the eighth [stage] up to the 
ninth engages his mind at all times effortlessly in acting for the benefit of others, [i.e. 
his way of] accomplishing the activity of gathering beings to be tamed by means of the 
four means of gathering [disciples]:  
Just as fire naturally ignites on dry fire-wood smeared with butter, similarly [this 
bodhisattva] has the ability to evenly enter, at all times, mental concentrations305 and 
meditative equipoise306 which pacify selfish efforts as well as all elaborations, because 
he has gained mastery over the non-conceptual.  
 
  
       2.2.7.2.2.2.3.4. The conduct of one who is impeded by one life  
[65] The fourth [part], the conduct of one who is impeded by one life, has five 
[subdivisions]: (1) Engaging effortlessly in others aims, (2) Engaging in the 
application of skilful means, (3) Engaging in limitless modes of conduct, (4) Being 
similar to the buddha [with regard to] the benefit [accomplished for] others, and (5) 
Being dissimilar to the buddha [with regard to] the benefit [accomplished for] oneself.  
 
        2.2.7.2.2.2.3.4.1. Engaging effortlessly in the aims of others  
In regard to the first [subdivision]: 
    sngon gyi ’phen pa’i dbang dang ni || 
    rnam rtog307 thams cad bral ba’i phyir || 
    de ni lus can smin pa yi || 
    don du ’bad pa byed ma yin ||    (I.74) 
 
Due to the propelling power of [prayers made in] the past,  
and because he is [now] free from all discursive thinking,  
he does not exert effort in order to ripen embodied beings. 
 
                                                 
304 Takasaki (1966: 253): “For bringing about the welfare [to the world] […].” 
305 Tib. bsam gtan; Skt. dhyāna. 
306 Tib. snyoms ’jug; Skt. samāpatti. 
307 Nakamura (1967: 101,11): rnam rtogs. 
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In the past, this bodhisattva abiding on the tenth [stage] made the aspiration to 
effortlessly benefit others. By the propelling power308 of [this aspiration he later] 
engages [in these very activities], and since he is [now] free from all discursive 
thinking by having transformed his mind and thoughts, this bodhisattva does not rely 
on making efforts for the purpose of ripening embodied beings.  
 
        2.2.7.2.2.2.3.4.2. Engaging in the application of skilful means  
In regard to the second [subdivision]: 
 
    bstan dang gzugs sku dag309  dang ni || 
    spyod dang spyod lam gyis kyang rung || 
    gang zhig ji ltar gang gis ’dul || 
    des de de lta nyid du shes ||    (I.75) 
 
By means of teaching and form bodies,  
conduct, as well as physical activities;310 
He knows precisely who is to be tamed,  
how and by what [means].  
 
By verbally teaching the Dharma according to the interest of those to be tamed, 
showing various form bodies, and displaying a conduct in harmony with the minds of 
those to be tamed, as well as [appropriate] physical activities of walking and moving 
around and so forth, whoever is to be tamed, in whatever manner, and by whatever 
means, is tamed. This bodhisattva knows precisely the aspects of those means.  
 
        2.2.7.2.2.2.3.4.3. Engaging in limitless modes of conduct  
In regard to the third [subdivision]: 
 
    de ltar nam mkha’i mtha’ klas kyi || 
    ’gro la311 rtag tu lhun grub par ||  
                                                 
308 G (65,5) and K (113,5) both read ’phen pa’i dbang. LS (65,3) has ’phel pa’i dbang. 
309 Following Rong-ston’s commentary, I translate dag as a plural marker in this case. The Skt. (52,6), 
however, reads deśanyā rūpakāyābhyām, which is problematic (Cf. Schmithausen 1971: 152). 
Schmithausen favours an alternative reading of this passage (deśanārūpakāyābhyām), which would be 
rendered with: “By means of teaching and the form body […].”      
310 Tib. spyod dang spyod lam; Skt. cāryā and īryāpatha. Takasaki (1966: 254) has: “by conduct [of 
worldly life] or by religious observances.” In addition to the observances of religious mendicants, 
īryāpatha can also refer to the four positions of the body (i.e. going, standing, sitting, and lying). This is 
Rong-ton’s understanding of this term here. 
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    thogs med blo ldan de yis ni || 
    sems can don ni yang dag ’jug ||    (I.76) 
 
Thus, for beings which are limitless like space,  
one endowed with unimpeded intelligence  
genuinely engages in benefiting sentient beings,  
constantly and spontaneously.312  
 
For beings who are [as] limitless [as] space is vast, this intelligent bodhisattva 
correctly engages [in the practice of accomplishing] the benefit of sentient beings. 
Furthermore [he] engages [in this practice] at all times, spontaneously, and in an 
unhindered [66] manner.  
 
       2.2.7.2.2.2.3.4.4. Being similar to the buddha [in regard to] the 
         benefit [accomplished for] others  
 
In regard to the fourth [subdivision]: 
 
    byang chub sems dpa’i tshul ’di ni || 
    rjes thob de bzhin gshegs rnams dang || 
    sems can yang dag sgrol ba la || 
    ’jig rten na ni mnyam pa nyid ||    (I.77) 
 
This way of the bodhisattva in post-meditation  
to genuinely liberate sentient beings in the world, 
is equal to the tathāgatas’ [way]. 
 
The ways in which a bodhisattva in [the phases of] post-meditation of the tenth stage 
truly liberates sentient beings from suffering is equal with the tathāgatas’ way of 
accomplishing benefit, in the face of the worldy beings to be tamed.313 Here, there is 
only equality in the way of accomplishing enlightened activity to the face of those to 
be tamed, but they are not [actually] equal.314  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
311 Nakamura (1967: 101,15): ’gro ba. The Derge edition of the RGV (48a1) reads ’gro la, which is not 
marked in Nakamura’s edition.  
312 Takasaki (1966: 254) gives the translation of the Skt. which has a slightly different reading: “In such 
a way, he does always, with no effort and with unobstructed Wisdom, bring benefits for the living 
beings among the worlds, […].” 
313 LS (66,2) and G (66,4) both read: gdul bya’i ’jig rten gyi ngo na don byed tshul. K (114,6) has: gdul 
bya’i ’jig rten gyi don byed tshul. 
314 The explanation for this follows under the next heading.  
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       2.2.7.2.2.2.3.4.5. Being dissimilar to the buddha [in regard to] the  
        benefit [accomplished for] oneself  
In regard to the fifth [subdivision]: 
 
    de lta mod kyi sa rdul dang || 
    rgya mtsho ba glang rmig rjes kyi || 
    khyad par gang yin sangs rgyas dang || 
    byang chub sems dpa’i khyad de nyid ||    (I.78) 
 
Despite this fact,  
whatever difference there is between the earth and a particle,  
or between the ocean and [the water] in an ox’s hoof print,  
is the difference between a buddha and a bodhisattva. 
 
Although, from the perspective of other [beings] there might be such an equality in the 
way [buddhas and this bodhisattva] benefit others, the benefit [accomplished for] 
themselves is not equal. For example, whatever difference there is between the great 
maṇḍala of the earth and a minute particle, or between the water of the great ocean 
and [the water] in the hoof print of an ox, [there is] just as much difference between 
the excellences of a buddha and [those] of a bodhisattva on the tenth stage.  
 
 
    2.2.7.2.3. The manner of being immutable in the thoroughly purified state  
[The explanation of] the manner of being immutable in the thoroughly purified state 
has three [parts]: (1) identifying the reasons (rtags), the predicates (bsgrub pa’i chos), 
and the meaning (don); (2) joining the reasons with the predicates to be established; 
and (3) explaning the meaning of “permanence”315 and so forth.  
 
     2.2.7.2.3.1. Identifying the reasons, the predicates, and the thesis   
For this first part: 
gzhan ’gyur min bdag mi zad chos ldan phyir || 
’gro skyabs phyi ma’i mtha’ med mur thug phyir || 
de ni rtag tu gnyis med mi rtog phyir || 
    ’jig med chos kyang ma byas rang bzhin phyir ||    (I.79) 
 
                                                 
315 LS (66,5) and G (67,1) both have rtag. K (115, 2) reads rtags.  
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          skye ba med cing ’chi ba med || 
gnod med rga ba med pa ste || 
de ni rtag dang brtan phyir dang || 
    zhi ba’i phyir dang g.yung drung phyir ||    (I.80) 
 
[Its] nature does not change into something else,  
because it is endowed with inexhaustible properties.    
[It is] a refuge for beings, because it [lasts] endlessly.316  
It is ever non-dual, because it is non-conceptual.  
It also [has] the property [of being] indestructible,  
because its nature is uncreated.  
 
This [dhātu] is unborn, undying, unimpaired, and not aging,   
because it is permanent, stable, peaceful, and changeless.317  
 
The dharmakāya of utmost purity, the dharmin, is without birth, without death, 
unimpaired, and without aging, because it is permanent, stable, peaceful, and 
changeless respectively.  [67] The meaning (don) of the four reasons [presented] step 
by step: 
(1) It is permanent because it is a nature (bdag nyig) which does not change into 
something else. [This is] because it is endowed with inexhaustible excellences. 
(2) It is stable because it is the refuge for beings. [This is] because it remains until the 
final end.  
(3) It is peaceful because it is devoid of karma and mental afflictions. [This is] because 
it has the nature of being permanently non-conceptual.  
(4) It is changeless because it is indestructible. [This is] because it is the nature which 
is not made by karma and mental afflictions.  
 
     2.2.7.2.3.2. Joining the reasons with the predicates 
In regard to the second part: 
de ni yid kyi rang bzhin gyi || 
lus kyis skye med rtag pa’i phyir || 
bsam gyi mi khyab bsgyur ba yi || 
’chi ’pho brtan phyir de mi ’chi ||318     (I.81) 
                                                 
316 Tib. phyi ma’i mtha’ med mur thug; Skt. anaparāntakoti (lit. “it has no limit in the future”). 
317 Tib. rtag pa, brtan pa, zhi ba, g.yung drung ; Skt. nityatva, dhruvatva, śivatva, śāśvatatva 
318 Derge’s edition of the RGV (58a4) reads: bsam mi khyab ’gyur ’chi ’pho yis || de ni mi ’chi brtan pa’i 
phyir ||. 
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bag chags phra mo’i nad rnams kyis || 
gnod med zhi ba nyid kyi phyir || 
zag med mngon par ’du byed kyis || 
    g.yung drung phyir na rga ba med ||    (I.82) 
 
B eing permanent,   
this [dhātu] is not born from a body of mental nature.  
Being stable,  
it does not die due to an inconceivable death and transference.  
 
Being peace,  
[it is] unimpaired by diseases of subtle imprints.   
Being changeless,  
[it is] without aging caused by uncontaminated formative factors.319  
 
That dharmakāya of utmost purity, the dharmin, is without the arising of a body of 
mental nature because it is permanent. It does not die [and take rebirth] through an 
inconceivable death and transference because it is stable. It is unimpaired even by the 
disease of the subtle imprints of ignorance because it is peace itself. It is without 
aging, which ripens the result of uncontaminated formative factors (zag med kyi ’du 
byed), because it is changeless.  
 
     2.2.7.2.3.3. Explaning the meaning of “permanence” and so forth  
   2.2.7.2.3.3.1. Brief exposition  
In regard to the first [subdivision], the brief exposition: 
de la tshig gnyis de bzhin gnyis || 
gnyis dang gnyis kyis go rim bzhin || 
’dus ma byas kyi dbyings la ni || 
 rtag pa la sogs don shes bya ||    (I.83[a]) 
   
Here, in regard to the unconditioned expanse,320  
the meaning of “permanent” and so forth 
is to be known by means of two phrases,  
and likewise [“stable”, “peaceful,” and “changeless,” by means of]   
two, two, and two [phrases] respectively. 
 
Laying out the meaning of “permanence”321 and so forth:322 
                                                 
319 Tib. zag med mngon par ’du byed ; Skt. anāsravābhisaṃskārāh. 
320 Tib. ’dus ma byas kyi dbyings; Skt. asaṃskr̥tapada. Takasaki (1966: 257): “immutable Sphere.” 
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“[Its] nature does not change into something else [...]”323 is the phrase which shows the 
thesis (dam bca’), and “because it is endowed with inexhaustible qualities”324 is the 
explanatory phrase. Through [these] two phrases, the meaning of “permanent”325 is to 
be known in accordance with the sūtras. Here, the meaning of “permanent” is applied 
to the unconditioned expanse.  
[68] Likewise, “refuge of beings” shows [the thesis], and “[because] it lasts endlessly” 
is the explanatory phrase.326 Through [these] two phrases, the meaning of “stable”327 
[is to be known]. 
“Non-dual” shows [the thesis], and “non-conceptual” is the explanation328. Through 
[these] two phrases, the meaning of “peaceful”329 [is to be known]. 
“Indestructible” shows [the thesis], and “uncreated” is the explanation330. Through 
[these] two phrases, the meaning of “changeless”331 is to be known.  
If, according to what some say, [the thesis] is shown by means of one phrase332 and the 
explanation is given by means of two phrases each, such as “inconceivable [death and 
transference]”333 and so forth, it would become three phrases. [This] is in contradiction 
with: “by means of two phrases each.”334 Also it would not conform to the statement 
found below:  
    Because it is endowed with inexhaustible excellences,  
    it has an immutable identity (bdag). 
    [This is] the meaning of “permanence.”335 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
321 Again, K (116,6) reads rtags instead of rtag.  
322 In the next paragraph the verse Tib.68; Skt.I.79 is analysed. 
323 RGV I.79a 
324 RGV I.79a 
325 RGV I.80b 
326 These two are from RGV I.79b. 
327 RGV I.80b 
328 These two are from RGV I.79c. 
329 RGV I.80b 
330 These two are from RGV I.79d. 
331 RGV I.80b 
332 Tib. tshig rkang pa (Skt. pāda), one quarter of a stanza.  
333 RGV I.81 
334 tshig gnyis gnyis kyis. Here Rong-ston rephrases RGV I.83[a]. 
335 RGV I.83[b] 
98 
 
 
 
 
      2.2.7.2.3.3.2. Extensive explanation 
Second, the extensive explanation:  
mi zad yon tan dang ldan phyir || 
gzhan ’gyur med bdag rtag pa’i don || 
mtha’ yi mu dang mtshungs pa’i phyir || 
    skyabs kyi bdag nyid brtan pa’i don ||    (I.83[b]) 
 
rnam par mi rtog rang bzhin phyir || 
gnyis med chos nyid zhi ba’i don || 
ma bcos yon tan nyid phyir ni || 
    ’jig med don ni g.yung drung nyid ||    (I.83[c])336 
 
Because it is endowed with inexhaustible excellences,  
it has an immutable nature.337 
[This is] the meaning of “permanence.”  
Because it is similar to the uttermost end,  
it has the nature of a refuge.338  
[This is] the meaning of “stable.”     
 
Because [its] self-nature is non-conceptual,  
it has the property of non-duality.339  
[This is] the meaning of “peaceful.”  
Because the excellences are uncontrived,  
it is indestructible.  
[This is] the meaning [of] “immutability.” 
 
The meaning of “permanent” is that it has the nature of not changing into something 
else. The explanation of this [is that this is so] because [even in the state] without 
remainder of aggregates it is endowed with inexhaustible excellences.  
The meaning of “stable” is that it has the nature of being a lasting refuge. The 
explanation of this [is that this is so] because it is similar to the uttermost end.  
The meaning of “peaceful” is that since it is free from both karma and mental 
afflictions, it is the dharmatā (chos nyid).340 The explanation of this [is that this is so] 
because it is non-conceptual.  
                                                 
336 Stanzas I.83 [b] and [c] are thought of as interpolations by Johnston (1950: 54, n. 7), as well as by 
Takasaki who does not include them in his translation. However, the Tibetan version follows Ms. B 
consulted by Johnston in that they are both included in the body of the text.  
337 Skt. ananyathātmatva; Tib. gzhan ’gyur min bdag. 
338 Skt. śaraṇātmatva; Tib. skyabs kyi bdag nyid. 
339 Skt. advayadharmatva; Tib. gnyis med chos nyid 
340 It is interesting to note that the term chos nyid seems to have a different meaning in the root text, 
where it translates the Sanskrit term dharmatva, as opposed to dharmatā, which seems to be the term 
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The meaning of “changeless” [69] [is that] it is an indestructible continuum. The 
explanation of this [is that this is so] because it is the very excellence which is 
unaltered by contaminated karma.  
    
  2.2.8. Explanation of the meaning of “inseparable of excellences”   
 
The eight point, the exposition of the meaning of “inseparability of excellences” has 
three [subdivisions]: (1) a brief exposition, (2) an extensive explanation, and (3) a 
summary. 
 
   2.2.8.1. Brief exposition  
In regard to the first [subdivision]: 
gang phyir de ni chos sku de ni de bzhin gshegs || 
de ni ’phags pa’i bden pa don dam mya ngan ’das || 
de phyir nyi dang zer bzhin yon tan dbyer med pas || 
    sangs rgyas nyid las ma gtogs mya ngan ’das pa med ||    (I.84) 
 
Why is this [thoroughly purified dhātu] the dharmakāya,  
the Tathāgata, the truth of the noble ones,  
and the ultimate nirvāṇa?341 
Because, being inseparable from the excellences,  
like the sun and its rays,  
there is no nirvāṇa apart from buddhahood. 
 
One might wonder whether others apart from buddhas, [i.e.] śrāvakas and 
pratyekabuddhas, also partake in the final nirvāṇa. Since the utterly pure nirvāṇa is a 
synomym for the dharmakāya of the tathāgata and so forth, it is taught that śrāvakas 
and pratyekabuddhas do not partake in the inseparable excellences, which have all the 
countless aspects and so forth.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Rong-ston refers to in his commentary. Apparently, this stems from the fact that both suffixes, -tā and -
tva, are rendered with nyid in Tibetan.  
341 Tib. don dam mya ngan ’das; Skt. paramārthanirvr̥ti (“ultimate extinction”).  
Note that in his commentary on RGV I.84 and I.86, Rong-ston reads ultimate (don dam) either as an 
apposition to the noble truth (’phags pa’i bden pa) or as an adjective, in which case we could render the 
expression with “the ultimate truth of the noble ones.” He writes (LS: 69,5–6): khams shin tu rnam par 
dag pa de ni chos sku dang | de ni de bzhin shegs pa dang | de ni ’phags pa’i ’gog pa’i bden pa don dam 
pa dang | de ni mya ngan las ’das pas te bzhi po don […]. For a translation of this passage see below.  
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There is no attainment of the final nirvāṇa apart from [the state] of perfect buddhahood 
because, just as the maṇḍala of the sun and its light rays are not differentiable, the four 
excellences are [also] not differentiable.  
One may further wonder why this is so.  
It is so because the thoroughly purified dhātu and [these] four: the dharmakāya, the 
tathāgata, the truth of cessation of the noble ones, [i.e.] the ultimate truth,342 and 
nirvāṇa, have the same meaning.343 
 
   2.2.8.2. Extensive explanation  
The second [subdivision], the extensive exposition has two parts: (1) an explanation of 
the first half of the verse, and (2) an explanation of the second half.  
 
    2.2.8.2.1. Explanation of the first half of the verse  
This first [part] has two [subdivisions]: [70] (1) an explanation of the synonyms by 
means of definitions and (2) an explanation of the differentiation between the 
definitions.  
 
     2.2.8.2.1.1. Explanation of the synonyms by means of definitions   
In regard to the first [subdivisions]:   
mdor na zag med dbyings la ni || 
don gyi rab tu dbye ba bzhis || 
chos kyi sku la sogs pa yi || 
    rnam grangs bzhir ni rig par bya ||    (I.85) 
 
In brief, since in regard to the uncontaminated expanse  
there are four divisions of meaning, 
it should be known as (having) four synonyms,  
(i.e.) dharmakāya and so forth. 
 
In brief, the expanse devoid of the contaminations of the two obscurations is to be 
known as having the four synonyms of dharmakāya and so forth.  
One may wonder how this is so. It is so on account of the four divisions of the 
definition [of the dharmakāya].  
                                                 
342 phags pa’i ’gog pa’i bden pa don dam pa. 
343 Lit.: “[...] are subsumed in one meaning.” 
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     2.2.8.2.1.2. Explanation of the divisions of the definition   
In regard to the second [subdivision]: 
sangs rgyas chos dbyer med pa dang || 
de rigs de bzhin thob pa dang || 
brdzun med slu med chos nyid dang || 
    gdod nas rang bzhin zhi nyid do ||    (I.86) 
 
The buddha-qualities are inseparable, 
Attainment of the gotra as it is, 
Not false, undeceiving nature,344 and 
From the beginning by nature peace. 
 
The expanse devoid of the contaminations of the two obscurations, the dharmin, is 
called “dharmakāya” because of its abiding inseparably from the all the qualities of a 
buddha such as the powers and so forth.  
It is called “tathāgata” because of having attained the realisation of the gotra of the six 
sources [of perception],345 suchness just as it is.   
It is called “the truth of cessation,” [i.e.] the ultimate truth, because it is the pure and 
ultimate nature, which is neither false nor deceiving.  
It is known as “nirvāṇa” because the adventitious defilements [which are placed] on 
that which is naturally pure from the beginning are pacified.  
 
    2.2.8.2.2. Explanation of the second half of the verse  
The second [part], the explanation of the second half of the verse, has four 
[subdivisions]: (1) the meaning of “buddha” and “nirvāṇa” is not different, (2) the 
inseparability of “liberation” and “nirvāṇa,” (3) the cause for accomplishing the 
excellences, and (4) the common properties (chos mthun) of the inseparable 
excellences.  
                                                 
344 Tib. chos nyid; Skt. dharmitva.  
345 Tib. skye mched drug gi rigs. The expression “six āyatanas or sources [of perception]” stands here 
for sentient beings endowed with those sources. Asaṅga’s commentary gives the following quote from 
the *Ṣaḍāyatanasūtra which, as Takasaki remarks, is not extant: “[This Germ], having attained the 
Absolute Essence, has come down since beginningless time from one existence to another existence 
assuming various forms consisting of six organs of cognition, (i.e. in the form of various living 
beings).” (Takasaki 1966: 260; Johnston 1950: 55,16–17; Nakamura 1967: 109,6–7.) 
On the ṣaḍāyatanagotra see also Ruegg 1969: 266. 
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     2.2.8.2.2.1. The meaning of “buddha” and “nirvāṇa” is not different  
In regart to the first [subdivision]: 
rnam kun mngon par byang chub dang ||346 
dri ma bag chags bcas spangs pa || 
sangs rgyas mya ngan ’das pa ni || 
    dam pa’i don de gnyis med nyid ||    (I.87[a]) 
 
Manifest awakening [in regard to] all aspects and 
the abandonment of defilements together with [their] imprints,347  
in the ultimate sense there is no duality  
with regard to buddhahood [and] nirvāṇa. 
 
Because the four synonyms, [i.e.] the dharmakāya of the tathāgata etc., are subsumed 
in one meaning, [71] in the ultimate sense there is no duality with regard to “buddha”–
–who has manifestly and completely awakened to all aspects just as they are and 
however many there are––and “nirvāṇa”––which has abandoned the defilements of the 
two obscurations together with their imprints. Therefore, as long as buddhahood has 
not been attained, the ultimate nirvāṇa is not attained [either].  
 
     2.2.8.2.2.2. The inseparability “liberation” and “nirvāṇa”  
In regart to the second [subdivision]: 
rnam pa thams cad grangs med pa || 
bsam med dri med yon tan dang || 
dbyer med mtshan nyid thar pa ste || 
    thar pa gang de de bzhin gshegs ||    (I.87[b])348 
 
Liberation, [has as its] characteristic to be inseparable from  
the excellences in all [their] aspects,  
which are innumerable, inconceivable, and undefiled. 
Such liberation is the tathāgata. 
 
The dharmakāya of the tathāgata is:  
                                                 
346 My reading follows Nakamura (1967: 109,20). The Derge RGV reads: rnam kun mngon rdzogs 
byang chub dang ||. This same wording is found in Rong-ston’s commentary as well. 
347 Tib. bag chags; Skt. vāsana. Takasaki (1966: 261) reads “roots.” 
348 This verse is not counted as part of the RGV in Johnston’s edition (1950: 56,14–15 and n. 6), who 
attributes it to the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra. Takasaki (1966: 262, n. 471) adds that the place within this 
sūtra remains untraced. 
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(1) [endowed with] all aspects because the gotra of excellences is nunimpaired (or 
complete without anything missing); 
(2) not countable or immeasurable, because the divisions of [its] radiance are limitless.  
(3) profound and inconceivable for the conceptual intellect because it is impossible to 
fathom the number and powers [of its excellences]; and 
(4) undefiled and pure because the two obscurations are abandoned together with their 
imprints. 
The dharmakāya which possesses the characteristic of [being endowed with these] 
four inseparably is liberation, [i.e.] the ultimate nirvāṇa.  
Because such liberation is the tathāgata, if buddhahood is not yet attained, one does 
not attain [this liberation].  
The nirvāṇa of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is not the ultimate nirvāṇa. 
In the Dpal phreng gi mdo (Skt. Śrīmāladevisiṃhanādasūtra) it was taught: 
It is so, because the path is long, a town is magically created for the tired 
traveller in the middle of an empty plane. Similarly [the nirvāṇa of śrāvakas 
and pratyekabuddhas] is an irreversible means for [the followers of] the inferior 
vehicle of the Lords of Dharma, the perfect buddhas.349 
 [72] Thus, [the assertion that] the Rgyud bla [ma] belongs to the Cittamātra school is 
refuted.350  
 
     2.2.8.2.2.3. The cause for accomplishing the excellences  
In regart to the third [subdivision]: 
ji ltar ri mo ’dri byed pa || 
                                                 
349 This quote actually comes from Asaṅga’s RGVV on I.87 (Johnston 1950: 56,16–17; Nakamura 1967: 
111,9–10; Takasaki 1966: 262), where he comments on the following short passage from the ŚMS: 
nirvāṇam iti bhagavann upāya eṣa tathāgatānām iti. (D: 264a5: bcom ldan ’das yongs su mya ngan las 
’das pa zhes bgyi ba ’di ni de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi thabs lags so ||.) 
350 In other words, if the RGV claims that all beings without exception can attain buddhahood, it cannot 
be counted as a Cittamatrā scripture. Indeed, in scriptures categorized as Yogācāra (or Cittamatrā), such 
as the Sandhinirmocanasūtra or the Madhyāntavibhāga and so forth, there is mention of three definite 
types of gotras leading to three different results, one uncertain gotra, and one class of beings being 
devoid of any spiritual propensity (agotra). In the scriptures counted among the Madhyamaka literature 
however, such as the Laṅkāvatārasūtra or the Madhyamakāvatāra and so forth, these statements are not 
taken literally.  Ultimately, there can be no difference between beings, as all are devoid of own-being. 
On the meaning of the term gotra according to the different philosophical see Seyfort Ruegg 1976, as 
well as the first part of his Théorie (1969).  
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gzhan dang gzhan la mkhas pa dag || 
gang zhig yan lag gang shes pa || 
    de gzhan des zin351 med par ’gyur ||    (I.88) 
 
des na ’di la khyed kun gyis || 
nga yi gzugs ni gyis shig ces || 
mnga’ bdag rgyal pos de dag la || 
    bka’ yis ras ni byin pa dang ||    (I.89) 
 
de nas de ni thos gyur te || 
ri mo’i las la rab sbyor ro || 
de la mngon par sbyor rnams las || 
    gcig cig yul gzhan song gyur na ||    (I.90) 
 
de ni yul gzhan song bas na || 
de ma tshang phyir ri mo de || 
yan lag thams cad yongs rdzogs par || 
    mi ’gyur bzhin zhes dper byas so ||    (I.91) 
 
Suppose there were variously skilled painters, 
those knowledgeable in one area  
unable to complete another [part]. 
 
Further, a mighty king gives them a cloth with the order: 
“On this [I order] a portrait of mine to be realised  
by all of you [together].” 
 
Having heard this [order] from him,  
they set out in their painting work. 
Among those applying themselves to this, 
one left alone for another country. 
 
Since this [painter] went to another country 
[the group] was incomplete,  
and therefore the painting was not completed in all of its parts. 
Thus the example is given. 
 
The cause for accomplishing the four excellences is the supreme knowledge realising 
emptiness endowed with all aspects of the means.352 This is demonstrated by means of 
the example of the painters.353 
                                                 
351 Nakamura (1967 : 111,19): des gzhan des ’dzin med par ’gyur ||. I followed Derge (58b3 and 105a4) 
in this case, since zin pa seems to be a better rendering for ava-√dhr̥ (“ascertain”, “understand”).  
352 Tib. thabs kyi rnam kun dang ldan pa’i stong nyid. The meaning of this is given in the commentary to 
the next verse.  
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Suppose there are many skilled painters, certain painters being particularly skilled in 
[painting] individually different [parts of the body such as] the head and so forth.  
Those who know [how to paint certain] parts [of the body, such as] the head and so 
forth, will certainly not finish [the drawing of] other parts, [for] they will not know 
[how to do it].  
Now, [suppose] the ruler of a land, the king, having given to those master painters a 
painting cloth, instructs them with these words: “All you master painters, complete a 
portrait of me, the king.” Then the painters, having heard this command of the king, 
individually set out to execute the task of painting whatever [the part of] the portrait354 
they knew [how to paint]. Among those engaged in painting this portrait, the one who 
knew [how to paint] the head left for another country. Then, since the artist skilled in 
painting the head was missing, the painting of the king’s portrait was not completed. 
This is the example given.  
 
de rnams ’dri byed gang dag yin || 
sbyin dang tshul khrims bzod la sogs || 
rnam pa kun gyi mchog ldan pa || 
 stong pa nyid ni gzugs su brjod ||    (I.92) 
 
Who are those painters? 
[They are] giving, discipline, patience, and so forth. 
Emptiness endowed with all supreme aspects355  
is said to be the form [of the king].  
 
What is illustrated by the artists painting the different parts [of the portrait]? 
[They stand for] giving, discipline, patience, [73] diligent effort, and so forth, [i.e.] all 
the means for accomplishing buddhahood.  
In this way, from supreme knowlegde which realises emptiness endowed with all 
supreme aspects of the means, [i.e.] giving and so forth, the excellence of every aspect 
gets accomplished. [Thus] a buddha’s excellences endowed with all sumpreme aspects 
of the excellences, [such as] the powers and so forth, are completed.  
                                                                                                                                                        
353 This illustration is taken from the Ratnacūḍasūtra (RCP). See Takasaki 1966: 263, n. 484. 
354 Lit.: painting. 
355 Tib. rnam pa kun gyi mchog ldan pa’i stong pa nyid; Skt. sarvākāravaropetā śūnyatā. Takasaki 
(1966: 264) “non-substantiality endowed with all sorts of excellences.”  
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Because on the level of buddhahood every single [pāramitā, such as] giving and so 
forth, is absolutely limitless, [they] are immeasurable. Because it is impossible to 
fathom [their] number and powers, [they] are inconceivable. Because of having 
cleared the imprints of [their] opposites, [i.e.] stinginess and so forth, they are the 
culmination of perfect purity.  
 
     2.2.8.2.2.4. The common properties of the inseparable excellences 
The fourth [subdivision] has two parts: (1) the general common properties and (2) the 
particular common properties.  
 
      2.2.8.2.2.4.1. General common properties  
In regard to the first [part]: 
shes rab ye shes rnam grol rnams || 
gsal dang ’phro dang dag phyir dang || 
tha dad med phyir ’od dang zer || 
    nyi ma’i dkyil ’khor rnams dang mtshungs ||    (I.93) 
 
Supreme knowledge, wisdom, and complete liberation are 
similar to the light, the rays, and the orb of the sun 
due to their clarity, radiance, and purity,  
and because they are indifferentiable.  
 
The three aspects of (1) the luminosity of the sun, (2) the radiance of [its] light rays, 
and (3) [its] purity, are possessed inseparably by the maṇḍala of the sun. They are like 
(1) supreme knowledge which knows [things] as they are, (2) the wisdom which 
knows [things] in their multiplicity, and (3) the purity of being completely liberated 
from that which is to be abandoned, because [these] three are possessed inseparably by 
the undefiled expanse.  
 
      2.2.8.2.2.4.2. Particular common properties  
In regard to the second [part]: 
des na sangs rgyas ma thob par || 
mya ngan ’das pa mi ’thob ste || 
’od dang ’od zer spangs nas ni || 
    nyi mab lta bar mi nus bzhin ||    (I.94) 
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Therefore, without the attainment of buddhahood, 
nirvāṇa is not attained; 
just as one will not be able to see the sun 
once the light and the light rays are removed. 
 
Knowing [things] as they are is similar to the luminosity of the sun,356 for it 
illuminates the way [things] are just as they are. Knowing [things] in their multiplicity 
is similar to the sun rays’ radiance, [74] for it radiates onto the appearance of the 
multiplicity [of things]. Complete liberation is similar to the pure light of the maṇḍala 
of the sun, for it is pure from the defilements of the two obscurations.  
                                                
 
2.2.8.3. Summary:357 
Therefore, as long as buddhahood––[i.e.] the realisation of a wisdom devoid of 
attachment and obstruction358––is not obtained, nirvāṇa––[i.e.] the abandonment which 
frees from all obscurations––will not be obtained [either], just as [one] will not be able 
to see the orb of the sun, after [its] light and light rays have been removed.  
For these [reasons] it is taught that there is no final nirvāṇa for śrāvakas and 
pratyekabuddhas. However, it is not taught that there is no mere passing beyond 
sorrow [for them]. 
 
2.3. Summary: 
The third [subdivision], the summary: 
de ltar rgyal ba’i snying po yi || 
rnam gzhag rnam pa bcu zhes brjod ||    (I.95[a])  
 
Thus has been expounded presentation of  
buddha-nature (jinagarbha)  in ten points. 
 
Thus, buddha-nature has been expounded by means of a presentation in ten points. 
This ends the teaching on the presentation in ten points.  
 
 
356 LS (73,6) and G (73,5) both read: nyi ma’i ’od gsal. K (122,17) has: nyi ma’i ’od zer gsal. 
357 K omits this whole passage. 
358 This phrase means it is a wisdom free from the two obscurations of mental afflictions and their 
imprints.  
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Appendix II - 
Zusammenfassung 
 
In meiner Diplomarbeit „Rong-ston über Buddha-Natur: ein Kommentar zum vierten 
Kapitel des Ratnagotravibhāga (v. I.27–95[a])“, geht es vornehmlich um die 
Darstellung der Interpretation eines wichtigen tibetischen buddhistischen Gelehrten 
aus dem 14/15 Jh. einer philosophischen Abhandlung aus Indien, die auf das 5 Jh. 
n.u.Z. zurückdatiert wird. Das Thema dieser Abhandlung, dem Ratnagotravibhāga, ist 
die Buddha-Natur (Skt. tathāgatagarbha; Tib. de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po). Sie 
stellt, je nach Interpretation, entweder das grundlegende Potenzial der Lebewesen zur 
Erleuchtung dar, oder aber deren grundsätzlich bereits erleuchtete, jedoch von 
abtrennbaren geistigen Befleckungen verdeckte, Natur. Dieses Konzept wurde zu 
einem zentralen Thema in der Entwicklung der Mahāyāna Tradition und zum 
Gegenstand zahlreicher philosophischen Debatten, besonders in Tibet.  
Im ersten Teil meiner Arbeit gehe ich auf die ideengeschichtliche Entwicklung dieses 
Konzeptes ein, indem ich dem Leser, nach einem kurzen Überblick, die kanonischen 
Quellen, die zur Formulierung dieser Idee beitrugen, vorstelle.  
Der zweite Abschnitt behandelt den Ratnagotravibhāga als wichtigstes Werk der 
indischen Kommentarliteratur zu diesem Thema. Hier wird auf textgeschichtliche 
Fragen eingegangen, sowie auf die Frage der Autorenschaft. Des Weiteren behandelt 
dieser Abschnitt auch die Rezeption dieses Werkes in Indien und Tibet. Abschließend 
gebe ich auch einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Etappen der modernen 
wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Thematik 
Das dritte Kapitel bezieht sich auf den Autor des von mir behandelten Kommentars. 
Zunächst stelle ich kurz das Leben und Werk von Rong-ston Shes-bya kun-rig (1367–
1449) dar und gehe danach auf dessen Darstellung des Themas Buddha-Natur ein. 
Dieser Abschnitt ist eine systematische Studie des zentralen Teils seines Kommentars 
und vergleicht seinen Standpunkt mit denen anderer tibetischer Philosophen.  
Der vierten und letzte Teil meiner Arbeit besteht aus einer annotierten Übersetzung 
von Rong-stons Kommentar zum vierten Kapitel des Ratnagotravibhāga 
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Den Abschluss der Arbeit stellen die aus Primär- und Sekundärliteratur bestehende 
Bibliographie, sowie drei Anhänge dar. Diese bestehen aus (I) einem detaillierten 
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Tib. sa bcad) des übersetzten Kommentars, (II) der deutschen 
Zusammenfassung der Arbeit und dem Lebenslauf des Verfassers, und (III) einer 
Faksimile Reproduktion des tibetischen Originals. 
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